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INTRODUCTION
This book is dedicated to Piet Strydom who has been the most
inspirational and outstanding teacher within the social sciences at
University College Cork for more than 30 years. He arrived in Cork
by chance in 1976, even if his leaving of his native South Africa was
a deeply considered decision. He and his wife Sunette were forced
to leave their home because of their conscientious opposition to
the apartheid regime. Their solidaristic commitment to their fellow
South Africans separated them from everyone they loved – family,
friends and colleagues. As ethical émigrés they were embarking on a
very uncertain future. They arrived in Europe, first to Belgium and
then to Liverpool with no assured prospects. Through contacts with
a friend, John O’Malley, they were given an introduction to the
Department of Philosophy at University College Cork. Later Piet
would migrate to the Department of Sociology his true intellectual
home.
From the beginning he carved a new reality for Sociology in
Cork. His engagement with the Frankfurt School of critical social
theory influenced not just his theory, but his practice as a teacher. As
a student of Piet Strydom’s you were ever mindful of the historical
legacy of the Frankfurt School to the development of social theory
and its commitments to justice and equality, but also of the price
paid by many of its early members for their adherence to the critical
perspective, having to flee from Nazi oppression. In a country that
was largely a late arrival to the world of the enlightenment, that had
only recently joined the then EEC and was struggling to shake off
the shackles of convention Piet Strydom was in a very real sense an
enlightenment figure. For over 30 years he has engaged his students
and colleagues in Cork in an intellectual journey that is ever fresh,
new and especially challenging. His research output has gathered
pace and importance in the second half of his time in Cork, bringing
an international community of researchers into contact with his
exceptional contribution to social theory. This book draws from
both of those communities and addresses many of the key theories,
concepts and insights of Piet Strydom’s critical social theory.
i
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xii CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
In his own chapter Piet Strydom examines cognitive frames,
which have been recognized as being integral ‘to the structuring
and patterning of social life’. He presents a detailed discussion on
knowledge, especially on how it has been framed and understood
in social theory. From this starting point he turns his focus more
to ‘the cognitive dimension – variously called categorical structures,
schemata, schemes or frames – which are to be found at the level of
both mutual lifeworld knowledge and situational common sense’.
Before pursuing his objective of analyzing cognitive frames, he
points out that cognitive sociology has a much wider remit taking in
a broader concern with communicative and discursive processes. He
delineates his discussion under a series of headings, beginning with
Pragmatic-Realist Constructivism. Here he discusses how practical
knowledge allows individuals to take part in social life in an intuitive
or taken for granted way, which is described by Husserl and Schutz
as the Lebenswelt.
In Habermas’ terms these are ‘deep-seated structures of the
lifeworld’ presenting in linguistic and communicatively transmitted
and linguistically organized cultural forms. He explores these tran-
scendental structures, particularly cognitive frames, through various
understandings including Schultz’s ‘schemes of experience’, Kant’s
‘schemes of imagination’ and Habermas’ insistence on distinctions
between weak and strong transcendental interpretations. He unfolds
an engaging analysis which highlights that these cognitive frames,
while presuppositional, are not reducible to empirical facts nor
do they ‘possess universality and necessity’ in a Kantian sense. This
leads to questions about what is real and ‘what is selectively revealed
by our cognitive structures’.
He rehearses some important constructivist debates emerging
from Gamson, Habermas and a range of other orientations. Pointing
out a broad acceptance that ‘language use and communicative action
have a biological or evolutionary root’, while emphasizing the
necessity of placing these in the category of ‘weak naturalistic’. This
approach allows for the acceptance of ‘a certain universality and
necessity’ in our understanding of the world, while also discounting
a ‘strong naturalistic’ approach which would suggest it is part of the
genetic inheritance of Homo sapiens.
In practice, social actors can draw upon ‘all-pervasive back-
ground understanding’ except where there is some contention or
breakdown about this understanding. This produces what Strydom
describes as ‘critical discourse moments’, which are public commu-
nicative contestations between individual frames of understanding.
This leads to ‘a more or less successful learning process’ variously
i
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INTRODUCTION xiii
described as ‘an emergent synthesis’ (Mannheim), ‘metascheme’
(Schutz) or ‘masterframe’ (Eder).
What are cognitive struggles? They are about the ‘discursive
construction of reality’. Strydom places them at two levels; the
macro or external level of commonly shared cultural structures: and
the micro or internal level of constructing individual actor frames.
While he also points out the milieu in which they unfold at the
interchange of frames and the development of coordinating master
frames. All of which is swimming, as it were, in ‘the whole spectrum
of cognitive phenomena’.
He presents a review and critique of a range of social theoretical
approaches to cognitive structures. Included here are Mannheim,
Schutz, through to Berger and Luckmann, Garfinkel and Cicourel.
He then deals with Goffman’s frame analysis. Indicating his advances
beyond ethnomethodology and his presentation of ‘primary frame-
works’ with two general classes of ‘natural’ and ‘social’ frameworks.
Goffman focused on individual experiences and developed a theory
of the transition of meaning from primary to secondary frameworks,
where a new or different meaning is acquired for something already
understood in a previous context. The discussion then picks up on
Habermas’ approach commencing with his theory of communicative
action. Central to his approach ‘are discursive processes whereby
cognitive structures and cultural models are activated. . . and recon-
stituted and reshaped’, but for Strydom it lacks ‘a reflective treatment
of the cognitive structuration of discursive processes’. He identifies
in Bourdieu’s work ‘an acute understanding of cognitive structures’,
which ‘are historically constituted and acquired categories’ that help
actors make sense of the world. While these are available to all
competent actors, they are subject to different interpretations and
thus become contested between ‘social groupings and classes’. He
contrasts Bourdieu’s ‘anthropological-sociological’ approach to that
of Touraine who takes ‘a more historically specific, epochal, societal,
political-sociological approach’.
His review of the various contributions suggests that while
it is rich in diversity it is unsystematic, thus prompting him to
bring coherence through a ‘cognitivist communication and discourse
theory of society’. He presents a typology, the first dimension of
which is the macro-level cognitively important frame, which emerges
through evolutionary process. It is that toolkit of basic structural
forms that allows actors experience and understand both the social
and natural world and is variously described by Schutz, Mannheim,
Bourdieu and Goffman.
The second dimension at the macro-level is about ‘culturally
i
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xiv CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
available cognitive structures under modern conditions’. He ad-
dresses this in the context of the structure of modern social relations
typified by a ‘liberal-egalitarian-discursive frame’ extending in late-
modernity to encapsulate ‘society and nature’. This new paradigm
of a ‘macro level frame or categorical scaffolding’ necessary for
the contemporary era is traced from Goffman through Habermas
and Touraine. He contextualizes this around the three frames –
rights, justice and responsibility–from his own work that reflect the
historical significance of frames at a macro level.
At the micro level cognitive frames are ‘a stock of knowledge
at hand or. . . a toolkit’ which help actors perform in a wide range
of social situations. Using Eder’s ‘empirical or objective, moral or
normative, and aesthetic or conative framing devices’ he illuminates
how social actors can construct collective (actor, identity, action)
frames and also highlights some theoretical disagreement about
these ‘meso level frames’.
He develops an explanation of how cognitive structures emerge
and play out within social life. He emphasizes that this occurs in
the milieu of ‘communication and discourse’. When a problematic
episode emerges, within a modernity cultural frame, a social ac-
tor selects framing devices that help establish ‘a publicly relevant
identity’ which interacts with others in public. What emerges is a
sort of competitive network involving the individual frames, which
eventually settles into a synthesis derived from the winning aspects
of the various frames. This is not a steady state per se but ‘a tempo-
rary, unstable, relative, practical synthesis’. He terms this phase as a
master frame, which is a ‘temporary, power-drenched, normatively
sanctioned, practical synthesis’. He draws a distinction between it
and a macro frame, which is more foundational in nature represent-
ing ‘all-pervasive, virtually unchangeable, common, context-setting
cultural and modernity framework’.
He introduces his concept of ‘triple contingency’ into the discus-
sion, emphasizing why it is necessary to move beyond the concept
of ‘double contingency’ in the context of ‘a communicating soci-
ety’. In this discussion he runs through the inherent weaknesses of
double contingency as presented by Parsons, Habermas and Luh-
mann. With triple contingency social reality is not constituted in
a dyadic relationship, but includes a third perspective that ‘repre-
sents society’. Triple contingency recognizes the dynamic role of the
public in identifying, defining and resolving problems. It recognizes
an increasing reflexive and discursively oriented ‘cultural macro
frame’. It reflects the changing nature of many social actors who
exhibit an increasing sophistication in terms of recognition and use
i
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INTRODUCTION xv
of ‘cognitive structures and cultural models’. Most significantly it
recognizes the capacity of the public to ‘observe, appreciate and
evaluate’ cognitive structures and cultural models and thus shape
choices towards the selection of ‘a collectively valid master frame’.
Catherine Brennan examines the meaning of responsibility in
the twenty-first century, cast in the light of theoretical discussions
emerging from Ricoeur, Jonas and Apel. She outlines the scale of risk
that in Apel’s words threatens the ‘life space of all living creatures
on earth’. Human exploitation of the planet is creating a context of
‘global, universal and irreversible risks’ as the ecosphere, shared by
all planetary life, is being put under unsustainable strain.
She rehearses some of the most profound questions facing hu-
manity as technological capacity moves us ever closer to ‘turning
human beings into artifacts’, with the possible consequence of erod-
ing ‘a common human ontology’. This is an area still open to wide
speculation, but there is already active theorizing around possible
‘post-human’ scenarios demanding perhaps a new generation of
philosophical concepts to even address them.
She expresses a deep concern for the ‘autarchic’ nature of con-
temporary technology: ‘the self-accelerating yet purposeless ten-
dency of organized action propelled forward. . . and freed from
control by moral impulse’. Her discussion raises a series of key soci-
etal issues emerging from current and future science and technology
advances.
She speaks of ‘techno science’ which is the ‘fusion of scientific
and technological activities’ manifested in the conversion of scientific
discoveries into both military and commercial applications. She
introduces the notion of ‘distance technology’ which gives rise to
‘adiaphorization’ or the stripping of a causal or moral link between
technological processes and their impacts. Distancing cause and
effect creates a nebulous connection to responsibility, Bauman’s
‘floated responsibility’ in which it is difficult to ascribe cause and
therefore problematic to locate responsibility. Her discussion leads
her to propose responsibility as the ‘ethical category’ necessary in
this context. She builds her approach, to what responsibility might
mean in the contemporary world, around a series of key theorists.
Her discussion on responsibility and especially her insistence
that we have to look at it prospectively rather than retrospectively is
enlightening. The ethics of responsibility she calls for emerge from
our vulnerability and it is a shared sense of fragility that helps us
appreciate a need for a global responsibility not just for ourselves
but also for all other living things. She points out too that a future
oriented responsibility is not reciprocal.
i
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xvi CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
She considers Hans Jonas’ concept of responsibility and lays
emphasis particularly on his idea of ‘value’. Value in these terms
is about recognizing that all being is both a good and an end
in itself. Value then is neither peculiar to humans nor a human
construct per se. By understanding responsibility in terms of value
it is emancipated from dependency on either subjective or relativist
definitions. While ‘purposive existence’ is part of all living things
humans alone have the ability to both set and achieve their own
ends. Humans are alone too in having ‘special dignity as moral
agents’, in being able to ‘appreciate the value which other living
beings place on their own being’.
She deviates from Jonas in adopting what she describes as ‘a
moderate, non-deterministic essentialism’. However, she reiterates
the point that it is the ‘intrinsic fragility’ and vulnerability of
any being of value that makes responsibility concrete and gives
rise to ‘an ethic of collective responsibility’. She turns to Karl-
Otto Apel to overcome deficiencies in Jonas’ ethics of collective
responsibility. Apel advocates moving beyond Kantian principles of
universality and reciprocity when establishing a future oriented co-
responsibility. He uses discourse theory to ground his justification,
which is neo-Kantian in recognizing ‘universalized reciprocity’, but
is achieved with reference to rational argument. For in the principles
of discourse there is both an a priori recognition of the equality of all
individuals and a means through which norms may be validated ‘with
the consent of all those affected’ (Habermas: 1992). As Brennan puts
it those seriously engaged in discursive debate ‘presuppose that real
life problems. . . can only be dealt with responsibly by reasonable
argument’.
She presents three dimensions that need to be drawn out more
systematically in order to develop ‘an ethic of co-operative respon-
sibility practiced and organized discursively’, these are embodiment,
emotions and imagination. In the first of these she underlines the ne-
cessity to revisit ‘bio-bodily existence and vulnerability’ in order to
answer the question why ought human beings exercise co-operative
responsibility, which is not addressed satisfactorily by Apel. She
proposes that it is our vulnerability as beings not our rationality that
disposes us to being moral subjects. Fragility she points out does not
arise through argument but because of our biological existence.
She criticizes both Apel and Habermas for having ‘a rationalist
prejudice’ and thus underplaying the significance of emotions ‘in
gaining access to the domain of the moral’. She develops this
discussion making connections to a recognition of the importance
of the emotions in Habermas, Apel and Jonas, but leaving a sense
i
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that this avenue has not been nearly explored to the extent it ought.
The third dimension concerns moral imagination, which is be-
coming increasingly important as humans are sanitized both spatially
and temporally from the consequences of their actions through ad-
vances in technology. She advocates a leap in moral imagination
beyond ‘an ideal speech’ scenario involving ‘all linguistically compe-
tent humans’. Included in this moral community would be ‘all living
beings, even if all these forms of life are not of equal moral worth’.
In the closing section of the chapter Brennan raises important
questions regarding how as humans we might act in a responsible
way vis-a-vis those ‘not capable of speaking in the reasoning public
sphere’. Here she includes not just other animal and plant life, but
future generations of humans and ultimately inorganic nature. She
proposes an advocatory solution, but this leaves open a number
of issues that need to be addressed including a tendency among
humans as the only participants in ‘practical discourse’ to take an
anthropocentric orientation, the value placed on different beings
and things, conflicts between the needs of different beings and
things (for instance beings that might be harmful to humans).
Towards the end of his chapter Pat O’Mahony highlights the
central importance of Strydom’s work in ‘exploring the relation
between macro-ethical learning processes and institutionalized prac-
tical rationality’. The challenge is for society to understand its own
learning processes and in turn see how these might lead to ‘advances
in practical reason’. These can justifiably be seen as fundamental
questions for our time and may demand greater public attention in
the coming decades than they have in the past. For that contribution
alone Strydom deserves a greater recognition within critical social
theory and in the wider public sphere.
In addressing sociological learning theory O’Mahony sets out
by at once highlighting the existence of a rich tradition of learning
theory within sociology and simultaneously indicating its lack of
visibility and indeed a poorly formed appreciation of its complexity.
He then introduces Strydom’s contribution to developing this field.
Initially he drew on and critiqued Habermas, taking a line closer to
that of Miller and Eder, this acts as a foundation for his later work
on cognitive sociology.
He sets out his analysis of Strydom’s contribution in three waves.
The first is based on Strydom’s ‘constructivist inspired reassessment
of reconstructivism’, his ‘move from moral development to the social
evolution of practical reason’ and his ‘shift in emphasis from double
to triple contingency’. His second appraises Strydom’s cognitive
sociology. The third looks at his cognitive sociological framing of
i
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xviii CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
collective learning within a democratic public sphere
He identifies a shift in emphasis in Strydom’s work from the
1980s which orients it towards ‘the development of a social prag-
matic framework’. This new direction leans towards a normative
approach which carries social theory’s evolutionary theory forward
and simultaneously keeps alive the realization of ‘non-linear dynam-
ics of a contingent, emerging world’. He places Strydom’s work
beside that of Habermas, highlighting both areas of convergence,
but also clear divergence. He presents an overview of the origins
and dynamics of reconstructivism in philosophy and social theory.
He then discusses Strydom’s critique of constructivism, pointing
out that in his earlier work he already saw it as ‘over-anticipating
and hence subsuming social practices’. Strydom’s theory would seek
to move beyond these limitations leading him to constructivism
‘that would have communicative practices in social situations as
its generative core’. For O’Mahony this is a ‘decisively sociological
orientation’ that moves beyond Habermas’ ‘individual and inter-
subjective model’ and is subsequently enhanced through Strydom’s
theoretical attention to frame analysis.
Strydom’s development of theories of learning, which are crit-
ical of Habermas’ emphasis on the individual, recognize collective
learning. His theory is grounded in recognition of the potentialities
of collective action and communication. He highlights an impor-
tant nuance in Strydom’s theorizing which ‘decouples learning from
practice’ that allows for recognition of collective learning but does
not suggest that it inevitably leads to new social practices. What this
highlights are the ‘socio-cognitive potentials’ of collective learning
through the creation of ‘a fund of collective utilizable knowledge’,
which may or may not be taken up in practice. These insights
pushed Strydom to develop his theory of triple contingency in the
1990s, this, as discussed elsewhere in this book, was a significant ad-
vance on the concept of double contingency associated with Parsons,
Habermas and indeed Luhmann.
O’Mahony points out that one of the key insights provided
by this model is that ‘triple contingency permeates all democratic
communication’, thus the public is central to political legitimation.
He goes on to counterpose this with Habermas’ continued use of
‘double contingency’. This leads to a series of unresolved issues in-
cluding a lack of recognition of ‘different subject positions amongst
the public’, which lead to further problems down the line. Triple
contingency is an inevitable outcome of Strydom’s strong ‘construc-
tivist and collectivist emphasis’. It gives a deeper understanding and
more sophisticated range of possibilities for how we conceive the
i
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INTRODUCTION xix
public and the public sphere, but it also opens up a range of possibil-
ities for the development of sociological theory, which O’Mahony
enumerates.
In terms of Strydom’s cognitive turn, he sees this emerging from a
critique of Habermas’ normative assumptions that do not distinguish
between ‘instituted norms and cognitive rules’. Cognitive rules are
the ‘means, devices or tools for categorizing, classifying and order-
ing the world’. There are two theoretical implications of this. Firstly,
that norms are continuously negotiable and reflexive and secondly
that normative innovation is a collective cognitive process, which
in turn has both discursive and substantive implications. Strydom’s
triple contingency and cognitive structures challenge Habermas’
concept of deliberation as ‘self-organizing and self-contained’. Stry-
dom’s approach emphasizes the procedural and contextual aspect
of deliberation. It is part of a wider discursive context playing out
in multiple arenas and social contexts. O’Mahony suggests that ‘ex-
isting forms of deliberation’ fail at a ‘basic normative-procedural’
level and are buffeted by a storm of non-deliberative externalities
and cognitive and pragmatic forces. Yet new opportunities and mod-
els for public deliberation are necessary to revitalize civil society.
Strydom diverges from Habermas in emphasizing ‘the openness and
variability of both the mechanisms and dynamics of discourse’.
O’Mahony highlights the significance of Strydom and others
pursuing theories of collective learning and evolutionary practical
rationality on the direction of critical social theory, pointing it
towards a more sociological bent and away from the psychological
and individual orientation of Habermas. He completes his discussion
on cognitive structures by making three points. Firstly, discursive
processes are both the product of cognitive structures and help shape
them by extending and interacting with them. Secondly, learning
processes operate both in the medium of cognitive structures and
in shaping them. His third point is that ‘macro-ethical cognitive
structures’ are essential to the formation and effectiveness ‘of the
ethical and moral norms essential to social integration’.
O’Mahony addresses Strydom’s contribution to the advancing
of sociological theory and research into public culture and the
public sphere and in turn links it to his own work in this area.
He addresses this from three perspectives, firstly vis-a-vis social
order in which he engages in a dialogue with Luhmann’s systems
theory. Then he engages it with ‘a cognitively sustained normative
pragmatic’ approach addressed but not taken to conclusion by
Habermas. He carries forward the discussion in relation to Eder’s
work and especially his ‘narrative construction of the social bond’
i
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xx CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
within identity communities being essential for a public sphere. He
presents a discussion on the cognitive structure of the public sphere,
which he illustrates diagrammatically. In this he draws out the three
symbolic codings: functional, ascriptive identity and normative –
and highlights the gravitational pull of each within the domains
of the state, the system, civil society and the lifeworld. He argues
that macro-ethical cognitive structures emerge in conditions where
autonomy has been achieved and have to be defended against
functional and non-normative logics. He follows with a discussion
on what he terms the cognitive circuit of communication. Collective
learning he concludes is a process of cognitive structure building,
which sometimes leads to the emergence of successful symbolic
structures, examples of which are at the normative level a macro-
ethics of responsibility and in identity the emergence of nation states
from the nineteenth century.
Klaus Eder addresses what are often presented as two poles in
a continuum represented on one side by ‘Habermasian discourse
theory’ and on the other by the economic rational choice model
emerging from ‘the non-Kantian English philosophical Enlighten-
ment tradition’. He presents a theoretical ‘third way’ to approach
the discourse–market debate which both pushes us beyond a di-
chotomous analysis and contextualizes it around what he terms ‘the
narrative bond’. Narrative bonds are socially acquired frames or
rules for social interaction, that allow individuals navigate a contin-
gent social world, these frames can in turn be ‘resistant to arguments
[discourse] or to real interests [rational choice]’.
He makes the bold statement that: ‘Living with stories is the
constitutive moment of social bonds’. Here he grounds everyday
social interactions in a real world, this is not a process in which
actors are compelled towards making rational choices or towards
reaching consensus. Instead actors drive towards reaching ‘a shared
interpretation’, in doing so they store narratives of successful and
unsuccessful attempts at shared interpretation.
Narrative bonds are essential for people to make sense of the
world. Traditionally these are ‘resistant against empirical evidence
as well as moral arguments’. Markets and discourse provide distance
from these types of narrative bonds by allowing for ‘freedom’ and
‘reflexivity’, yet they too must follow a narrative in order to maintain
necessary social bonds.
He proposes the concept of an ‘undifferentiated sphere’ which
is neither rational (utilitarian/game-theoretic) nor communicative
(deontological/Kantian). This pushes him to recognize the necessity
for a ‘theory of situational accounts’, which can explain the emer-
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gence of both markets and discourse as special situations that have
socially evolved. What he is driving towards is a way in which we
can understand a range of interaction situations from everyday life
to markets and discourse as narrative networks.
From this perspective it is not a case of primacy for either
rational choice or discourse, but rather recognition that they can
be understood as functionally specific modes of communication.
Thus they are not the key to understanding how social relations are
organized, but are specific narrative networks which have evolved
from everyday narrative networks. Arguing that social relations are
mediated by stories reminds us of the basic stuff out of which human
communication is made.
In his chapter Gerard Delanty searches for a cosmopolitan global
ethics, which avoids the pitfall of being a ‘false universalism’ or
western worldview. He defines global ethics as ‘non-foundational’,
it is not a code like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and it operates at a procedural level on ‘common ways of dealing
with problems rather than an appeal to an underlying consensus’.
Global ethics arise in the context of a cosmopolitan community;
it is in a limited universalistic context rather than universal and
is based on communicative rationality. It is articulated at the level
of ‘individual identities to global protest movements and inter-
governmental policy-making as well as forms of consumption.’
He dismisses the claims of a series of approaches to global ethics,
settling on Apel and Habermas constructs as providing the most
promising prospects. Global ethics are ‘post-universal ethics’, are
more cognizant of context, against the notion of attempting to
universalize the particular. He proposes that the context in which
we can understand global ethics is the public sphere rather than
specific actors. The complexity of the task he undertakes is clear
from a set of four preliminary questions he poses to tease out
precisely what global ethics might mean. He steers away from
modern deontological ethics, but does not jettison their essential
core; instead he proposes ‘a certain relativization of universalism’.
In order to contextualize global ethics he directly challenges
conceptions of civilizations that either suggest they are coherent
wholes or that they are primordial in nature. He dismisses the
idea that civilizations are ‘closed systems locked in conflict with
each other’. Instead the nature of inter-civilizational encounters
include mutually transformative dynamics. They do not meet each
other like tectonic plates, but are far more open and internally
diverse than many theorists (especially on the right) have allowed.
This analysis gives the task of searching for a global ethics a very
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different orientation. It is not about ‘global values’ per se but about
a communicative process on how we see the world.
Neither communitarians (Walzer) nor liberals (Rawls) satisfacto-
rily address the concept of global ethics. Walzer seeks after a ‘thick’
ethics and Rawls pursues a common ground for global ethics, but
does not sufficiently challenge current ethical assumptions nor allow
for global culture. Delanty finds some positive aspects to universal
cultural values approaches, highlighting the work of Bok and Kung
in particular. The key failure of these approaches is that they assume
that ‘a global ethics already exists within the cultural traditions of
different civilizations or ethnic groups’ and that what is required
is a recognition for these and mutual understanding. Collective re-
sponsibility as a starting point suffers from being too closely justified
by necessity and remaining too close to Kantian universalism of the
categorical imperative.
He identifies a more sustainable approach to global ethics in
the work of Apel and Habermas. Apel’s is based on discourse and
has four key features that recommend it. Firstly it is ‘an anti-
foundational ethics’, that is, it does not rely on any pre-existing
moral framework. It emerges through communication or discourse
and is thus free from national or context specific constraints (the
particular). It is not tied to ‘specific cultural worldviews’. Finally it
is procedural rather than substantive. Habermas and Apel diverge
in that Apel conceives global ethics as legal instruments, while
Habermas envisages a discourse that ‘can never be concluded’.
Underlying this understanding of global ethics are three pillars:
open debate; a global public sphere; and socio-cognitive evolution.
Delanty includes two important observations, first that Apel already
sees the emergence of a ‘ “second order” globalization’ and the
second is an open question on whether there is still a latent western
centric understanding within Habermas’ approach.
Louise Ryan renews a debate about the gendered dynamics of
social movements theories. She traces the discussion from Smelser’s
depiction of collective action as usually being spontaneous and lead-
ing to ‘irrational and abnormal behaviour’ through to the Resource
Mobilization Theorists and the later Political Process Theorists that
recognize the ‘rational’ aspect of social movements. She mines
deeper into these theoretical approaches to point out that they do
not pick up on the ‘emotions in social movements’ (Gould) and that
they are essentially framed in ‘an image of masculine rationality’
(Charles).
She develops an incisive critique of New Social Movement theory.
She finds particular objection to a shorthand analysis which counter
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poses nineteenth and early twentieth century social movements with
new social movements on the basis of a temporal critique that she
believes does not hold true in all cases. She poses three central
critiques to New Social Movement theory. Firstly, she believes the
descriptors of new social movements are too narrow in representing
them as being primarily ‘post-materialist’ in nature. This she points
out is empirically invalid as many new social movements in fact
address ‘old’ materialist issues like global poverty and debt, while
the ‘women’s movements continue to campaign around material
issues such as reproductive health, welfare and safety’. Her second
objection centres around generalized assumptions about ‘old’ social
movements. These include descriptions of them having ‘dominant
and centralized leadership structures’, which may be true of some
but not all social movements of the time. With specific reference
to the women’s suffrage movement she argues that they were
not just concerned with materialist issues, but campaigned around
identity concerns, while ‘new’ women’s movements still campaign
about some materialist issues. In short, she argues that there are
greater continuities between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movements than
is allowed within much of the literature. Her third area of objection
revolves around the lack of recognition of gender as an issue even
within the ‘identity-oriented school of social movement theory’.
A critical aspect of Ryan’s analysis is to demonstrate a level
of continuity within the women’s movement from the first to the
second waves, that gap is bridged through the use of Taylor’s
‘movement in abeyance’ construct. This has specific importance in
terms of how the women’s movement can be understood, especially
in eliminating misconceptions about the nature of the movement,
but it has wider application too in understanding the nature of
all social movements. She adopts Strydom’s ‘synthetic approach’ to
argue against a construction of social movements either within a
linear framework or a cyclical one. The synthetic approach allows
her to pick up a more nuanced and complex understanding of the
suffrage movement and break down the dichotomous analysis of old
and new social movement.
Her analysis captures a wider spectrum of social movements, it
gives a more complete picture of the social and political context
than much previous analysis that focused on ‘main social movement
and the dominant elite’ and gives a more sophisticated account of
continuity within social movements. Her examination of the first
wave feminist movement provides clear evidence of a more complex
agenda than is presumed in much new social movement theory.
Here she counts contestation around identity, the public-private
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dichotomy, male defined morality, laws and practices, prevailing
social structures and an internationalization of the movement in a
manner often reserved for descriptions of new social movements.
She describes the Irish suffrage movement as ‘fairly non-hierarchical’
with a ‘fluid and flexible’ membership. It also articulated a very wide
range of campaigns and not merely ones about suffrage and political
representation.
In her opening remarks Tracey Skillington reiterates critical so-
cial theory’s dual orientation of both attempting to understand the
world and also to engage in the struggle for justice and equality.
It inherits from Marx this orientation towards a praxis, which has
the social actor at its centre. She traces the origins of this commit-
ment through first generation figures like Adorno, Horkheimer and
Marcuse up through Habermas and on to the critical theory of Piet
Strydom. She sees evidence of this orientation in his work through
his push towards ‘a politics of inter-subjectivity’, in which the public
is ever present within contemporary communication processes. This
is an evolution from Habermas’ theory of communicative action,
which understands the production of knowledge as a communicative
process. In their ordinary lives people communicate using language,
which is about reaching common understandings, but it can also
through discursive processes take on a political role. At this level
they are engaged in trying to ‘realize modernity’s unaccomplished
emancipatory potential’.
She uses Habermas’ concept of lived crisis, which relates to the
individual’s ‘feelings of exploitation, injustice, resentment, insult’
which are initially experienced at an individual level, but through
communication can be shared socially. Skillington explores this rela-
tionship in Legitimation Crisis (1976) in which Habermas explains
how the individual’s experience of ‘lived crisis’ is a socially sig-
nificant pre-condition to practices of social learning. ‘Lived crisis’
here signals the emergence of feelings of exploitation, injustice,
resentment, insult within the lifeworld of individuals, and can be
distinguished from ‘systemic crisis’ which relates to a malfunction-
ing of objective contexts of relations, such as economic relations
(Benhabib, 1984).
She highlights, referring to Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis, an
inherent incongruity between an administrative system ‘geared to-
wards the impersonal demands of the market and capitalist growth’
and the social demands emanating from the lifeworld. She contex-
tualizes this theoretical discussion in the everyday lived experiences
of people with reference to the Irish health service. She applies this
in the context of a push to increasingly marketize the health service
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through adopting policies around ‘a drive for efficiency, effective-
ness and value for money’. Public dissatisfaction with the health
service, arising from the lifeworld, is shaped by ‘cognitive learning,
where citizens’ direct perceptions and experiences of institutional
inefficiency and neglect are collectively shared’. She lists a series
of issues that have been prominently debated in the Irish media to
illustrate this point.
Through pursuing a new set of policies deriving from what
she calls the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ the Irish government is
changing the ethos and objectives of the health service. Within
this she highlights an unresolved dichotomy. On one side is the
administrative system focused on an instrumental rationality, which
she aptly describes as ‘irrational rationality’, around delivering the
sort of system-defined efficiencies described above. However, this
leaves a dilemma where it cannot achieve legitimacy as ‘cognitive
awareness of crisis and neglect provides vital counterfactual evidence
to contradict the justifications’. This shift in emphasis from one based
on citizen rights and public service to one based on market criteria
is profound. The consequences she points out are both in terms of
increased risk and in many cases poorer service and also in terms
of the meaning of civil society. At play in the latter context is the
transformation of ‘citizens to market players, recognizing them only
as consumers’. This has elicited a counter drive to reassert citizens’
rights to ‘equality, justice and fairness’. This ground-up movement
is forcing the debate away from being merely economic to also
encompass a wider social and political frame, which sets out as an
articulation of dissatisfaction about either specific (lived crisis) or a
general crisis in healthcare up to the rights of citizens.
This reaction to a set of negative personal experiences leads to
a collective alternative understanding of the health service–‘a prog-
nostic framing’. This perspective articulates the need for ‘equity and
respect for the sick and the vulnerable’, in other words for a ‘more
communicative rationality’ in place of the instrumental rationality
espoused by a neo-liberal approach. In an excellent portrayal of
what is at issue she underlines the cultural significance of the hope
for health and longevity which is counterposed by an economic
and system driven rationality, which presents as a denial of that
hope, and is interpreted as ‘a powerful blow to individual dignity’.
It is perhaps ironic that in terms of exercizing their ‘citizenship
entitlements to equity’ actors have to resort to the courts as the
administrative system can ‘survive without fundamentally address-
ing the problems’. With reference to Strydom she classifies this as
a pathogenesis, which has been sustained because of an absence
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of ‘a participatory politics of conflict’, but she sees indicators that
disenchantment with the health service may be leading to ‘a degree
of societal learning’ that may arrest this deficiency.
In his chapter Séamus Ó Tuama addresses the right to have
rights, borrowing a phrase from Arendt to frame a discussion on
rights in a posttraditional context. He discusses human rights at a
fundamental level, prior to law and bills of rights, at the human
level where all individuals require recognition, respect and dignity.
He contextualizes his discussion against a backdrop of major
advances of rights from national constitutions and rights provisions
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rolling out of
several other international conventions, treaties, courts and tribunals
on one side and on the other a continued disregard for rights in a
wide range of contexts. The essential point of his discussion is that
despite many advances ‘there is still no clear recognition that all
humans are truly equal’. He addresses this problem at two distinct
levels. The first is about ‘establishing a fundamental benchmark’
for rights, which he develops around the concepts of recognition,
respect and dignity. The second stage is about how the justifications
can be articulated and in this regard he looks to the communicative
contingency theories of double and triple contingency. In this he
identifies two basic tasks, firstly ‘a sustainable justification for human
rights’ and then ‘a genuinely universal realization of human rights’.
In terms of a universal realization of rights he points out that
while there may be legal definitions of rights in national and interna-
tional contexts this does not transfer into a uniform recognition of
those rights (including their denial by terrorists and criminals). With
reference to Honneth he takes the discussion to the private domain
where in practical terms many people are denied respect, dignity
and tangible recognition of their rights as humans. He broadens
out his account to indicate a range of contexts in which rights
are systematically denied and or curtailed by legislation or by the
categorization of human beings to label them such that they are
not afforded their full dignity, respect and rights. This brings us
back to the two basic contentions he sets out at the beginning; that
we still need to find irrefutable and defensible bases for humans to
have rights; and that we need to have means to enforce those rights
uniformly and universally.
He contends that the unfolding of human rights is not necessarily
an inevitably permissive one and that there are enough contrary
indicators that, at the least, we need to have stronger arguments
to defend them in all contexts. He delineates a series of boundary
mechanisms that are adopted in the developed world that place huge
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swathes of the world’s population beyond the pale of universality in
terms of rights. While we can witness advances in terms of formal
rights recognition, we are not approaching a situation where rights
are ‘universal, immutable and inalienable’.
He explores the neo-liberal perspective, with reference to Hayek
in particular, which delivers a logic that human rights are not
underpinned by a universal categorical grounding, but are regarded
as ‘utilitarian rather than essential’. In essence he sees two pressures
undermining the justification of rights. Firstly, in a posttraditional
context we can no longer call on ‘transcendental assumptions’ to
support rights. Secondly, an ideological push from neo-liberalism
frames formal rights as being ‘grounded in utility’.
In seeking a solution to this he reverts to seeking new groundings
for rights. Here he draws on the concepts of recognition, dignity
and respect, which he defines. Recognition is necessary both in
terms of our identity as humans and as citizens. It is about how
we understand the individual, how we understand the individual
as a social actor and ultimately how we understand both society
and a community in which rights are recognized. He teases out the
distinction between the concepts of dignity and respect and how
they relate to each other. Dignity he defines as that which marks us
as inherently human, it is ‘the commonality of the human experience
as opposed to the particularity of the individual’. Respect he defines
as ‘that which we owe to each other as humans, given our common
dignity’.
Taking the denial of respect–disrespect–as an empirical tool he
applies his discussion to human lived experiences. He draws out
the meaning, context and implications of disrespect with reference
to Miller, who suggests it manifests itself ‘predominantly in mun-
dane contexts’. He then looks at two US studies of disrespect and
recognition, Pritchard (1972) and Taslitz (2003), both in relation to
justice. In this discussion he states that dignity is ‘an innate quality
of being human’ and is a ‘fundamental catalyst’ for both the emer-
gence of rights and why they ought to be considered inalienable.
He explores this in relation to the denial of dignity as generating
a ‘pre-political moment’ prior to an appreciation of right per se,
referring to similar interpretations in Pritchard, Honneth and Lynd.
In an aside to the main theme, but related to denial of dignity,
he discusses surveillance in contemporary society emerging from a
variety of state, commercial, subversive and private sources. On the
discharge of justice he highlights issues around respect, exhibited
by failures regarding the ‘just and equal’ application of law vis-a-
vis individuals and certain population cohorts, especially minorities
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and other out groups in society. This underlines issues like police
profiling of certain populations. While in general terms Tyler and
Wakslak (2004) showed this to reflect negatively on the police there
are indications that in the Post-9/11 era it has gained some legiti-
macy in the fight against terrorism. They share with Honneth a view
that the recipients of disrespectful treatment by the police intuitively
recognize that something is inherently wrong in the exchange that is
a denial of recognition as humans of equal dignity. The concept of
recognition is then pursued in relation to the work particularly of
Honneth, who in turn draws heavily on Hegel’s categories of ‘love,
legal respect, and esteem’.
He places the discussion in ‘an action setting’. What this means
is that to pursue an individualized notion of the good life or self-
understanding one needs both formal and factual rights protection.
This introduces the concepts of double and triple contingency as the
context in which this can be acted out, a point he explores with ref-
erence to Honneth, Habermas and Thomas McCarthy. What follows
is an in depth discussion on double contingency as elaborated both
by Parsons and Luhmann. In elaborating on double contingency and
its limitations he also makes links to Strydom’s triple contingency.
He then refocuses the discussion back to recognition, dignity and
respect. Here he suggests that recognition emerging at the level
of double contingency leads to a recognition of individual rights
[mainly formal rights]; and that recognition emerging at the level
of triple contingency leads to a recogniton of ‘solidaristic rights’
[mainly factual rights]. The nature of rights ‘not as an individualized
contract, but. . . a common contract within a collectivity’ draws out
the significance of this distinction and highlights the role triple con-
tingency plays. Using a communicative logic rights are established as
being universal in the sense of applying to all and being fundamental
to the human condition (dignity) and inalienable and immutable as
all humans are due equal respect. This approach frees rights’ jus-
tification from western oriented universalistic arguments like those
underpinning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and many
bills of rights. Instead rights are justified in an ongoing communica-
tive process, that still recognizes them as fundamental, universal,
inalienable, and immutable, but does not circumscribe them in terms
ultimately derived from a western cosmological perspective.
In a short but interesting chapter Loet Leydesdorf discusses
both Luhmann’s model of double contingency and Strydom’s triple
contingency. He speculates on possible ways to mathematically
capture triple contingency.
Two chapters apply critical social theory to environmental issues.
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José Maurício Domingues and Andrea Coutinho Pontual look at
environmental responsibility and the public sphere in Latin America,
while Gerard Mullally takes Ireland as his case study.
Domingues and Pontual present an overview of the changing un-
derstandings of responsibility from a liberal individualistic concept
through to how ‘environmental responsibility spreads its ideals to
all sectors of society’, which is evidenced in the Bruntland Commis-
sion, through to the Rio Earth Summit and in the take up of the
idea of sustainable development. They then address the meaning of
the public sphere, here they draw on Habermas, but quickly expand
the understanding of public sphere beyond ‘an exclusive focus on
communication and the networks of collaboration’.
Their model of ‘real public spheres’ includes three key organising
dimensions: market; hierarchies and networks. Their wider framing
of the public sphere gives it a greater grounding and mirrors some
of the issues raised by Strydom, including his seminal work on triple
contingency, and Klaus Eder’s chapter in this book.
They show a transformation of the public sphere in Latin America
partially arising through external pressure to address environmental
issues, but from the 1980s also through the emergence of ‘endoge-
nous environmental social movements’. Environmental concerns
were articulated in the context of ‘socio-environmentalism’ – deal-
ing with both environment and inequality. In this revitalised public
sphere discourse around rights, justice and responsibility were to
the fore.
They point to some serious issues that hinder the proper func-
tioning of the public sphere. One arises through external support
for local NGOs, which ultimately compromise their effectiveness,
leading to ‘low internal public legitimacy’ and ‘stalling the develop-
ment of endogenous priorities’. The landscape is further distorted
through a perception that natural resources are plentiful. These per-
ceptions are played out against extensive poverty and the perceived
need for development to address this. This is further exacerbated by
a ‘neoliberal trade regime’ that prioritises economic growth often at
the expense of the environment.
They trace the development of environmentalism and environ-
mental politics in Brazil from the early 1970s through the fall of
the military regime on to the emergence of a new constitution in
1988. A raft of pro-environment legislative instruments, agencies
and constitutional provisions were created, partly in response to the
environmental movement and the later emergence of ‘Ecopolitics’.
They point to a high degree of success by the Brazalian environ-
mental movement in terms of impacting on policy, engaging with
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and participating in influential networks (including at governmental
level), increased professionalization, extending the environmental
movement to include previously excluded groups. However its ‘ca-
pacity for popular mobilization’ and ‘influence in the larger public
sphere have declined’. They suggest the environmental movement
at local level is ‘flawed in terms of efficacy and legitimacy’ and
highlight significant barriers to participation in the public sphere
by socially and educationally disadvantaged groups. They highlight
some serious crisis points in the Brazilian public sphere in rela-
tion to environmental issues. At national level there are ‘limits to
collective environmental responsibility, the national environmental
agency CONAMA ‘has lost much of its power’ and Congress is
not motivated to support environmental issues as ‘environmental
considerations’ carry very little weight in the electoral process. This
has resulted in serious environmental degradation at local level as
evidenced by massive deforestation in the Amazon region to facili-
tate soy cultivation. Overall Domingues and Pontual find that Brazil
exhibits a patchy commitment to environmental responsibility.
In the case of Mexico the initial environmental policies were
exogenously driven following the 1972 Stockholm conference. Key
issues around air pollution and specific challenges to ecosystems
dominated the early phase. This was followed by several reforms,
including an attempt to mobilise ‘a state controlled environmental
movement’ in 1984. However significant developments followed in
subsequent years. Domingues and Pontual raise serious questions
about the extent environmental responsibility in Mexico has been
taken up in the public sphere. At governmental level there have been
efforts at cooption and neutralization of environmental movements
and discourse, and to use environmental rhetoric to ‘bypass conflicts
and legitimize’ its own position, without implementing significant
environmental reform.
The Venezuelan case is very interesting as environmental con-
cerns are constitutionally enshrined, but not copper fastened in law.
This has facilitated the development of an active environmental
movement, but does not have sufficient legal force. A proposed elec-
trical connector between Venezuela and Brazil exposes the strengths
and weaknesses of the model. On one side environmentalists empha-
size ‘ecological and participatory dimensions’ while the government
favours economic growth and consultation. They pose very serious
questions about how ‘a stronger public sphere’ might be able to
address the clear contradictions that the Venezuelan case exposes.
They point out that the very term ‘sustainable development’ in a
Latin American context has emotive echoes emerging from its two
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poles of sustainability and development.
Gerard Mullally builds his analysis off four pillars, the first
of which is a discussion on responsibility, which tracks through
Strydom’s conceptualization of responsibility, and especially his ap-
plication of co-responsibility to sustainable development. It also
points to the emergence of reflexivity, which he discusses in terms
of first and second order reflexivity. First order reflexivity enables
the emergence of the concept sustainable development as it allows
for ‘societal advance’ in a way which does not undermine future
progress. Second order reflexivity is about a ‘self-critical and self-
conscious reflection on processes of modernity’, so in terms of
environmental risk it also forces society to evaluate what is im-
portant and to make conscious decisions to shape the future. Part
of this process has been the emergence of discursive ‘innovative
institutional procedures outside the state’.
His second pillar is that ‘of co-governance as a steering mech-
anism’ for ‘co-ordinating societal responsibility for sustainable de-
velopment in conditions of complexity, uncertainty and growing
ambivalence’. Beneath this banner he disentangles a series of com-
plex issues, including the concept of sustainable development. In
common with Domingues and Pontual, he points out that in the
political realm it is a difficult concept to pin down, but in his
understanding it presupposes addressing responsibility, political co-
ordination and radical new thinking about what sustainability means
in practice. This latter point must take cognizance of challenges of
complexity, contingency, lack of predictability and social, economic
and political orientations. Governance is then not just about ‘de-
sign and implementation of government policy’ but also concerns
‘monitoring, reflection, debate and decision’.
The discussion engages in some key contemporary political ques-
tions like the changing role of the nation state, political legitimacy,
complexity, knowledge, contingency and path dependency, the shift
from formal rationality towards procedural rationality and ‘softer
“steering mechanisms” ’, corporatism and post-corporatism. This
leads neatly into his discussion of the Irish case, which forms the
third pillar of his analysis.
The Irish case shows a shift from ‘governance as hierarchy to new
more flexible forms of governance’, but its specific characterization
and whether it fits under the rubric of post-corporatism is open
to debate. Equally in relation to Irish civil society there seems to
be problems of clear definition as the voluntary sector occupies
its core and the boundary between the state and civil society is
ambiguous. Within Irish civil society environmentalism is seen as
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one of its ‘weakest sub-sectors’, which lacks political clout and
coherent coordination. The environmental movement is engaged
in activism within a formal public sphere rather than having a
representative role, but it is nonetheless innovative in terms of its
activism.
He looks at some recent communicative interfaces, which give
an important empirical dimension to the discussion. The Irish sub-
mission to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002
emerged from a process that included ‘a range of voluntary and
participative instruments alongside instruments to improve existing
regulatory measures’ and Comhar: the National Sustainable Devel-
opment Partnership was given an agenda that aimed at reaching a
national consensus on sustainable development. However he is not
convinced of a substantial shift away from the social partnership
model.
He then considers the fourth pillar of his analysis around prac-
tices of local social partnership, Corporate Social Responsibility, to
discursivity around waste management. In 2002 CDBs (City and
County Development Boards) were established ‘to build consensual
problem-solving institutions with strategic intentions at the local
level’ and ‘were consciously designed to be deliberative and par-
ticipative’. The CDB experience is varied. From an environmental
perspective the high visibility of sustainable development in offi-
cial strategies is positive, the limitations of low membership by the
voluntary sector and poor public awareness of their ‘purpose and
activity’ are negatives.
Corporate Social Responsibility reporting is not mandatory in
Ireland and is thus far largely ‘self-referential communication or
public relations’. However, there are indications that citizen pressure
may eventually push for change as a 2003 survey showed ‘that 60
per cent of Irish adults believe that industry and commerce do not
pay enough attention to their social responsibilities’.
He places the waste management debate into three categories;
i. Spatial location and responsibility; ii. Toxicity and risk; and iii.
Waste as a public good. He is stark in his analysis that in Ireland
‘waste management politics represent a communicative abyss’. The
contentious public engagement around waste ‘creating an inhos-
pitable context for reflexive governance’, even when the issues were
put before a citizens jury.
Ananta Kumar Giri’s chapter forces us to look at critical social
theory and the work of Piet Strydom from a very different perspec-
tive to the other contributors. He comes to the discussion with an
appreciation of Indian philosophy and from an Indian perspective.
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He sets out by highlighting Strydom’s contribution to what he
terms the ‘continental traditions of critical-social theory’, listing a
long line of theoretical achievements. He writes about Strydom’s
capacity to marry critical engagement with ‘a new normative height
and depth’ in sociological analysis. From the outset one senses in
Giri’s style and approach that he is not only speaking as a critical
observer, but in his own words as a ‘fellow seeker’. What we get is a
combination of both orientations, theoretically based and innovate
analysis of Strydom’s work, but also a critique which pushes us
beyond the normal comfort zone of critique within the critical
tradition.
In his capacity as fellow seeker he takes us on a journey through
a series of theoretical concepts in Strydom’s work alluding all the
time to their practical application. He places before the reader
the possibility of dichotomous challenges in Strydom’s work: ‘a
political process but also a spiritual process’ and between epistemic
and ontological processes. He speaks about ‘going beyond the
dualism’ this presents and seeks in Strydom’s approach the ‘creative
pathways’ to make bridges, in a sense loosening the theory from
its continental genesis. In this journey he pushes Strydom’s work
into an innovative and from a western philosophical perspective
somewhat new terrain.
He links into Strydom’s ‘new cognitive revolution and social
constructivism’ and shares with it a commitment to address ‘contin-
gency, disjunction between facts and norms, the work of antinomies
in self, culture and society, and the critique of linearity’. He re-
hearses Strydom’s cognitively oriented depiction of constructivism,
which accommodates ‘both intersubjective understanding and the
objectivity of reality’ and brings us through a four-point exposition
of socio-cognitive critique.
He then presents and underlines the significance of triple contin-
gency and triple contingency learning both in terms of individuals
and society but also as a means of making sociology public. Leading
from this he teases out the meaning of the third point of view
arriving at a contingent juncture rather than firm answers. In the
first stage he has an early formulation by Strydom which sees it
as representing society and then his later formulation is of a ‘a
discursively engaged and learning public’. He then poses a second
level question regarding its transcendent locus, posited by Strydom
as being within society, but he suggests that it has transcendence
that is ‘between, within and beyond society’.
He traces significant advances in Strydom’s theory on the public,
public sphere and the third point of view that take him beyond
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Habermas. In brief he shares with Strydom the view that Habermas
does not fully elaborate the distinction between the public sphere
and the public; that Habermas places the moral philosophical third
point of view over that of society or citizens; that Habermas focuses
on social movements actors over other ‘agents who participate in
the process of social construction’; and that he has an individu-
alistic orientation to the neglect of a ‘more sociologically relevant
phenomenon of social knowledge and cultural models’.
He addresses Strydom’s theories of responsibility, co-responsibi-
lity and risk. These are contextualized within public communication
and specifically in relation to collective learning processes. He pur-
sues this theme with reference to Strydom’s six concentric circles of
resonance in contemporary communicative societies. For shorthand
purposes I will label them: formal decision-making institutions;
statutory decision-making institutions; civil society; lifeworld; cul-
tural foundations and the auditing public. Giri raises objections to
this model on two counts, firstly because they are concentric and
not interpenetrative and secondly on the fundamental issue that he
contends there should also be a ‘circle of self ’. This omission he as-
cribes to Strydom being a child of the European enlightenment and
thus predisposed to ‘privileging of the public to the exclusion of en-
gagement with self ’. He tests this against Ramashrov Roy’s critique
of Aristotle’s construction of the public. Roy basically contends that
the public cannot rectify deficiencies in individual character and to
be a citizen capable of pursuing the common good one needs to
‘be reborn as a person’, which he describes as ‘the cultivation of
dharma’.
Giri proposes that Strydom must transform his concentric circles
to interpenetrative ones as it is not enough to have performative
competences, the actor must also be able to self-transform. This
requires the actor to move beyond his or her own ego, ethnocentrism
and anthropocentrism. This contention is central to Giri’s argument,
which he labels ‘multigonal’, in other words he is determined to open
up ‘a multi-value logic’ and sees in Strydom’s work the potential to
achieve that logic.
In this he is walking a tightrope when seeking to liberate ‘modes
of thinking’ from what he terms ontological and epistemological
violence, or what in lay terms might be seen as a western philosoph-
ical mindset. In a very different linguistic and conceptual discourse
his analysis carries some of the same resonances as O’Mahony. Both
see a shift in Strydom away from a primary reliance on philosophi-
cal formulations. In O’Mahony’s case in the direction of sociology
which gives his theory a far more rounded aspect than Habermas’
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and in Giri’s case opening up what Delanty might describe as a cos-
mopolitan ethics. Giri’s quest may remain to some degree frustrated.
He draws on Ankersmit to highlight the ontological dimension of
learning which he conceives to be weak in Strydom. He is correct
in identifying in the continental mind a reluctance to push too far
beyond rationality, the genesis of that has powerful resonance in a
context where enlightenment also delivered liberation from varieties
of ontological and epistemological violence.
In seeking to rectify this deficiency he proposes to add a seventh
circle to Strydom’s model, the ‘circle of self ’. He also wants to
present them as interpenetrative not concentric circles in order to
represent what he terms a ‘multidimensional ontology of autonomy
and interpenetration’. He supports this orientation with reference
to Chitta Ranjan Das’ construction of self and especially the un-
conscious as being a gateway to ‘the highest possible in self, world
and cosmos’. Giri pursues an engaging debate, challenging what he
terms ‘authoritarianism in epistemic authority’. This is an important
discussion, at the heart of which is what he sees as ‘judgmental cri-
tique from above or afar’. It is for him about the inclusion of a third
point of view that is not limited by ‘arrogance and closure’ and in
which all participants can self-transform and learn from each other
in an environment which is not dominated by a priori judgements.
He presents the concept of ‘sakhi purusha (witnessing self)’
from the Indian spiritual tradition as a transcendental or third
perspective in which critical observation is both from within the self
and externally at societal level–in a way the self acts as an external
observer or the third perspective envisaged in triple contingency. He
is attempting here ‘to combine cognition with emotion and generate
knowledge’ which comes from the heart. From an Indian spiritual
perspective this may seem more feasible than from a European
perspective, which has a tradition of battling against cosmological
certainties that eschewed rationality and in more recent history a
fascist legacy that eschewed intellectual endeavour. In fairness to
Giri’s discussion he is not eschewing rationality, rather he attempts
to forge a new balance in which spirituality and self are seen as part
of a ‘new critical theory’.
He critiques Strydom for not including self-knowledge among
his catalogue of plural knowledges. He sees this as a failure to
engage in ‘a foundational critique of knowledge itself ’. He carries
this discussion through to Strydom’s formulation of responsibility
and suggests the inclusion of ‘appropriate self-preparation’ in order
to fully comprehend its meaning. In proposing his vision for a
new critical theory he suggests that ‘self-development is a neglected
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theme of critical theory’. He pursues this towards Bhaskar’s concept
of the ‘transcendentally really self ’. He enumerates the components
and realms in which and through which this can be realized, but
is neglectful of the legacy of social psychology, which helps inform
Strydom’s theorizing.
He addresses power and seeks for a Heideggerian ‘power free
existence’ and ‘shared sovereignties’. He again addresses ‘inclusion
of the other’ charging that while Habermas espouses universalism
and other sensitivity, his approach is framed and understood from
a western Judeo-Christian perspective and requires ‘a lot more
self-development’.
He concludes his discussion with reference to ‘planetary realiza-
tions’. He rehearses this new reality in the global context of what
might be seen as the risk society and ties this into Strydom’s theories
around ‘risk, environment and responsibility’ and his recognition of
a need for transformation at the level of anthropocentrism and post-
nationalism. He also includes in this possibilities emerging from his
work like triple contingency learning. With reference to Melucci,
Giri also articulates a need for inner planetary realizations around
‘the biological, emotional and cognitive structures’ that are part of
our experiences and relations.
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A THEORY
OF COGNITIVE FRAMES
FOR CRITICAL SOCIOLOGY
Piet Strydom
Introduction
Since the critique of functionalism and structuralism and the appro-
priation of the long marginalized interpretative and critical sociolo-
gies, it is widely recognized that cognitive structures and knowledge,
far from being incidental to the structuring and patterning of social
life, in fact are integral to it. The acknowledgement of this across
theoretical and national traditions constitutes one of the most sig-
nificant developments in the social sciences in the late twentieth
century (Strydom 2007). It amounts to a cognitive turn which trans-
formed not only the traditional sociology of knowledge but in fact
sociology itself – in particular opening the possibility for a better
appreciation of its critical dimension. Appropriate quotations could
be drawn from various leading authors, but Pierre Bourdieu is per-
haps the one who gave the constitutive significance of this cognitive
component its most pointed sentence-long formulation when he
indicated that his project is ‘to include in the object the knowledge
which the agents, who are part of the object, have of the object, and
the contribution this knowledge makes to the reality of the object’
(1986: 467).
It is of course inadequate simply to speak of knowledge here
or, rather, it is apparent that Bourdieu uses ‘knowledge’ in more
than one sense of the word – whence his further submission that
‘all knowledge, and in particular all knowledge of the social world,
is an act of construction implementing schemes of thought and
expression’ (1986: 467). But this is a matter about which there
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is not full clarity. It had always been a problem of the classi-
cal tradition of the sociology of knowledge. Mannheim himself
undoubtedly understood the issue, for he explicitly identified the
‘categorial apparatus. . . of order patterns’ preceding all knowledge
(Wolff 1993: 426–7, 409). Yet he paid scant attention to the distinc-
tion between the cognitive dimension (Erkennen/Erkenntnis) and
knowledge (Wissen), with the result, as Wolff (1993: 27) pointed
out, that the subsequent literature failed to recognize and elucidate
it. For related reasons, Schutz (1964: 121) criticized the sociology
of knowledge as a misnomer. Subsequently, Giddens proposed to
improve matters by focusing on ‘the logical status of the knowledge
applied by social actors in the production and reproduction of social
systems’ (1979: 5). His remedy is to keep apart two levels which are
often conflated: ‘mutual knowledge’, in the sense of a non-corrigible
tacit resource shared not only by social actors but also by the social
actors and the social analyst, and ‘common sense’ understood as cor-
rigible knowledge or belief-claims tacitly or discursively implicated
in social forms of life (1979: 251–2, 1986: 336–7). This proposal
calls to mind the phenomenological distinction between the pre-
reflective and the reflective. Schutz, for instance, knew that what
he called the ‘stock-of-knowledge’ at the core of the lifeworld is
not merely a passively possessed store of already constituted shared
knowledge, but also includes ways and means whereby such knowl-
edge could be used or even creatively reactivated so as to give rise to
new categorial structures (1967: 77–83). Habermas (1987: 124–5)
likewise distinguishes between the lifeworld as the totality of what is
taken for granted, on the one hand, and known and problematized
facts, norms and experiences framed by the formal concepts of the
objective, social and subjective worlds. An important connotation of
the distinction between knowledge and the cognitive acknowledged
here should be kept in mind. On the one hand, cognitive forms,
schemes or frames organize experience and thus make possible the
generation of interpretations of the objective, social and subjective
worlds and the attachment of meaning to them, and on the other
particular instances of knowledge, interpretations and meanings fill
out these forms (e.g. Goffman 1986; Eder 1996; D’Andrade 1995;
Conein 2005).
The principal concern of this paper is with the cognitive dimen-
sion – variously called categorial structures, schemata, schemes or
frames – which are to be found at the level of both mutual lifeworld
knowledge and situational common sense. It is the task of cognitive
sociology to analyze and clarify these frames. Although it is widely
held that the lifeworld is a transcendental concept which fulfils a
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metatheoretical function and thus cannot directly be put to empiri-
cal use, this perspective allows one to draw out the relevance of this
dimension for empirical research purposes. In view of this, cognitive
sociology is understood not merely in the micro sense of for instance
Cicourel (1973), but also in the sense of being capable of extension
to the macro dimension of society. At the outset, however, it should
be acknowledged that cognitive sociology does not exhaust itself
by focusing on such frames alone. The cognitive turn extends to
the broader concern with the knowledgeable participation of social
agents in communication and the discursive construction of reality
at both the micro and macro dimensions (e.g. Eder 1996, 2007;
Strydom 1999a, 2000, 2002). In the present context, I concentrate
largely on the sociological level of analysis of cognitive frames, but
I also add some reflections on the processual dimension. A critical
cognitive sociology requires both.
Pragmatic-Realist Constructivism on a Weak Naturalistic Basis
Practical knowledge makes it possible for competent social actors
to take part in social forms of life and to fulfil corresponding
accomplishments. It is embodied in a whole range of elementary
types of activities or practices, the key to the analysis of which
is the concept of being oriented towards a rule. Social actors on
the one hand follow many rules intuitively in so far as they have
gained a practical mastery of them, while on the other they have an
explicit knowledge of a range of further rules. Intuitively exercised
knowledge enjoys a certain priority over explicit rule knowledge
for it carries the whole network of basic practices and accomplish-
ments in which a social form of life is articulated. It is this whole
complex of implicit yet holistic practical knowledge that phenome-
nologists such as Husserl and Schutz described as the Lebenswelt,
the taken-for-granted largely unthematic background of social life.
The fact that the presupposed practical knowledge at issue here is
of an enabling kind, making social participation and accomplish-
ments possible, leads Habermas, despite the pragmatist deflation of
Kant’s transcendental philosophy by Peirce and Apel (1981), still
to approach it in terms of ‘transcendental analysis’ (1999: 19). It
takes the form of the analysis of the deep-seated structures of the
lifeworld embodied in the practices and achievements of competent
social actors. For him this means the identification of those invariant
yet flexible features which appear throughout the whole range of
different sociocultural forms of life. First among them is language,
and the second is culture in the sense of the communicatively trans-
mitted and linguistically organized stock of patterns or frames of
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interpretation, valuation and expression. With these transcenden-
tal features Habermas contrasts the contents of cultural tradition
persisting only in symbolic form and situationally relevant facts,
norms and experiences which, strictly speaking, alone fall under the
category of knowledge (1987: 124–6).
The transcendental status of these structures, of which cognitive
frames are of most interest in the present context, can be understood
in a number of different senses. Schutz, for instance, insists that his
schemes of interpretation and expression, which are ‘schemes of
experience’, differ sharply from Kant’s schemes which are ‘schemes
of the imagination’ (1967: 82). Habermas makes a distinction be-
tween a weak and a strong transcendental interpretation (1999: 27).
In the classical sense, anything encountered in the world receives its
very form from the structures of the human mind. As against this
strong version, the weak interpretation requires at most that the
world, in so far as human beings are at all able to gain knowledge
of it, should match our cognitive structures. In addition, however,
the contemporary interpretation of the transcendental appreciates
further that the possibility of encountering the world depends on
human activity embodying human concerns, interests and beliefs
(Habermas 1999: 28). The cognitive frames providing the situa-
tional structures of social forms of life located in space and time
form part of a variety of different practices, from instrumental inter-
vention through self-interpretation to communication and discourse.
Although these transcendental structures are of a presuppositional
kind and therefore are not simply empirical facts, they no longer
possess universality and necessity, as Kant would have accepted in
respect of transcendental consciousness. This opens the door for a
form of idealism which is widely accepted today in the social sci-
ences, particularly by certain forms of constructivism. Since we do
not know whether and to what extent the structures of the human
mind ontologically correspond to the world itself, we can no longer
be sure whether the reality selectively revealed by our cognitive
structures is objective or perhaps a distorted cross-section. Gamson
is of course correct when he submits that a ‘successful theory of
framing must be based on an epistemology that recognizes facts as
social constructions’ (1992: 69), but this leaves one uneasy about
the exact status of the constructivism he has in mind. Habermas
(1999: 30, 39) goes further by insisting that there is a sense in which
our grasp of the world does possess universality and necessity. For
him this is apparent from the fact that these structures not only
provide human beings with access to the world, but at the same time
also occupy a position in the world itself – i.e. they evade both the
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THEORY OF COGNITIVE FRAMES 5
transcendental difference between the world and the inner-worldly
as well as the methodological dualism between understanding and
observation.
Authors from a variety of intellectual traditions such as Marxism,
pragmatism, philosophical anthropology and genetic epistemology
had already recognized that instrumental practices, language use
and communicative action have a biological or evolutionary root.
Against this background, Habermas advances a ‘weak naturalistic’,
‘transcendental-pragmatic’ position (1999: 32, 36–40). At its core
is a pragmatistic understanding of lifeworld practices. On the one
hand, they take the form of ‘intelligent’ or cognitively structured
and knowledgeable problem solving and learning through the cor-
rection of errors and discursive justification and, on the other, they
generate a broad dynamic of the growth of cognitive structures and
knowledge beyond the particular views and commitments of the
participants. The overall process of the constitution of society takes
place at one and the same time on a spatial, social and temporal
level, and involves both moments of passive experience of reality
and moments of constructive design, interpretation and justification.
Active engagement with reality, whether resistant and constraining
objects or contradictions between social actors whose orientations
come into conflict, is accompanied by, or at least eventuates in, a
discursive exchange of views and objections from which in turn
emerges a more or less justified, intersubjectively accepted inter-
pretation on the basis of which society is then for the time being
organized.
An interesting step in his recent writings is where Habermas
(1999: 37–40; 2005: 157, 171, 215) explicitly adds a ‘weak’ or
‘soft’ naturalistic dimension to his account of lifeworld practices.
According to this metatheoretical assumption, the learning processes
that we human beings undergo, which are possible only within
the context of sociocultural forms of life, are no more and no
less than a continuation of the preceding evolutionary learning
processes which, for their part, gave rise to the structures of our
forms of life. This means that those structures which make our
learning processes transcendentally possible are the outcome of
less complex natural-historical learning processes which lend them
cognitive significance. Habermas is emphatic about the cognitive
import deposited in the structures of the lifeworld by evolutionary
learning processes. It accounts for the fact that, despite the deflation
of transcendental epistemology, our grasp of the world nevertheless
possesses a certain universality and necessity which remains despite
its contingent genesis. He also stresses that the assumption of
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6 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
natural-historical continuity must be understood strictly in a weak or
soft naturalistic sense and, hence, that no reductive claims should be
attached to it. The latter would be the case with a strong naturalistic
approach which seeks to replace the conceptual analysis of lifeworld
practices by a natural scientific, e.g. a neurological or biogenetic
explanation (e.g. Turner 2002). It is sufficient, by contrast, simply
to make the basic assumption that the organic development and
cultural form of life of homo sapiens have a natural origin and
are accessible to an evolutionary explanation. It would be mistaken,
furthermore, to conceive of the cognitive dimension of the lifeworld
in ontological realist terms, as Outhwaite (1987: 84, 86–7) seems to
interpret Habermas. In his recent work, Habermas adds clarity by
explicitly adopting ‘pragmatic realism’ (1999: 45, 2005: 171) and
insisting that lifeworld structures must be analyzed, notwithstanding
the metatheoretical assumption of natural-historical continuity, in
terms appropriate to cognitive structures appearing to us as universal
and necessary.
Given the centrality of the lifeworld infrastructure specifically
understood in cognitive terms, the question arises as to how it could
be extrapolated sociologically. How could we transpose Haber-
mas’ detranscendentalized transcendental analysis into a sociolog-
ical analysis of the whole range of cognitive complexes – from
context-setting structures, through situation-generating structures,
to situation-defining structures? How could we theoretically develop
a cognitive sociology that is relevant for social scientific – specifically
critical sociological – research practice?
A Theory of Cognitive Frames
Social reality presents us with a complex of instrumental interven-
tion, communicative action, social interaction and a network of
social relations. On the one hand, this complex is provided with an
all-pervasive background understanding making possible the various
practices and their corresponding accomplishments. On the other,
this complex often takes a discursive form in the wake of the partial
breakdown of this background understanding or a problematization
of an aspect of it. It is in such discursive moments that the contra-
diction between social actors whose orientations come into conflict
becomes manifest. Critical discourse moments of this kind are of
particular cognitive sociological interest since it is in breaches like
these that cognitive structures and cultural models structuring or
potentially structuring the situation become visible. Those involved
all focus on the fact, norm, experience or combination of them
which has become problematic and contentious. Each of the parti-
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THEORY OF COGNITIVE FRAMES 7
cipants draws on culturally available resources to construct its own
frame of the situation in general and the issue at stake in particular,
and then communicates this individualizing frame in public. In so
doing, the communications of the different participants generate a
discourse in which their respective frames enter into competition
and conflict with each other. Such a discursive legitimation struggle
in the medium of public communication typically ends, via a more
or less successful learning process (Miller 2002), in the intersubjec-
tive or collective acceptance of an emergent ‘synthesis’ (Mannheim
1993: 433), ‘metascheme’ (Schutz 1967: 119) or ‘masterframe’ (Eder
1996: 181) in the sense of a new selective set of cognitive structures
coordinating the competing frames in proportion to their degree of
power and acceptability to the public.
A central yet nevertheless weakly acknowledged dimension of
discursive struggles is the cognitive one. Struggles of this kind repre-
sent a social process of the discursive construction of reality. In and
through such processes, cognitive devices made available by culture
are employed by social actors to construct more or less coherent
sets of cognitive structures or frames, while these latter frames are
communicatively mediated and thus catapulted into a dynamic that
leads to the discursive construction of a composite master frame. In
a sense, this statement could be read as a decomposition and more
analytical restatement of the formula Giddens used to indicate the
sense of his theorem of the ‘duality of structure’: ‘the structural
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the
practices they recursively organize’ (1986: 25). Although it is not
brought out, Giddens also recognizes the cognitive dimension when
he continues that: ‘Structure is not “external” to individuals: as
memory traces, and as instantiated in social practices, it is in a
certain sense more “internal” than exterior to their activities in a
Durkheimian sense’. What is not clear from his formula, however, is
the crucial difference in level of structure in the course of the process
linking ‘medium’ and ‘outcome’. On the one hand, structure refers
both to commonly shared and generally available cultural structures
on the macro level and to their appropriation and employment at
the micro level as elements or devices for the purposes of construct-
ing actor frames. On the other hand, structure also refers both to
the meso level arrangement and rearrangement of frames and to the
emergent macro level master frame coordinating them. Of cognitive
sociological interest is the whole spectrum of cognitive phenomena
which play a structuring role throughout the process of discursive
construction – which is actually the medium – at all the different
levels.
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8 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
The sociological question arising here, therefore, is what these
cognitive phenomena are, and how we could go about analyzing
them. A few references to some leading social theorists could be
helpful.
Social theorists on cognitive structures
Against the background of theoretical developments around the
turn of the previous century seeking to describe the structure of
modern life which was supposed to have freed itself from structure,
Mannheim in the 1920s adopted the most basic societal cognitive
resources as starting point for analyses within his favoured area of
the sociology of knowledge. He spoke of the ‘deepest strata of world
interpretation’, ‘the categorial apparatus’ or the ‘inventory of our
set of fundamental meanings in terms of which we experience the
outside world as well as our own inner responses’ (Wolff 1993: 419,
405). It is clear from his earlier writings, particularly those on ‘the
structures of thinking’ (Mannheim 1980: 211–25), that he grasped
the multi-dimensional – and not just linguistic – makeup of this
categorial apparatus. In addition, he also exhibited an interest in
the change and differentiation of these cognitive resources through
the competition of different generations and groups (e.g. Wolff
1993: 399–437). At the centre of his attention, however, were
ideational contents, bodies of knowledge, ideologies or sets of
related ideas, with the result that he neglected both to theorize the
presupposed cognitive dimension and to exploit its significance for
sociological analysis.
Schutz (1964, 1967), by contrast, concentrated on structure.
On the one hand, he offered a formal theoretical analysis of the
‘categorial structures of meaning’ or ‘stock of knowledge’ and the
constituent ‘schemes of experience’, ‘interpretive schemes’ and ‘ex-
pressive schemes’ (1967: 77–86). On the other, he drew attention
to the schemes or ‘typifications’ of common sense which form in-
tegral elements of concrete, historically specific sociocultural forms
of life (1971: 59, 73, 281–5). Even at the latter level, however,
Schutz’s analyses retained the formality of the former level, thus
never developing in a substantively oriented direction beyond epis-
temological and methodological concerns. Later authors who drew
on Schutz advanced matters in one way or another by highlight-
ing the social scientific significance of presuppositional structures.
Berger and Luckmann (1967; Berger 1973) emphasized the link
between the sociology of knowledge and the cognitive implications
of social-psychological processes and its employment as a basis for
a sociological rather than social- psychological model of the social
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THEORY OF COGNITIVE FRAMES 9
construction of reality. Garfinkel (1967) and the ethnomethodolo-
gists focused on the formal properties of everyday or common sense
activities. Since they assumed that such properties have no source
other than ongoing practical accomplishments, however, they sought
to reveal them sporadically through indirect means, such as the mis-
understanding or unsuccessful application of a taken-for-granted
assumption or deviation from it, rather than developing a more pos-
itive theoretical account. Adopting a comparable approach, Cicourel
(1973) emphasized the cognitive role of memory and interpretation
in invoking formal properties through practical reasoning by draw-
ing on indexical particulars in interaction situations.
In his significantly entitled book Frame Analysis (1986), Goffman
went beyond the ethnomethodologists’ theoretical abstentionism by
adopting a more structural approach to the organization of expe-
rience and the interpretation of the world. He indeed continued
to focus extensively on the analysis of anecdotal materials which
reminds one of the ethnomethodological obsession with marginal
or liminal situations, but throughout the book one gets a sense of an
attempt to make a systematic contribution. In any case, his avowed
aim was ‘to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding
available in our society for making sense out of events’ and thus
to arrive at ‘a general statement’ (1986: 10, 14). The major step he
took toward a theory of frames as the cognitive forms organizing
experience was put forward under the title of ‘primary frameworks’
(21–39) of which there are two general classes: ‘natural’ and ‘social’
frameworks applying respectively to natural occurrences, events and
phenomena and to rule guided conduct and events involving agency.
He saw these frames as cognitive resources which form a central
component of culture and are shared, although not uniformly, by
large numbers of people. They are culturally available principles of
organization or complexes of rules which enable individuals to ex-
perience, perceive, interpret and understand events and actions and
their effects as well as the responses of others. The larger part of his
work, using the central concept of ‘key’, was focused on the process
of transition from primary to secondary frameworks involving activ-
ities already meaning something in one context but then acquiring
another meaning in a different context. Throughout, however, his
focus remained the organization of individual experience.
Habermas provides valuable guidelines by means of his theory of
communicative action and discourse, but he himself has developed
his position only in a very general way. In the Theory of Com-
municative Action (1987), he sought to revitalize critical theory by
refocusing it on the provocative contemporary threat of the col-
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 10 –- #52 i
i
i
i
i
i
10 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
onization of lifeworld structures and thus made available a range
of cognitively relevant concepts, but beyond that he neglected to
pursue the implied line of cognitive sociological inquiry. Between
Facts and Norms (1996) considerably improved the situation. The
core of the social theoretic contribution of this work turns on his
focus on the ‘discursive mode of sociation’ characteristic of contem-
porary societies. In accordance with the general pragmatistic (i.e.
Peircean-Piagetian) view of ‘societies. . . as problem-solving systems’
(1996: 319), he here exploits to some degree his understanding
of the discursive construction of reality in public communication.
Central to his account are discursive processes whereby cognitive
structures and cultural models are activated, on the one hand, and
reconstituted and reshaped, on the other. In this respect, his theoret-
ical model of the constitutionally guaranteed circuit of power in the
public sphere is very promising. As a sociological version of the dis-
course theoretical interpretation of democracy, it offers an excellent
statement of the general framework required for situational analy-
ses and contains a profusion of suggestive contact points for their
development. What is lacking, however, is a reflective treatment of
the cognitive structuration of discursive processes. Using a variety of
terms, Habermas does indeed refer to cognitive structures of various
kinds. For instance, he speaks of ‘cultural patterns’ ‘interpretative
patterns’, ‘patterns of interpretation, valuation and expression’, ‘for-
mal world-concepts’, ‘formal frames’, ‘validity claims’, ‘the frame
or categorial scaffolding that serves to order problematic situa-
tions’ and ‘forms of the intersubjectivity of possible understanding’
(1987: 124–6). Since the early 1970s, moreover, his work has been
shot through with an acute sense of the ‘epistemic’ role of discourses
whereby something individual, such as interests, motives or values,
is abstracted and transposed into a structure appropriate to the
situation and acceptable to the participants (e.g. 1998: 7, 31, 43,
81–2). It is apparent that when he stresses that ‘single elements
[of lifeworld structures], specific taken-for-granteds, are. . . drawn
upon [and] mobilized. . . in co-operative processes of interpretation’
(1987: 124), he appreciates that they are discursively available cog-
nitive structures and cultural models brought into play in social life.
The problem remains, however, that Habermas’ position on the
cognitive dimension is too schematic and underdeveloped. Taking
a problem-solving perspective, he also overlooks the world-creating
significance of cognitive processes and structures.
Amongst contemporary sociologists, Bourdieu (1986) stands out
as one who has an acute understanding of cognitive structures
as a fundamental dimension of a society which is simultaneously
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THEORY OF COGNITIVE FRAMES 11
incorporated into the minds and bodies of its members. He em-
ploys a wide range of expressions, from ‘cognitive structures’ (468),
through ‘schemes of thought and expression’ (467) and ‘historical
schemes of perception and appreciation’ (468), to ‘commonplaces’
(477), ‘forms of classification’, ‘classificatory schemes’ (471) or ‘clas-
sificatory systems’ (477). All these concepts refer to the cognitive
dimension, but they differ in that they point to either its micro
or macro manifestations. Bourdieu is critical both of philosophical
idealism, which is fixated on a system of universal forms and cate-
gories, and of cognitive approaches in anthropology and sociology
(e.g. interactionism, ethnomethodology), which ignore the problem
of the genesis of mental structures and classifications. In his view,
they are historically constituted and acquired categories which or-
ganize the idea of the social world in the minds of all the subjects
belonging to that world. Being common to all competent agents,
even if interpreted differently by them, they make possible the
production of a common, meaningful, common-sense world. As
principles of division, they are produced and reproduced through
social divisions, including divisions between generations, the sexes
and classes. Far from being a system of universal forms and cat-
egories oriented toward pure knowledge, therefore, they form a
system of internalized and embodied schemes which are available
as practical knowledge and are used for the purposes of practice.
Social groupings and classes are incessantly engaged in legitimation
controversies or ‘classification struggles’ (479) in which the sys-
tem of classificatory schemes is the ‘stake of the struggles’ (477).
While struggling over it, they seek to gain control over the clas-
sification system and to turn it to their own advantage. They put
forward different interpretations and make antagonistic uses of it,
and thus form distinct social identities on the basis of differences.
This position is comparable to that of Touraine who emphasizes
the ‘cultural model’ (1981: 14; 1988: 54–5) or the common image
of society’s creative capacity which is differently interpreted and
used by the major social forces struggling over it as the stake in
their conflicting constitution of society. Bourdieu’s examples show
that he conceives of classifications and schemes in a more gen-
eral anthropological-sociological way, whereas Touraine’s work is
focused in a more historically specific, epochal, societal, political-
sociological way. Bourdieu (1986: 468, 470) thinks of a ‘matrix of
all commonplaces’ forming a ‘network of oppositions’ of high/low,
strong/weak, spiritual/material, fine/course, light/heavy, free/forced,
broad/narrow, unique/common, brilliant/dull and so forth, which in
class societies are articulated in terms of the intersection of two
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12 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
principles, namely the division between the dominant and the domi-
nated and between different factions competing for dominance, such
as business executives and intellectuals today. Touraine (1988: 111)
has in mind liberty, justice and happiness as the central loci of con-
flict and struggle between elite and social movement in mercantile,
industrial and contemporary societies respectively.
What becomes apparent when one assesses some of the major
contributions to the theory of the cognitive dimension is the dis-
sonance between the different emphases and hence the lack of a
systematic position. There is certainly no dearth of interesting ideas,
but they are still in need of being related to one another, of being
compared and contrasted, and of being put together and developed
so as to form a more coherent theory of cognitive structures and
cultural models.
Typology of cognitive frames
I propose to begin this task by developing a non-eclectic typology
of frames which is able to accommodate the major distinctions sug-
gested in the literature by means of a cognitivist communication and
discourse theory of society. My aim is to pursue this theoretical ex-
ercise to the point where a framework emerges which is sufficiently
differentiated and coherent to be used as guidance in research (e.g.
Strydom 2000, 2002). The typology is a cross-section through a
dialectical process unity which consists of a number of dimensions
running from the macro to the micro level. They all form part of
a given cognitive order which is reproduced and/or transformed
through a process of cognitive structure formation in the medium
of communication and discourse such that it leads to a processual
result or outcome in the form of a new cognitive order (see diagram
below). Rather than teasing out all the logical possibilities, however,
I confine myself for present purposes to aspects more immediately
relevant to researching critical discourse moments and the resolu-
tion of controversies, with slower and more deep-seated cultural
change somewhat more in the background.
The first dimension of the typology occupies the macro level
occupied by the cultural (macro) frame possessing context-setting
significance. It embraces the intersubjectively shared, naively ac-
cepted, diffuse, enabling yet limiting, deep-seated structures of the
lifeworld which, as Habermas argues, have become established in
the course of natural history or evolution as structures having cog-
nitive import at the sociocultural level. As such, it corresponds
to the most basic part of Schutz’s ‘stock of knowledge’, or what
Mannheim called the ‘deepest strata of world interpretation’ and
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Bourdieu the ‘common system of classification’. This dimension in-
cludes both Goffman’s ‘primary frameworks’ straddling the natural
and sociocultural dimensions. Here are located all those structural
forms which make it possible for social actors or agents to experi-
ence, perceive, interpret and understand both the natural and the
social world as well as their own inner or subjective worlds. As a
‘stock of knowledge at hand’ (Schutz 1967: 78) or as a ‘tool kit’ or
‘repertoire’ (Swidler 1986: 273, 277), it keeps publicly available a
virtually limitless and diverse range of cultural resources.
Typology of Cognitive Frames
PROCESS IN THE MEDIUM OF COMMUNICATION AND DISCOURSE:
GIVEN COGNITIVE 
ORDER
PROCESS RESULT/ 
OUTCOME
MACRO
MESO
MICRO
cultural frame reproduced/transformed 
cultural frame
modernity frame reproduced/transformed 
modernity frame
historical frame   new master frame
problem situation frame current situation frame
collective actor frames   reproduced/transformed 
collective actor/identity/ 
action frames
framing devices reproduced/transformed 
framing devices
The second dimension of the typology is a crucial social theoretic
specification of the macro level from the viewpoint that the social
world is a world of meaning which is by necessity given a general yet
directional interpretation. Here it is understood in accordance with
the social theoretical assumption made by such authors as Habermas,
Mannheim, Bourdieu, Touraine and Giddens that in sociology we
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14 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
are concerned with culturally available cognitive structures under
modern conditions. Stated at the highest level of historical specificity,
it can be referred to as the modernity (macro) frame (compare
Strydom 2000: 60–3).
Since the early modern period and until recently, the modernity
frame took the form of a liberal-egalitarian-discursive frame, or what
Eder called ‘the frame of free, equal and discursively structured social
relations’ (1992: 3). It took effect in the process of the structuring of
social relations and society more broadly by operating as a cultural
model, partly embodied in constitutions and legal systems. In the
wake of the late twentieth century conflicts and debates about the
ecological crisis, however, the general modernity frame has recently
begun to undergo a marked modification – a change that itself
calls for social scientific analysis capable of traversing the cognitive
dimension. The direction of change is indicated by the emphatic
late twentieth-century concern with the environment. In addition
to the modern privileging of the social form of relations marked
by the emphasis on freedom, equality and discursivity, a range of
cultural resources has been singled out anew under the general
title of ‘nature’. A reconstitution of the relation between the two
types of primary framework distinguished by Goffman, the social
and the natural, obviously occurred here – or we could say that
through the ecological crisis natural historical processes produced
a new cognitive perspective for the organization of sociocultural
life. The liberal-egalitarian-discursive frame of modern times has
been expanded to form the late modernity frame in which both
society and nature occupy a significant position. Eder speaks of ‘the
frame of an order inherent in nature, the frame of a natural order of
modern societies’ (1992: 3). A new set of rules has been added to the
old set to form an expanded cultural model to generally govern the
experience, perception, interpretation and understanding of as well
as action upon reality in its various dimensions under contemporary
conditions.
The modernity frame itself gets internally articulated in histor-
ically more specific horizons of lower level yet dominant epochal
pre-understandings of society. This is what Habermas (1996: 388–
446) thinks about when he distinguishes the ‘liberal’, the ‘social-
welfare’ and the ‘procedural paradigms’ in his discussion of modern
law. It is also what Touraine (1988: 111) has in mind when he
identifies liberty, justice and happiness, or the cultural models of
exchange, progress and self-produced normative guidelines, as the
central loci of conflict and protest in the mercantile, industrial and
programmed ages of modernity respectively . We have here a macro
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level frame or categorial scaffolding of a broad historical situation
within modernity containing a general characterization of the times
in terms of an understanding of the direction which needs to be
pursued to realize its potential.
It is within this context, depending on the chosen level of anal-
ysis, that still more specific diagnoses of the times and responses to
the perceived challenges or threats of the present are discursively
developed – i.e. frame construction processes which are at the very
centre of critical cognitive sociological analysis. While such discur-
sive framing processes depend on problem situations which are in
turn framed on the meso level and allow problems to be made into
collectively defined issues, their outcomes in the case of high level
issues are macro level frames which for a certain time come to play a
central role in institutionalization and hence the organization of so-
ciety – what is here called a master frame (compare Eder 1996). For
instance, aspects of the sociocultural lifeworld become problematic,
whether facts pertaining to the objective world, norms belonging
to the social world, experiences ascribable to the subjective world,
or a combination of all three, as is more typical. It could present
itself in the form of the society-wide problems of early modern
violence and disorder, modern impoverishment, or contemporary
risk. Three historically significant frames of this kind can thus be
distinguished – what I for particular purposes elsewhere proposed
to call the ‘rights frame’, the ‘justice frame’ and the ‘responsibility
frame’ respectively (Strydom 1999b, 1999d, 2000, 2002). Many
smaller, lower level problems can and often do provide the focal
point of problem situations, even simultaneously with societally
more significant ones. There is no lack of examples of particular
issues from various fields providing controversial flash points (e.g.
Nelkin 1992). But the problem situation frames developed through
conflict, communication and discourse which flare up around such
problems do not necessarily provide what is required for the emer-
gence of a master frame. Society-wide problems are more likely to
do so.
The micro dimension of the typology concerns the wide range
of cognitive structures employed as frame construction devices by
the social or collective actors or agents. The cognitive resources at
issue here are those concepts, norms or rules of conduct and cul-
turally specific values as well as emotions and moods which social
actors draw from culture as a stock of knowledge at hand or as a
toolkit – having learned to use them more or less skilfully in varying
configurations to construct identities and lines of action to deal with
the different kinds of problems they confront in social situations.
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16 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
As framing devices, they include Schutz’s common-sense typifica-
tions and Gamson’s metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions
and visual images (Gamson and Lasch 1983: 399–400). Authors
in the Kantian-Habermasian tradition, however, have succeeded in
theoretically systematizing this dimension of analysis. Eyerman and
Jamison (1991), for instance, fell back on Habermas’ distinction
between technical, practical and emancipatory ‘cognitive interests’
to distinguish the different dimensions of what they call ‘cognitive
praxis’. Starting from Habermas’ cognitive ‘validity claims’ instead,
Eder (1996) distinguished empirical or objective, moral or norma-
tive, and aesthetic or conative framing devices. By employing these
three basic situation-articulating or text-generating devices, social
actors construct collective actor, identity and action frames in rela-
tion to an issue, which they then communicate in public and allow
to be reproduced or transformed through the ensuing discursive
process.
Such a construction process involves the alignment (Snow et
al. 1986) of the micro level cognitive structures of the individual
participants and meso level frames of collective actors. This is
certainly the case with social movements, as the relevant literature
makes clear (e.g. Morris and Mueller 1992; Melucci 1996; McAdam
et al. 1996). Quite untenably however, some authors prefer to
confine the concept of ‘frame’ to this level and to it alone (McAdam
et al. 1996: 6; see Strydom 1999d: 73–4) and concurrently tend
to reserve the concept of ‘master frame’ for the collective action
frame of social movements. But it should be emphasized that the
process of collective identity formation holds equally well for the
state, industry, science, and other relevant social agents. As soon
as frames are communicated in public and a shift occurs from the
micro to the meso level, at any rate, frames appear in the plural.
For this reason, authors such as Mannheim (Wolff 1993: 399–437),
Bourdieu (1986: 230–1), Gamson (1992: 70) and Eder (1996: 169)
rightly emphasize that ‘competition’ – and by extension conflict –
is of central social scientific interest. Such dynamic processes are
all the more of interest in that they are essential for the discursive
construction of a master frame.
The Discursive Socialization of Cognition
To offset the disadvantages inherent in the diagrammatic presenta-
tion of the typology, I propose to elaborate briefly on the dynamics
of the process of structuration whereby the various types and levels
of cognitive structures become expanded and interwoven in practical
contexts of social life. The processual medium in which the different
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cognitive structures are suspended, as it were, and through which
they are related to and connected with one another is provided by
communication and discourse. Unlike Giddens’ structuration, there-
fore, this is conceived as a process of communicative and discursive
sociation or socialization of cognition and learning.
When the taken-for-granted background of understanding breaks
down or something becomes problematic, the relevant segment of
the lifeworld is thrown into relief, so that the context of relevance
and hence the ordering frame of the problematic situation begin
to become apparent. It is articulated by social actors who, locating
themselves in the cultural frame already interpreted in terms of
modernity, choose particular framing devices and construct collec-
tive actor, identity or action frames for themselves. By means of
such a frame, a social actor establishes a publicly relevant identity,
and by communicating it in public it distinguishes itself from and
establishes a relation with other co-operating or competing social
actors. The framing process allows the actor to define the situation –
in the sense of becoming clear about the current context of rele-
vance – and in particular the problem which needs to be identified,
defined and eventually agreed upon as a collectively relevant issue.
In this way, a link is forged between the cognitive structures or
frame of the actor and the broader frame that serves to order the
problematic situation that has arisen for the participating actors.
The communication of a variety of frames in public establishes a
network of co-operative, competitive and even conflicting relations
among them, and thus generates a discourse with dynamics of its
own. In and through the processual dynamics, the frames of the
different actors are played out and weighed up against one another,
up to the point that an amalgam of selected aspects of each of
the frames in proportion to their situational and cultural signifi-
cance emerges victorious over the competing frame elements. If one
thus considers the macro dimension from a dynamic viewpoint in
relation to the micro and meso dimensions, then an important man-
ifestation of lifeworld structures becomes apparent. Attention then
shifts from the givenness, commonality or intersubjective sharing of
these structures in the form of the cultural and modernity macro
frame to their emergent effects and patterns. This is where the
sociologically – rather than philosophically or anthropologically –
crucial phenomenon of a historically specific, discursively generated
and collectively accepted and valid frame of reality makes itself felt –
Mannheim and Eder’s ‘synthesis’ and ‘master frame’ respectively.
As Mannheim was acutely aware, this is of course only a temporary,
unstable, relative, practical synthesis which at best provisionally
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18 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
normalizes continuing oppositions (Wolff 1993: 433; see also Ket-
tler and Meja 1988). This is what Eder has in mind when he, in
Bourdieuian parlance, speaks of the significance of ‘frame capital’
(1996: 169) for the emergence of a collectively valid master frame
of reality through discursively organized frame competition. This
by no means excludes, of course, the normative component of such
a synthesis.
I propose to reserve the term ‘master frame’ for this temporary,
power-drenched, normatively sanctioned, practical synthesis. The
rationale for this is theoretical in at least two senses. On the one
hand, it allows a distinction between macro frame and master frame,
where the former refers to the all-pervasive, virtually unchangeable,
common, context-setting cultural and modernity framework and
the latter to the historically specific, temporally activated, situation-
defining frame which can be expected in the course of time to be
replaced by another quite different frame. The acknowledgement of
this distinction is the first step toward dealing with and overcoming
the seemingly irresolvable conflict between formalism and contextu-
alism (see critique of Habermas in Strydom 1999c). Here different
objects of possible analysis present themselves for social scientific
study, from the master frame to the reproduced and/or transformed
cultural and modernity frames. On the other hand, the theoretical
choice to reserve the master frame for the temporary synthesis opens
the possibility of confronting the problem of contingency in a novel
way.
The process of communicative and discursive socialization of
cognition and learning through which the different types and levels
of frames are interrelated so as to continuously constitute and
structure social life is classically understood as a process subject to
double contingency. This is emphatically the case with such leading
authors as Parsons, Habermas and Luhmann. In opposition to this
theoretical position, I have elsewhere argued that we need the new
concept of ‘triple contingency’ (Strydom 1999c).
In accordance with the theorem of double contingency, social
reality is conceived in terms of the dyadic or dialogical ego and
alter model. Social action, interaction, social systems, social order
and hence society are possible only to the extent that the first and
second persons are able to bridge the differences between them
and to overcome the indeterminacy of the situation in which they
confront one another. If, instead of the reductive dyadic model, one
were to choose a more complex model which takes into account the
full structure of communication, something all the more necessary
under contemporary conditions of the abstraction and generalization
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of communication in what is called a communication society, he
or she is in a better position to keep in mind the whole range
of cognitive structures and the dynamic relations among them.
To proceed from double contingency can mean different things,
depending on one’s theoretical perspective, but in each case the
consequences are negative. Either one reifies the cultural macro
frame and snuffs out the effects of social actors’ creative choice
and combination of framing devices, as Parsons does (Strydom
1999c); or one indeed makes culture dynamic and stresses the
competence of social actors yet fixes on the participants trying
to convince each other by means of the better argument while
overlooking the public which has to accept and validate the position
emerging from the debate, as Habermas does (Strydom 1999c,
2001, 2006); or one autopoietically fluidizes social reality as a
whole into recombinant cognitively relevant elements yet holds
onto a ‘mutualistic organization’ of social systems which cannot rise
above the fragmentation of a ‘semantic mediation’ of a ‘multiplicity
of double contingencies’, as Luhmann (1992: 379; Strydom 1999c)
does. One of the contributions of a critical cognitive sociology aware
of the whole range of phenomena specified in the above typology is
precisely to draw attention to the necessity of taking into account
the dimension systematically ignored by the neo-classical social
theorists.
To consider the process of communicative and discursive soci-
ation in terms of triple contingency instead, implies that the third
person point of view is taken into account above and beyond the
first and second person perspectives. It is to acknowledge that the
third point of view has a constitutive import for social reality
and, therefore, that the threefold configuration of the first, second
and third person perspectives represents the elementary generative
model of the social situation rather than the twofold relation usu-
ally adopted by social theorists. It is to recognize that the third
point of view represents society and that it, rather than simply
the first and second perspectives, serves as vehicle of the power to
define the social situation. This obviously has serious implications
for the establishment of master frames. Since World War II, both the
more general constitutive import – e.g. human rights (e.g. Donnelly
1998) – and the more specific defining power of the third point of
view – e.g. national, transnational and global public spheres (e.g.
Habermas 1998: 175–77) – are increasingly appreciated and are
therefore also becoming increasingly effective. The particular form
in which it asserts itself is that of the epistemic authority of the
public in discourse conducted in the medium of public communica-
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20 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
tion. Although not a direct participant taking either the first or the
second person perspective, the public exerts influence through its
epistemic role in public communication which has a direct bearing
not only on the collective identification of a problem but also its
collective definition as an issue deserving to be placed on the public
and political agenda. Above all, it also has a decisive impact on
the collective resolution of issues. It affects first the collective selec-
tion of cognitive structures from the available variety of competing
frames, secondly the collective acceptance of the resultant master
frame as appropriate to the given situation, and finally the collective
validation of this master frame as a new configuration of cognitive
structures (i.e. emotions, concepts and norms) that will henceforth,
at least for the time being, be significant for the organization of
social interaction, social relations and society.
The introduction of the concept of triple contingency invokes a
new level of contingency which becomes fully apparent only from
a cognitive sociological viewpoint. Considering the typology pre-
sented above, this phenomenon embraces and therefore must be
explicated with reference to a number of different levels. In the
first instance, it concerns the fact that a growing part of the cul-
tural macro frame, including an increasing number of constituent
cognitive structures and cultural models, is becoming increasingly
reflexive and thus discursively available. Secondly, relativizing Bour-
dieu, it refers to the fact that an increasing number of social actors
are not only gaining awareness of cognitive structures and cultural
models, but are also developing the ability to choose among them
and to employ them in processes of identity construction. Above all,
however, the new level of contingency is manifested in the increasing
ability and epistemic authority of the public to observe, appreciate
and evaluate such choices and identity constructions and thus to
guide the selection, definition and acceptance of a collectively valid
master frame.
Master frames, which are of special interest in empirically ori-
ented, cognitive sociological analysis, can be adequately understood
only in terms of triple contingency. But to be able to satisfy the
proper social scientific interest in the genesis of such master frames,
it is imperative for cognitive sociological analysis to focus on the
different types and levels of cognitive phenomena in the dynamic
process of their intentional construction and subsequent discursive
interrelation, selective reduction and synthetic recombination. This
is what distinguishes critical cognitive sociology (e.g. Miller 2002;
Eder 2007; Strydom 2000, 2002; Delanty 2001) from the more
prosaic forms of cognitive sociology available today.
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AN ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY:
SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
Catherine Brennan
The borders of the moral community for the majority of moral
philosophers and social theorists (at least in the West) did not un-
til recently, that is, until the development of ‘distance technology’
extend beyond relations between humans living in the present. An
ethics of proximity held sway anchored in moral norms regulating
face-to-face relations. The nature of ‘distance technology’ is such,
though, that the causal connections between the technological pro-
cesses which trigger activity and their final consequences remain
invisible. The ethical category that is called forth by this totally
novel situation in human history is responsibility. In this chapter I
reflect on what human responsibility might mean in the risk society
we inhabit at the threshold of the twenty-first century by engaging
in a dialogue primarily with Paul Ricoeur, Hans Jonas and Karl-
Otto Apel. The main thread holding my reflections together is that
vulnerability (not only of human beings but of all living creatures)
is the wellspring of an ethic of collective responsibility enacted to
deal with the consequences of the collective activities of humankind
in science and technology.
The Ecological Crisis
As Apel (1978) puts it, ‘the unchecked onslaught of technology upon
nature threatens to destroy the life space of all living creatures on
earth’ (83). The whole biosphere of the planet is revealed in its vul-
nerability due to humankind’s excessive technological intervention
and power. What is particularly striking about modern technolog-
ical interventions into nature is the spatial spread and time-span
of the cause-effect chains set in motion and the irreversibility of
many processes. Some of the major cause-effect chains set in motion
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include: environmental pollution, depletion of energy resources, at-
mospheric warming, rising sea levels, the destruction of rainforests,
nuclear risks and overpopulation.
In respect of non-human sentient beings, scientific progress in
many fields depends on their use in experiments. Modern meat
production, for instance, is largely dependent on the scientific ex-
ploitation of the life processes of domestic animals. Examples that
come to mind include: genetically generated deformations and the
minimization of the space available for the natural movements of
animals. More than that, non-human sentient beings living in their
natural habitats are increasingly at risk of becoming extinct. Simi-
larly, biodiversity is under serious threat because of the extinction
of a vast number of plants.
This rendering of the ecological crisis is constituted, under-
standably, by an anthropocentric point of view. However, a vulgar
anthropocentrism is not being propounded here which considers
nature simply as instrumental to the purposes of human life. Rather,
as Apel (1992) observes, human beings cannot avoid focusing on the
anorganic and organic components of the earth which constitute ‘the
ecosphere of humans and those plants and animals which make up a
community of fate with us’ (237). What could be destroyed, by the
technological interventions of homo faber into nature, is that part
of the biosphere that shares its conditions of life with humankind
and, thus, belongs to our ecosphere. As Clark and Stevenson (2003)
point out, we are already in a kind of ‘ecological overdraft’ since
current global demand is digging deep into the earth’s ‘capital stocks
of forest, fish and fertile soils’ in a way that is simply not sustain-
able (235). This intensification of the human exploitation of nature
through technology conjures up global, universal and irreversible
risks. ‘Risk’ has become, as Strydom (2002) observes, ‘the signature
of contemporary society’ (4).
The Instrumentalization of Human Nature
Technology is not only applied to ‘outer’ nature; it is now also
applied to ‘inner’ nature. To take the case of the major advances in
molecular genetics: what human beings are, ‘by nature’, is coming
increasingly within the ambit of biotechnological intervention in ‘the
civilization of the gene’ (Strydom, 1999a). As Habermas (2003) puts
it, gene manipulation is intertwined with issues touching upon the
very identity of the human species. Enhancing eugenics suggests the
technical use of the human body, obscuring the boundaries between
‘the naturally grown’ and ‘the made’, in other words, turning human
beings into artifacts. The future ‘human being’ is submitted to the
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intentions of third parties regarding their genetic make up which
is, in principle, non-modifiable (for the foreseeable future at least).
Will, as Habermas asks, ‘the genetic self-transformation and self-
optimization of the species’ lead to the increased autonomy of
human beings understood as self-determining, responsible ‘persons’
leading their own lives and treating one another with equal respect?
(29). Or, is it possible that genetic engineering tampering with the
genetic foundations of human life will bring about the ontological
transmutation of the human species? Will biotechnology erode a
sense of a common human ontology?
Another area where a direct technological challenge is being
posed to conventional wisdom about ‘the human’, relates to the pos-
sibility of a ‘post-human’ world involving the increasing overlapping
of humans and machines. Some thinkers envisage the emergence of
a new species, robo sapiens, involving a convergence between hu-
mans and robots and in the process de-emphasizing those aspects
of the human condition like embodiment (Menzel and D’Aluiso
2000; Moravec 1999) and consciousness (Brooks 2002) that intelli-
gent machines do not share (Haraway 1991; Hayles 1999; Latour
1994). Similarly, what are the implications of cyberspace technolo-
gies for embodied humans consequent upon the dislodgement of
the material body from the confines of its immediate lived space?
Modern Technology
Thus far, we have been reflecting upon technological interventions
into both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ nature. What is striking about modern
technology as we stand at the threshold of the twenty-first century
is that it has become autarchic; it generates its own legitimation. It
is the self-accelerating yet purposeless tendency of organized action
propelled forward by modern technology and freed from control
by moral impulse that is a cause for such grave concern. The very
availability of technological resources justifies their need and calls
for their ever more efficient application (Shibasaki 2005).
Of particular relevance also is the increasing fusion of scientific
and technological activities, in other words, the fading of the tra-
ditional separation between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research in what is
aptly called techno-science (Kurasawa 2004). Since World War Two,
techno-science has been increasingly penetrated by the state and the
market (‘big science’). Scientific discoveries are being increasingly
operationalized into technological applications that are exploitable
for military or commercial purposes.
Another important point is that the development of techno-
science allows action at a distance. The nature of ‘distance technol-
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ogy’ (in both a spatial and temporal sense) is such that the causal
connections between the technological processes which trigger ac-
tivity and their final effects remain invisible. Indeed, techno-science
has pushed the adiaphorization of social action to an extreme
level; social action is merely measurable against technical (purpose-
oriented/procedural) but not moral criteria.
The term, ‘adiaphoron’, originally meant a belief or custom
declared indifferent by the Church and, thereby, requiring no official
endorsement or prohibition. Put another way, the operation of
techno-science is associated with ‘ “floated” responsibility’, to use
Bauman’s (1993) apt term. That is to say, responsibility ‘belongs to
no one in particular, as everybody’s contribution to the final effect
is too minute or partial to be sensibly ascribed a causal function, let
alone the role of the decisive cause’ (126).
Besides techno-science allowing for action at a distance, long-
distance interaction by means of anonymous relationships in the
global capitalist market-economy leaves little room for an ethics of
proximity grounded in moral norms regulating face-to-face relations
in small groups such as the family and neighbourhood. For, after all,
human interaction in the world market is driven by factors such as
prices and realized through the medium of money.
Vulnerability and the Call to Responsibility?
The unchecked onslaught of techno-science leaves humankind in an
‘ethical vacuum’ (Jonas 1985). Techno-science has neutralized both
‘outer’ and ‘inner’ nature with respect to value. The ethical category
that is summoned by this ethical novum is responsibility. What kind
of responsibility is called for in the risk society to deal with the
effects and side-effects on both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ nature of the
collective activities of humankind in science and technology? The
ethical universe until recently was of ‘the here and now’, comprised
of contemporaries who were ‘sharers of a common present’ (Jonas
1973: 36). The ethical universe did not extend beyond human beings
in proximity to each other. In this regard, Kemp (1999) bequeaths
the important insight that a ‘certain insensibility towards the living
world’ has been part of our ethical inheritance in the West. What
is called for now in our scientific-technological society, according to
Kemp, is ‘bioethics’, that is, ‘an ethics for the entire living world’
(292). In a similar vein, Jonas (1973) contends that the biosphere
has become a ‘human trust’ (40). Westra (1994) emphasizes that
the principle of environmental integrity obliges us to refrain from
interfering in the healthy functioning of life-support systems. And
Apel (1987) speaks of ‘an ecologically oriented ethic of responsibility
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to the future’ (see also Strydom 1999b).
What these various declarations are pointing to is that the
traditional notion of responsibility rendered as the ability to regard
oneself as the author of one’s acts is incomplete. The incompleteness
resides in the fact that this kind of responsibility tied to individual
autonomy is oriented towards the past rather than the future; it
simply involves giving an account of one’s actions. ‘Thus’, as Ricoeur
(1995) remarks, in giving an account of action, ‘it is always towards
retrospection that we are drawn’ (16). What Ricoeur underlines is the
intrinsic relation between fragility and responsibility. Fragility is a
sufficient condition to qualify as a moral addressee. Put another way,
vulnerability is the wellspring of an ethic of responsibility. There
are two principal types of human vulnerability: natural threats
stemming both from our biology and environmental and other
natural disasters, and social threats arising from war, crime and the
like. The intrinsic vulnerability of human beings and non-human
sentient beings, plants, other living organisms and, indeed, the
whole biosphere calls for action by dint of an intrinsic relation
with the notion of responsibility. Responsibility is a ‘principle’ in
the sense that it is an imperative which nothing precedes. ‘We are
rendered responsible by the fragile’ (16). We are enjoined by various
kinds of living, finite fragile beings to help and to contribute to
their flourishing. It is always vulnerable ‘others’ (not just other
human beings) who render us responsible. In the final analysis, I
would argue that it is humans’ acknowledgement of their very own
fragility that makes them receptive to the call for responsibility from
other living creatures qua vulnerable creatures.
What is equally important is that we are directed towards the
‘future’ of fragile beings in need of care to survive and flourish.
Even though human beings share vulnerability with other forms
of being, the difference is that humans as ‘rational’ beings can be
aware of and are able to respond to and make choices about their
own vulnerability and that of other beings (Buttle 2003). Finally,
the intrinsic link between fragility and responsibility means that
responsibility is decoupled from reciprocity. It goes without saying
that the imperative on the part of humans living today to take care
of the environment to ensure that there may be future generations
cannot be reciprocated. Similarly, the onus on human beings to take
care of non-human sentient beings, plants, other living organisms
and so on cannot be reciprocated.
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Towards an Ontological Grounding of a Planetary Ethic of
Collective Responsibility
It is Jonas’ (2001) central contention that an ethic of responsibility
‘must be founded on a principle discoverable in the nature of things
lest it fall victim to subjectivism or other forms of relativity’ (284).
An ethic of responsibility must be grounded in the nature of being,
of which humankind is a part. Jonas is stipulating that it is necessary
to provide a rational foundation from metaphysical premises for a
new macro-ethic of collective responsibility for the consequences of
humankind’s collective technological interventions into nature.
What Jonas sets out to convey is the objective reality of being
as a Good-in-itself. His claim is that the current ecological crisis
brought about by human technology is illuminated by reference to
the intrinsic value of all living beings. Only if ‘what exists is of value,
then its being will have a claim on me. . . its value has a justified
claim on me’ (1996: 102). According to Jonas, value exists in living
nature due to each being’s inclination to persist in its own being.
Purposive existence (conatus) is not a special attribute of human
beings but is present throughout living nature. ‘ “Value”. . . contains
an immanent claim on reality that says it is better for value to be than
not to be’ (102). All organisms, not only humans, have ‘concern’ for
their own being and reach out to the world to prevent non-being.
Value and disvalue are not human creations but are essential to
life itself. If the different forms of living beings have no worth,
to begin with, humankind cannot discover their value. More than
that, humankind itself would have no value either. All organisms,
then, are ‘ends-in-themselves’; they value whatever contributes to
their existence and well-being. In other words, Jonas extends the
category of existence to all organisms.
Even if purposive existence is an attribute of all living beings,
Jonas does not espouse biotic egalitarianism. Not all living beings
are of equal oral standing. Although all living beings are ends in
themselves, they have those ends ‘by nature’. On the other hand, the
principle of purposiveness has reached its highest (and most danger-
ous) level in human beings through the freedom to set themselves
their own ends and the power to carry them out. Moreover, humans
have special dignity as moral agents, according to Jonas, since hu-
man beings can be responsible to ends beyond their own vital ones.
Humans can have non self-referential aims. ‘Only human freedom
permits the setting and choosing of ends and thereby the willing
inclusion of the ends of others in one’s immediate own, to the point
of fully and devotedly making them one’s own’(1985: 235). Human
beings, then, have the capacity to appreciate the value which other
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living beings place on their own being. What, in the final analysis,
follows from Jonas’ ontological grounding of an ethic of collective
responsibility against the backdrop of the current ecological crisis
and advances in biotechnology, is the ranking of values. In other
words, even if the ethical extends to all living beings, a gradualist
analysis of human responsibilities towards various living beings like
fellow humans, non-human sentient beings and plants needs to be
worked through, each according to its value.
Jonas’ claim that the development of a planetary ethic of col-
lective responsibility to deal with technological developments must
ultimately be derived from a weighty metaphysics is a serious bone
of contention, especially, since we live in a modern postmetaphysical
world. It is my contention that there is no inconsistency in referring
to ‘essential properties’ of various living beings, whilst simultane-
ously opposing the idea of a metaphysical essence. Essentialism of
some kind cannot be ruled out tout court. Besides, any living being
with no essential properties is to be of no sort at all, in short, to
be inconceivable. Essentialism simply entails that each type of living
being shares the same fundamental properties. What is being ad-
vocated is a ‘moderate, non-deterministic essentialism’, as opposed
to a ‘strong, deterministic essentialism’. As Sayer (1997) remarks,
essentialism in the philosophical sense is an ontological doctrine
which simply states that ‘objects have certain essential properties
which make them one kind of thing rather than any other’ (456).
Hence, the investigation of the essential properties of various living
beings can make a fundamental contribution to establishing the basis
of moral obligation to them and to promoting their flourishing.
Even if an ontological grounding of a macro-ethic of collec-
tive responsibility is required for the consequences of humanity’s
collective technological interventions into both ‘inner’ and ‘outer’
nature’ in the risk society, moral action will not be motivated by
such ontological commitment. Jonas (1996) does, in fact, acknowl-
edge that ‘in the last analysis my argument can do no more than
give rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for
a thoughtful person – an option that of course has its own inner
power of persuasion’ (108). The claim of any value-possessing liv-
ing being such as an endangered species of animal on the human
being only ‘becomes concrete (1) when this being is a vulnerable
one, as living beings with their intrinsic fragility always are; and
(2) when it, with this vulnerability, enters the field of my actions
and is at the mercy of my power’ (108). What is being underlined
here by Jonas is that human motivation to take responsibility for
any value-possessing living being is predicated upon that being’s
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fragility being acknowledged and experienced in a concrete way. To
reiterate, it is vulnerability that is, ultimately, the wellspring of an
ethic of collective responsibility.
Towards a Macro-Ethic of Co-Operative Responsibility
A striking omission in Jonas’ ontologically grounded planetary ethic
of collective responsibility for the effects and side effects of hu-
manity’s collective technological interventions into nature relates
to the primordial sociality of human beings. Humans, after all,
cannot be conceived of outside of a social context. It is in this
regard that it is worth considering Karl-Otto Apel’s macro-ethic of
co-operative responsibility, a form of responsibility that applies to
human beings as members of a community of communication and
co-operation. To begin with, Apel (1992) contends that from Jonas’
metaphysical premises ‘it seems. . . completely impossible, in princi-
ple to derive. . . the duty of respecting the equal rights of all living
human beings with regard to the future existence of humankind’
(240). Jonas’ ‘proposed formulations. . . can only prescribe that life’s
and especially humankind’s existence ought to continue’ (241). As
Apel goes on to say, it is conceivable from Jonas’ metaphysical
premises that unjust solutions could be enforced (for example, a
racist solution of letting the people of the Developing World starve)
to ensure the future existence of humanity.
This being the case, Apel argues that in attempting to ground
an ethic of future-directed co-responsibility for the collective effects
and side-effects of humankind’s technological interventions into
nature, we must not fall behind the Kantian principle of the uni-
versalizability of justice understood as generalized reciprocity and,
thereby, the solidarity of all human beings as reasonable beings. This
principle can only be grounded from the vantage-point of a strict
transcendental pragmatic reflection on what human beings on pain
of self-contradiction must have acknowledged as normative when
they actually engage in argumentation. Let us flesh out this issue
further.
Rather than ontologically grounding a macro-ethic of co-opera-
tive responsibility to deal with the consequences of techno-science in
the risk society, Apel endorses a renovated transcendental philoso-
phy which can rationally ground co-responsibility in general and can
ground the formal procedural principle of discourse that governs the
organization of co-responsibility in particular. What Apel has un-
dertaken is a a re-conceptualization of co-operative responsibility by
means of discourse theory. He is saying that it can be demonstrated
by rational argument through a conception of co-responsibility,
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which must be related a priori to humans as members of a com-
munity of speech and co-operation, that human beings ought to be
and can, indeed, be reasonably responsible. Apel’s (1987) essential
point is that when human beings are seriously arguing they have
already acknowledged an ethic of discourse and of responsibility in
the sense of the universalized reciprocity of rights and duties that
belongs to a potentially unlimited community of argumentation. Or
as Habermas (1992) puts it: ‘Only those norms may claim to be
valid that could meet with the consent of all those affected in their
role as participants in a practical discourse’ (197). The agreement
made possible in a practical discourse depends upon the participants’
inviolable freedom to respond with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to validity claims.
And the discursive enactment and organization of co-responsibility
in the communication societies of advanced modernity is, by the
same token, contingent upon the uninfringeable freedom of the
individual.
Those human beings who seriously engage in an argumentative
discourse must also presuppose that real life problems like the eco-
logical crisis and the advancement of biotechnology can only be
dealt with responsibly by reasonable argument. By seriously rais-
ing a contentious issue such as the ecological crisis in a practical
discourse, the participants have, in principle, already accepted co-
operative responsibility for solving the problem. Moreover, they
have accepted the equality of rights and duties in problem-solving
of a real community of communication. Furthermore, given the nec-
essary counterfactual anticipation of an unlimited ideal community
of communication, the participants in a practical discourse have also
recognized, in principle, that all valid solutions to problems would
have to be capable of being freely assented to by all members of
the unlimited ideal community of communication, if they were able
to participate in the discussion. And the foregoing implies that the
problem-solving responsibility on the part of the members of the
real community of communication extends also to the members of
the unlimited community of communication who it may be assumed
will exist in the future. In sum, co-responsibility, according to Apel,
can only be practiced and organized discursively.
One final point is that Apel’s macro-ethic of co-responsibility
is restrictive (like all deontological theories) in that it prioritizes
procedures for the justification of social norms/rightness claims over
conceptions of the good/values. A discursively redeemable concept
of the good life is incompatible with late modernity. Procedural-
ism is deemed by Apel and Habermas to be the only option in
the communication societies of late modernity, given far-reaching
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differences in values, worldviews and forms of life. It is against
this backdrop that Apel’s planetary ethic of co-responsibility out-
lines the restrictive conditions which make it possible for different
forms of life to engage in dialogue, for instance, the different views
expressed on global warming. The restrictive conditions/norms are
formal and procedural (not substantive) concerning the processes of
communication and co-operation. To re-iterate, all the participants
in practical discourses, whatever their form of life, have, in principle,
an equal right to solve problems and equal co-responsibility.
A Macro-Ethic of Co-Operative Responsibility: Critical Reflections
Apel’s discourse ethics revolves, as already shown, around a rational
validation of a planetary, intersubjectively binding ethic of co-
responsibility for the future of humanity and other living beings. It
is only in argumentative discourse (a reflective form of communica-
tion) that validity claims can in principle be criticized and dealt with
in a universalistic manner that transcends the limits of a particular
community. That said, there is no moral principle that is adhered to
for the simple fact that it is reasoned through in argumentation (Ute
2006). Abolishing or lessening threats to the survival of humans,
animals, plants and all other forms of life in the risk society of the
twenty-first century requires much more than openness to moral
argumentation. A deontological theory like Apel’s macro-ethic of
co-responsibility may be very good at explaining how to ground
and apply norms/rightness claims. However, it is still unable to
answer fully the question as to why human beings should exer-
cise co-operative responsibility at all for all living beings. In this
respect, Apel’s own answer that when one seriously argues one is
by definition already determined to be moral is not the full story.
What I will be suggesting in the following critical reflections is that
the capacity of Apel’s macro-ethic of co-operative responsibility to
transfer rational insight into ethical motivation in the risk society
of the twenty-first century is strengthened if much more systematic
attention is focused on: bio-bodily existence and vulnerability, the
human emotions, the moral imagination and advocatory represen-
tation. In other words, argumentative discourse cannot carry all of
the moral weight. In the course of these critical reflections I will
also engage with some of Habermas’ ideas.
Bio-Bodily Existence and Vulnerability
Apel’s (and Habermas’) discourse ethics highlights the fact that
humans are, first and foremost, rational beings. However, it is not
being ‘rational’ but being ‘vulnerable’ which, in my view, primarily
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makes human beings into ‘moral subjects’. The moral significance
of formal discursive procedures through which co-responsibility is
enacted and organized, only makes sense for those humans open
to their own vulnerability and that of other living creatures in
the first place. And vulnerability, that is, our disposition towards
sickness, disease, disability and death, is predicated upon a bio-bodily
existence. In this regard, Skirbekk (1994) notes that ‘a biological
bodily existence is necessary for a competent moral discussant.
Those who cannot be morally harmed, since they lack vulnerability,
cannot be moral subjects and therefore cannot be moral discussants’
(104) see also Haber (2006). The participants in a practical discourse
(moral discussants) would not be capable of fully making sense of
the validity claims of other participants if they were not, to begin
with, capable of being touched by their fragility. Fragility imposes
itself on us in a non-argumentative way in that the relation to fellow
participants in practical discourses is first of all a matter of inter-
corporeality. In this regard, Keane (1984) points out that human
communication ‘is strikingly and sensuously “embodied” ’ (174).
Speakers’ bodies in practical discourses carry and convey meanings
that influence validity claims to rightness.
Habermas (2003) does acknowledge that: ‘Normative regulation
of interpersonal relations may be seen as a porous shell protecting a
vulnerable body, and the person incorporated in this body, from the
contingencies they are exposed to’ (33). But, on the other hand, he
remarked much earlier on that ‘. . . “reason”. . . has no body, cannot
suffer and also arouses no passion’ (1982: 221). As for Apel (2000),
he concedes that any theory of discourse presupposes the bodily
existence of human beings; bodily existence is uncircumventable.
And he, quite rightly, simultaneously hammers home the point that
an appreciation of the vulnerable, corporeal other is impossible apart
from a communicatively rational context. Discourse ethics enables
human beings to become conscious of their own vulnerability and
that of other forms of life. In a word, vulnerability has to be
discursively communicable.
In a similar vein, what is required of an ethic of co-responsibility
practiced and organized discursively to deal with the inexorable
onslaught of technological interventions into ‘outer’ and ‘inner’
nature in the risk society of the twenty-first century, is to draw out
more fully the fragility of the corporeal existence of living creatures,
both human and non-human. Empirical research by Macnaghten
(2003), for instance, would suggest that environmental concerns
such as environmental pollution, the depletion of energy resources
and atmospheric warming are more likely to be experienced and felt
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strongly when they impinge upon the human body in the lifeworld,
the domain of lived experience. Individuals tend to appreciate
their personal environments when connected to embodied everyday
practices like gardening, walking, climbing, boating and so on.
According to Macnaghten, the depiction of the ecological crisis
simply as a set of global issues remains abstracted and cut off from
embodied, lived experience in the everyday world.
The Human Emotions
There are various traditions as to the relevance of emotions to ethics.
The tradition which can be traced back to Aristotle considers moral
education to involve learning to feel the correct emotion to the
correct degree at the correct time. What follows is that all emotions
are viewed as intrinsically relevant to ethics, not just empathy and
sympathy. On the other hand, the tradition going back to the Stoics
denies that emotions have any moral worth; they should be stamped
out in the pursuit of the good life. The advantage of this approach
lies in highlighting the importance of impartiality to ethics. This
position informed that of Kant and it is arguable that it prevails in
Apel’s and Habermas’ discourse ethics, even if the emotions (as we
shall see) are acknowledged, in particular, by Habermas.
It could be argued that a rationalist prejudice is built into Apel’s
and Habermas’ discourse ethics and, thereby, into the macro-ethic
of co-operative responsibility. What Apel and Habermas espouse,
to use Benhabib’s (1990) apt phrase, is ‘ethical rationalism’, that is,
‘a theoretical position which views moral judgements as the core
of moral theory, and which neglects that the moral self is not a
moral geometer but an embodied, finite, suffering, and emotive
being’ (356). A fundamental weakness inherent in the cognitive
proceduralism underpinning discourse ethics is that the emotional
bases of moral judgements are not subject to rigorous scrutiny. The
inner logic of moral argumentation involves, at bottom, a cognitive
task.
Even if the emotional bases of moral judgements are not given
systematic attention in discourse ethics, Habermas (1995) acknowl-
edges that the human emotions are indispensable in gaining access to
the domain of the moral; they sensitize us to moral phenomena. He
states that: ‘Feelings form the basis of our perception of something
as moral. Someone who is blind to moral phenomena is blind to
feeling. He lacks a sense. . . for the suffering of a vulnerable creature
who has a claim to have its integrity, both personal and bodily, pro-
tected. And this sense is manifestly closely related to sympathy or
compassion’ (174).It is worth noting here that collapsing the human
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emotions into subjective feelings is a flawed position. Emotions also
have a cognitive component in that they are forms of evaluative
judgements about phenomena in the world. Moreover, the human
emotions are associated with bodily sensations, a behavioural com-
ponent manifest in expressions via gestures, and a motivational
component propelling participants in practical discourses to act. In
a word, it is compassion that alerts us to and discloses the vulnera-
bility of ‘the other’ which, in turn, triggers the reasoning process in
moral judgements.
Furthermore, Habermas (1990) underlines the fact that the emo-
tions play an important role in the justification of norms in practical
discourses. He declares that ‘empathy – the ability to project oneself
across cultural distances into alien and at first sight incomprehen-
sible conditions of life, behavioral predispositions, and interpretive
perspectives – is an emotional prerequisite for ideal role taking,
which requires everyone to take the perspective of all others’ (174).
In other words, empathy facilitates the cultivation of sensitivity to
the particularities of different viewpoints in moral argumentation.
It obviously follows that the discursive practice and organization
of co-operative responsibility in the risk society is likewise anchored
in various emotions. Interestingly enough, Apel in response to
feminists contending that ‘justice’ (equal rights and equal duties) is
privileged in the ethic of co-responsibility at the expense of ‘care’,
claims that ‘care’ ‘is already there!’ (Griffioen and Van Woudenberg
1990: 17).
Jonas (1983) in his endeavour to provide an ontological ground-
ing for collective responsibility also stipulates that future ethics
should be guided by a heuristics of fear subordinated, in turn, to
the principle of uncertainty (31). The gist of the heuristics of fear
is that there are certain risks which humans possessed of such great
technological power in the risk society are responsibly not allowed
to take. That is to say, ‘the prophecy of doom’, if it is grounded
in sound reasoning, will have greater force than ‘the prophecy of
bliss’ to motivate human beings to control the unchecked onslaught
of technology upon nature. Fear, as Barbalet (1995) remarks, ‘is an
anticipation of a present threat or danger’ (20). The object of fear
is ‘an expectation of negative outcome’ and fear is the emotional
response to that danger (19). It is arguable that the commonality
of fear characterizes the risk society. Such an emotional climate of
fear may, indeed, motivate individuals and groups of individuals to
enter into practical discourses and enact co-operative responsibility
discursively.
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The Moral Imagination
In addition to the embodied and emotional dimensions of an ethic
of co-operative responsibility practiced and organized discursively
being drawn out in a much more systematic way, a specifically moral
imagination also needs to be mobilized to deal with the consequences
of technological interventions into ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ nature. The
crux of the problem is that the nature of ‘distance technology’ (in
both a spatial and temporal sense) is such that, as Apel (1984) puts
it, ‘it is now scarcely possible for humans to be directly affected
sensuously and emotionally by the consequences of their actions’
(251). There is an ever increasing gap between the world of human
action via technology and the consequences of that very action in
the organically conditioned sensuous-emotional lifeworld. Hence,
Apel calls for ‘a rational foundation, together with the mobilization
of a specifically moral imagination that, among other things, would
have to be able to generalize love of neighbour in the direction of
love of all humanity’ (1978: 83).
Mobilizing individuals/groups of individuals in different societies
and cultures at the threshold of the twenty-first century to exercise
co-operative responsibility through formal discursive procedures
is contingent on a particular moral-imaginary horizon, an ideal
community of communication or an ideal speech situation (Apel
1990). This communicative ideal state of affairs is understood
by Apel in the sense of the formation of a consensus through
the unconstrained constraint of argument in discourse. Engaging in
reasoned argumentation about any contentious issue like the current
ecological crisis is driven forward by the ideality of domination-free
communication, that is, a society in which inclusive and non-coercive
rational discourse between free and equal participants occurs.
Apel (1990) stresses that the moral-imaginary horizon that is
an ideal communication community is a ‘regulative ideal’ to which
nothing empirical can fully correspond. However, he simultaneously
emphasizes that moral discussants in arguing must anticipate coun-
terfactually an ideal speech situation, ‘and thus to a certain extent
assume the formal structure of an alternative or counterworld to
the existing reality’ (47). He hastens to add that this very anticipa-
tion does not refer to a ‘concrete utopia’ that one could envisage
as the future emergent state of the social world, but ‘only to the
normative preconditions of ideal communication, whose empirical
realization in a concrete society must indeed also be subject to ad-
ditional preconditions of historical individualization – e.g. concrete
institutions and conventions’ (48). In short, the moral imagination
igniting the practice and organization of co-operative responsibility
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in the risk society is rife with creative-productive tension in that the
utopian realization of an ideal communication community may not
be conceived and, yet simultaneously, must of necessity be envisaged.
The moral imaginary of discourse ethics incorporates all lin-
guistically competent humans in a society of free and open com-
munication. They are all representatives of the reasoning public
sphere and as such can place in question issues of public impor-
tance like the ecological crisis and genetic engineering in practical
discourses. The reason why the moral imaginary that is an ideal
speech situation holds such promise in the global world of ‘distance
technology’, relates to the fact that in Habermas’ (1992) words:
‘Discourse generalizes, abstracts, and stretches the presuppositions
of context-bound communicative actions by extending their range
to include competent subjects beyond the provincial limits of their
own particular form of life’ (202). There is a more universal basis for
agreement to be found in the capacity of humans to communicate
and reach a mutual understanding or rational consensus.
The moral imaginary horizon that is the ideal communica-
tion community incorporates those linguistically competent humans
who can participate in practical discourses and, thereby, enact co-
operative responsibility. What is required, in particular, against the
backdrop of the ecological crisis at the threshold of the twenty-first
century is a moral imagination to embrace ‘all’ living creatures,
not just linguistically competent humans. What is called for is a
leap of imagination to extend the borders of the moral commu-
nity to include all living beings, even if all these forms of life are
not of equal moral worth. Admittedly, discourse ethics (as we shall
see below) pays attention to various living beings ‘affected’ by is-
sues raised in practical discourses. However, how humans imagine
their relations with other living creatures in the risk society of the
twenty-first century is worthy of much more careful scrutiny. In
this regard, the moral imagination might be ignited by drawing on
the resources of ancient myth in which, for instance, ‘humanimals’
figured prominently (Murray 2007).
Advocatory Representation
According to Apel (1987), the fundamental demand put forward
in any practical discourse ‘consists in the directive that in principle
all ethically relevant problems in the practical discourses of those
affected by a given issue are to be solved in accordance with the
ability of the solutions decided upon to command the assent of
all those affected’ (26). The postulate to include all those affected
could involve: linguistically incompetent and nearly brain dead or
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severely damaged humans, future generations of humans, higher
mammals and other non-human sentient beings, organisms in gen-
eral, including plants and biological systems, and inorganic nature,
in view of its importance for life and living creatures. None of these
mentioned who could possibly be affected by decisions made in
practical discourses can, however, participate; they are not capable
of speaking in the reasoning public sphere.
The fact that those affected by a given issue discussed in a
practical discourse could include future generations of humans
(e.g. genetic engineering tampering with the genetic foundations
of human life) and linguistically incompetent humans, weakens the
consensual dimension and the principle of reciprocity built into
moral argumentation (Skirbekk 1997). The fundamental criterion
for entry into discourse is, after all, to be a ‘moral discussant’,
that is, a person who is linguistically competent and who is willing
to subject nonvalidated norms to consensual validation by other
moral discussants. Participants in practical discourses must be able to
express in their utterances semantically meaningful propositions that
make discursively appraisable claims about the world. Furthermore,
all those other living beings already mentioned who could be affected
by matters raised in practical discourses are ‘moral subjects’ in that
they are finite and vulnerable and, therefore, capable of being
harmed in a morally relevant sense. Habermas (1995) observes, for
instance, that: ‘Animals confront us as vulnerable creatures whose
physical integrity we must protect for its own sake’ (106). He also
notes that there are ‘good ethical reasons’ to protect plants and
other species (111).
In view of the fact that so many moral subjects could be affected
by the deliberations taking place in practical discourses, Apel (1992)
suggests the representation of their interests through some form of
advocacy. He argues for a ‘relationship of responsible care-taking
by good advocates’ (250). The greater the difference in temporal,
spatial, cultural and species terms between those who represent
(moral discussants) and those who are represented (moral subjects)
in practical discourses, as Skirbekk (1997) highlights, the more
those representing will have to rely on ‘discursive interpretations of
contributions from various scientific and scholarly disciplines about
harm and well-being in the various cases’ (68).
Bearing in mind that conflicts between the life-interests of all the
different living beings are inevitable, practical discourses provide the
best forum to discuss the criteria for conferring moral status on vari-
ous living beings and, thereby, our human obligations to them. To be
sure, ontological issues as to the nature of different living beings (e.g.
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 41 –- #83 i
i
i
i
i
i
AN ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY 41
animal ethology) will arise in the course of moral argumentation.
However, the advantage of discourse ethics over Jonas’ ontological
grounding of collective responsibility is to accentuate the fact that
the different forms of being are not just ontologically given. Rather,
we can only relate pragmatically through our linguistic practices to
the nature and value of different living beings and, thereby, work
through our human obligations to them. Stated otherwise, gaining
knowledge about the nature and value of different living creatures
is impossible apart from a communicatively rational context. Being
a good advocate is dependent upon the interests and worth of these
creatures being discursively communicable.
It goes without saying, as Apel observes, that a broader an-
thropocentric perspective (as indicated earlier) will operate as a
normative criterion when the human treatment of animals, plants
and the like is being deliberated upon. In Skirbekk’s (1994) words,
what ‘responsible care-taking by good advocates’ entails is ‘ethical
gradualism’. There is more than one criterion of moral standing im-
plying different obligations on the part of humans as moral agents
to different living beings and, indeed, to inorganic nature. Sen-
tience, for instance, is an important criterion of moral status in our
collective responsibility towards animals.
The reflections in this chapter on what human responsibility
might entail in the risk society we live in at the threshold of the
twenty-first century have been confined to the normative level. This
does not mean, however, that a strict division between ethics and
politics is being advocated. Briefly, discourse ethics and, concomi-
tantly, the macro-ethic of collective responsibility bring, as Strydom
(1999) says ‘a public level of responsibility’ (68) to deal with the
effects and side-effects on both ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ nature of the
collective activities of humankind in science and technology. This
is tantamount to saying that techno-science must be enframed in
vibrant reasoning public spheres where not only the interests of
humans but the advocatory interests of other living creatures and
habitats can be taken into account (Latour 2004).
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THE RECONSTRUCTION
OF SOCIOLOGICAL
LEARNING THEORY:
COGNITIVE SOCIOLOGY,
NORMATIVITY, AND
DISCURSIVITY
Patrick O’Mahony
To those oriented to a sociological theory of learning, it seems
evident that there is a tradition to draw off, albeit mostly a heterodox
one. Some years ago, Max Miller instanced Durkheim, Mead,
the early Piaget and Vygotsky as evidence for the presence of a
theory of learning in diagnosing the ontogenetic and evolutionary
potentialities arising from social processes (Miller 2002). To most of
the rest of the sociological community, the existence of a sociological
theory of learning is understood at most in a latent sense: theorists
who seek to understand the emergence of states of society as an
achievement in some sense could be said to indirectly utilize a
conception of learning. However, when a social scientific concept of
learning is explicitly fore-grounded it is normally conceived, on the
one hand, instrumentally and narrowly as in the policy-theoretical
concept of ‘social’ or ‘policy’ learning (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
eds, 1993) or, on the other hand, primarily individually as in Mead
and Habermas, even though the intention of both is ultimately to
comprehend society supra-individually, intersubjectively and intra-
subjectively as a symbolic and normative reality.
Some twenty years ago Piet Strydom, taking a lead from and
closely interacting with other writers working in a sociological idiom
in the tradition of Habermas, Klaus Eder and Max Miller, began
the task of reformulating an explicit sociological learning theory.
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This work was developed in a variety of forms, published journal or
book articles, research reports and unpublished manuscripts. This
earlier work of Strydom could be said to follow two main and
related directions; the critique of Habermas’ ontogenetic account
of learning and a sympathetic reception of the work of Miller
and Eder, who develop an emphatically sociological and collective
account of learning (Strydom 1987; Miller 1986; Eder 1985).
This was followed by a second phase that builds on the first, in
which Strydom develops an account of cognitive sociology that is
both reconstructivist and constructivist (Strydom 2000, 2006a and
2006b). This second phase on the whole only obliquely references
the earlier development of collective learning theory, but the whole
enterprise is ultimately founded upon those earlier gains. Much of
the work carried out by Strydom in both these periods, and to
some extent also that of the other authors writing on collective
learning, involved a sympathetic reception but nonetheless critical
reconstruction of Habermas’ work.
Rather than beginning in the first section of this essay with
an extended account of the ‘epistemic contours’ of the theory of
collective learning, I want instead, in a first step, to derive it from
a series of theoretical and methodological shifts in which Strydom
focalizes it in his own work and in the broader context represented,
chiefly but not exclusively, by Habermas, I will do this by addressing
three dimensions of Strydom’s development of a social pragmatic
theory comprising, firstly, the constructivist inspired reassessment
of reconstructivism; secondly, the move from moral development
to the social evolution of practical reason; and, thirdly, the shift
in emphasis from double to triple contingency. In a second step,
I will move on to the Strydom’s later cognitive emphasis, which
in reality is not so much a new departure as a concretization of
some of the developments of the earlier phase. These two steps
will enable me in a third step to formulate, albeit in brief overview,
Strydom’s distinctive shaping of a theory of collective learning. In
the second major section of the essay, building on the above, I
will move on to a theoretical-methodological specification within
a cognitive framework of the role of collective learning in the
democratic public sphere. Here, I will also pursue a number of
steps, firstly, fore-grounding the crucial dimension of a comprehen-
sive macro-sociological perspective I will seek to show that other
theory traditions need to be incorporated within Styrdom’s basic
framework to develop an adequate macro-sociological position. I
will then, secondly, seek to show how such a theory can be made
dynamic as a cognitive-pragmatic-discursive account of the mech-
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anisms of production or transformation of cognitive models and
cognitive structures by means of discursive processes. Thirdly, I will
place this dynamic model within a macro-sociological model of the
public sphere, giving some illustrative examples of how collective
learning may be comprehended within such a framework. I will
conclude with some brief reflections on what I consider to be the
outstanding significance of Strydom’s work, and that of the above-
named authors, for advancing the claims of a normative sociology
of public culture.
Social Pragmatics, the Cognitive Turn and Collective Learning
Strydom’s work from at least the late 80s onwards turns towards
the development of a social pragmatic framework that may be un-
derstood as a sociological variant of the normative pragmatic theory
of Habermas and the transcendental epistemology of both Apel
and Habermas. Strydom’s concern, important for the sociological
relation to critical theory, is to orient the theory and practice of
the social sciences in a normative direction that would retain some
of the explanatory advantages of evolutionary theory while remain-
ing open to the non-linear dynamics of a contingent, emerging
world. His work is united, as is that of Habermas, by its norma-
tive urgency both in the sense of learning from history and taking
an evolution-theoretically guided stance on the challenges of the
present. It is different from Habermas, as outlined further below,
by a general concern with the trajectory of normative innovation
within a discourse theory that remains distinctively sociological. In
the following short sections, I will document the major moments
whereby Strydom, departing from Habermas in both senses of the
term, lays out the foundations for a discourse theory of collective
learning.
Towards a Reconstructivist Constructivism
The idea of a reconstructive method has been central to the tran-
scendental epistemology of Apel and Habermas since the 1960s.
Terrence Kelly nicely describes reconstructivism in a paper primarily
exploring reconstructivism in Rawls (Kelly 2001). Reconstructivism
is a project shared between philosophy and the social sciences that
identifies the various intuitions embedded in a particular practice so
as to make explicit the implicit formal aspects of the practice. It then
‘idealizes’ the concepts built into this explication process into gen-
eral rules of social interaction. This approach is present in the work
of Habermas since the early 1970s (Habermas 1973; Alford 1985).
Following Alford, Habermas uses the term ‘reconstruction’ to char-
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acterize philosophical reflections on such transcendental questions
as what cognitive abilities are necessary for science or morality to
exist (Alford 1985: 330). More specifically in the sphere of practical
reason, the reconstructivism of Habermas and Apel involves the
transfer of the ‘moving spirit’ of the regulative transcendental idea
from a priori moral intuition to the formal presuppositions of lin-
guistic communication. This could be understood as a post-Kantian
reconstructive transcendentalism focused on the necessary cognitive
and intersubjective presuppositions of language use. These presup-
positions are understood as a form of communicative rationality
that grounds the formal and universalizable moral principles regu-
lating social relations and the human relation to nature. In social
evolutionary terms, such principles underpin the telos of moral uni-
versalization that is distinctive of modernity and which is achieved
by means of communicative rationalization. The direction of com-
municatively realized moral universalization proceeding against the
backdrop of social problems in need of a solution – e.g. violence,
inequality, non-recognition, loss of meaning, global endangerment –
takes the form of a social a priori that is progressively institution-
alized in modernity. This process can be reconstructed and made
explicit as immanent but not yet fully realized communicative ratio-
nality, with the reconstructive method providing the twin theoretical
advantages of normative grounding and anticipation.
While reconstructivism in this sense remains integral to Stry-
dom’s later cognitive turn, for long he has criticized it for over-
anticipating and hence subsuming social practices.
An accentuated social pragmatics would rather give situated
social practices a generative and creative role. In this way, both im-
plicit, habitual rules and socially transcendent but at the same time
open and revisable socio-cognitive structures would be recognized
as shaping both the initiation and ongoing application of explicit
principles of moral universalization. The revaluation of the con-
stitutive role of social practices and the accompanying recognition
of contingency and non-linear dynamics would open the path to
a constructivist approach that would have communicative practices
in social situations as its generative core, though this constructivist
approach would still be reconstructively informed by cognitive struc-
tures. Such overarching cognitive structures, for example, political
rights, social justice or ecological responsibility, are generated from
the collective need interpretations articulated in human social and
natural relations and as such follow a logic of collective competence
that reaches beyond but does not exclude the individual and inter-
subjective model of cognitive competence developed by Habermas.
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This reconstructive constructivism and constructivist reconstruc-
tivism marks a decisively sociological orientation – that Strydom
would later methodologically supplement by frame analysis – that
could both ground a three-fold collective, intersubjective and sub-
jective pragmatism that could both clarify criteria and capacities for
social action and place them within the empirically manifested social
conditions of communication (Strydom 2000; Eder 1985).
From Moral Development to Social Evolution
The theory of collective learning emerges within the interstices of a
social pragmatic reformulation of Habermas’ ontogenetic linking of
moral learning and social innovation. In an important article in the
late 80s (Strydom 1987), Strydom criticizes Habermas’ individualist
account of learning in which the individual subject is assumed to
do the learning, so generating rational potentialities that can sub-
sequently be practically applied. Strydom, building from the early
Piaget and a reception of Miller and Eder, proposes a move from
Habermas’ genetic individualism to a genetic interactionist perspec-
tive in which a ‘collectivity or intersubjective experiential context
serves, on the one hand, as the objective condition of individual
learning and, on the other, is simultaneously the outcome of col-
lective learning which is able to transpose the collective effect of
individual actions not only into the object but also into the medium
of learning’ (1987: 269). He ascribes to Habermas the individualist
position described above and claims that in conceiving of learn-
ing in this way he cannot grasp the constitutive role of collective
action in bringing about normative innovation. This conception of
supra-subjective learning also draws off Apel’s re-working of Pierce’s
three-fold semiotics – signs, signified reality, sign interpreter – in
which the pragmatic role of the sign interpreter in producing knowl-
edge and learning is re-positioned as a collective process with the
idea of the ‘unlimited community of communication’ (Apel 1980).
For Apel, knowledge and learning occurs within a collective frame-
work in which the collectivity as well as the individual learns.
Following Eder, Strydom not alone emphasizes learning as a
collective achievement but also decouples learning from practice, an
association that is prevalent in the individualist, ontogenetic model
in the sense that practice is regarded as the external sign of internal
learning. He claims instead that collective learning processes make
available collectively utilizable knowledge but do not guarantee that
such knowledge will actually be rationally utilized. The extent to
which collective learning becomes available for rational utilization by
its transposition into the normative structures of society determines
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the direction and extent of the social evolution of practical reason.
Collective learning processes themselves do not guarantee a gain in
practical evolutionary rationality; only transformations in collective
practices do that. Following Weber’s lead, Habermas, in his work
in the 1970s and early 80s had already clarified the fundamental
importance of the evolution of normative structures, beyond the
instrumental focus on the objectified control of nature, for the
constitution of society (see Habermas 1984). However, the focus on
collective learning involves a weakening of the relationship between
normative evolution and social practice by bringing in a third – socio-
cognitive – dimension. This cognitive dimension can be understood
as a fund of collective utilizable knowledge produced by learning
processes but its existence does not mean that it will necessarily be
used. Using a phrase of Eder’s, ‘collective learning potentialities’, for
example, vegetarian eating culture in the early nineteenth century,
may find its practical realization blocked (Eder 1996). These insights
are of the first importance for critical normative sociology. Instead of
criticizing existing normative structures from an idealized standard
derived from the formal pragmatic conditions of communication,
social criticism should now focus on the socio-cognitive potentials
that are collectively generated and reside within the cognitive order
of the complex cultural ensembles represented by civilizations or
individual societies.
From Double to Triple Contingency
From the late 1990s, Strydom (1999b) developed some of the impli-
cations of the above ‘paradigm shift’. This took on two major related
moments. I will address the first, the clarification of the question of
contingency with respect to the public sphere, in this section, before
going on to address the elaboration of cognitive sociology in the
next. The idea of triple contingency critically extends Habermas’
model of double contingency where ego and alter are assumed to
form communicative relations geared to the exchange of validity
claims against the backdrop of a situation defining and text generat-
ing cultural order. In the model of triple contingency, ego and alter
relate not just to one another, but in the case of democratic commu-
nication they also relate to the validity standards and factual beliefs
imputed to the general observing public. As Strydom observes,
Habermas’ account does not alone confine attention to contingency
generated in intersubjective communication, to the relative neglect
of the observer, but in the general model of the co-present exchange
of validity claims it also privileges normative reconstruction over
empirical description. The validity standards and fact interpretations
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held by the observing public in the model of triple contingency per-
meate all democratic communication as political actors are forced
to recognize the centrality of public support and legitimacy.
The problem of adherence to the model of double contingency
in Habermas, elaborated carefully in Strydom (1999b) poses con-
siderable problems. In Between Facts and Norms (1996) Habermas
provides an account of modern law in terms of double contingency
and then switches to an account of the public sphere in which the
public is given a prominent role. However, the model of double
contingency is retained in that the public is both idealized and
singularized as ‘responsibility demanding’ and set in a discursively
mediated relation to the political core. The pragmatic variability
generated by the existence of different subject positions amongst
the public is eviscerated and the public as a pragmatic subject is even-
tually assumed to dissipate entirely into the model of ‘subjectless
communication’ as issues progress through the selective sluice gates
of public relevance. Conceived in this way, the core-periphery model
taken over by Habermas from Bernhard Peters in Between Facts and
Norms (Peters 1993) becomes a doubly contingent one; first, the
public representing the political periphery can be understood in its
pragmatically singularized status as engaged in a relation with the
political core through the medium of public opinion and then once
issues are transferred from the realm of public opinion formation,
in the weak public of the mass public sphere, they again become
conceived double contingently in the deliberative communication of
strong publics, viz, parliament, administration, government and law
(see Fraser 1990 on strong and weak publics).
The theory of triple contingency from the vantage point of this
essay appears as a logical concomitant of the stronger constructivist
and collectivist emphasis of Strydom’s sociological reformulation of
critical theory. The expansion in the range of contingency places
the public neither exclusively as a generalizable subject position nor
as a diffuse carrier of ‘subjectless communication’, though it can
be partially conceived in both these ways. Rather, it pragmatically
expands the notion of the public as a carrier of multiple substantive
identities and issue positions and elaborates the space of the public
sphere as a medium of collective learning through discourse. This
formulation raises a wide range of issues for Habermas’ account
of the public sphere and the public sphere generally. These relate
to issues of multiple kinds of resonance (Strydom 2003), the rela-
tionship between cognitive structures, normative structures, public
discourse and pragmatic positions; the nature of resolution of issues
to do with the situation relative coordination of validity claims
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and fact interpretations within and between multiple publics and
multiple power-holders; the macro-sociological architecture within
which the public sphere is located.
The Cognitive Turn
Strydom’s cognitive turn proceeds by way of a critique of what he
adjudges to be Habermas’ normativist assumption of shared pre-
scriptive rules guiding action. As already outlined, Habermas does
not distinguish between such prescriptive rules that have the status
of instituted norms and cognitive rules that can either be insti-
tuted as an overarching collective epistemic framework emerging
from collective learning processes and reconstructively influencing
the selection and specification of norms or exist more weakly as
innovative ideas for practical realization. In general, the former
may be distinguished as institutionalized cognitive structures such as
frameworks of rights, justice and responsibility that have acquired
evolutionary status in social practice and the latter such as egalitar-
ian utopian communities that have not done so or have not yet done
so. Strydom’s constructivist cognitive approach regards cognitive
rules as means, devices or tools for categorizing, classifying and or-
dering the world. This cognitive constructivism builds on his social
pragmatism – constructivist reconstructivism, collective learning,
contingency and situation responsiveness, expanded agency – and
has two pivotal theoretical implications, expressed in the ongoing
negotiability and reflexivity of norms and in normative innovation
as a collective cognitive process. These implications in turn have
two key ramifications; in a relational direction, it necessitates rad-
ical expansion in the circuit of discursive action co-ordination and
symbolic alignment; in a substantive direction, it requires attention
be given both to the crystallization and consequences of collective
identities and the issue specific and issue transcending outcomes of
public discourse.
In relation to the procedural question, both the theory of triple
contingency and the emphasis on cognitive structures as a medium
of learning, have the effect of re-balancing the strong proceduralism
of Habermas’ account of democracy. The implication of Strydom’s
position is that deliberation cannot be regarded as self-organizing
and self-contained within the assumption of high levels of auton-
omy that Habermas and other deliberation theorists confer upon
it. Deliberation must instead be seen as part of a wider process of
discursive action co-ordination and symbolic alignment taking place
across multiple arenas and responding to multiple social sites of
cultural production and resonance and to multiple kinds of medi-
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ation processes. Responding to such expanded considerations, the
combined effect of the theories of triple contingency and of cog-
nitive structures is to reduce the overall societal importance of the
special kind of intersubjective communication represented by delib-
eration. This is not to say deliberation is not important. In fact, it is
immensely important. It is to suggest that existing forms of delibera-
tion do not by themselves satisfy basic normative-procedural criteria
such as inclusion, impartiality, parity, openness and responsiveness
to a desirable extent. Deliberation exists amidst a wide range of
quasi- or non-deliberative mechanisms of political decision-making.
Moreover, it also exists in a semantic and pragmatic relation to
cognitive forces that press in upon it, ideologies, interests, patterns
of resonance, degrees of organization of collective action and so on.
The construction of the observing public in representative deliber-
ation, for example, will depend on the state of play of the latter
factors; beyond this, deliberation by the public in new kinds of pub-
lic participation remains a pressing demand for the revitalization of
civil society.
Strydom (2006b) draws attention to Habermas’ over-extended
proceduralism that emphasizes the interactionist moment in in-
tersubjective communication rather than its substantive discursive
outcomes. Habermas therefore considers the issue of discursive out-
comes as formal idealizations emerging from unlimited and uncon-
strained interaction rather than related either to shifts in cognitive
structures or the forms of rationality instituted in society. Max
Miller (1992) and Bernhard Peters (2001) have also productively
raised questions about the outcomes of public interaction that, espe-
cially in the latter’s treatment, points beyond the idea of consensus,
which like both Strydom and Miller, he continues to regard as
important for social integration, to shifts in the spectrum of mean-
ing arising from public communication. In specific circumstances,
such shifts lead to a re-thinking of the cognitive foundations of
society. In any event, Strydom’s cognitive approach does not op-
erate with Habermas’ strong formal, institutional and idealized a
priori. It instead emphasizes the openness and variability of both
the mechanisms and dynamics of discourse – beyond but incorpo-
rating discursive procedures – and the substantive importance of
discourse synthesis as manifested in cognitive structures orientated
towards practical problems and that underpin institutionalized and
even universalized norms.
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Implications for a Theory of Collective Learning
The separate and combined implications of the theories of collective
learning and evolutionary practical rationality represent a decisively
sociological emphasis that corrects Habermas’ over-dependence on
psychological individualism in his learning theory and political-
philosophical proceduralism in his theory of discursive action co-
ordination. In Strydom’s version, the theory of collective learning,
combining social pragmatism and the cognitive turn, leads, firstly, to
a weak constructivistically-informed reconstructivism, which is ad-
dressed at cognitively specified macro-ethical orientations provided,
for example, by master-frames of rights, justice and responsibility.
These acquire the status of cognitive structures that shape the se-
lection and specification of norms. Discursive processes provide the
constructivist dimension that is in part conditioned by such cognitive
structures and partly acquires freedom to extend beyond them and
react back upon them. Secondly, cognitive structures should be un-
derstood as both the medium (opus operandi) and outcomes (opus
operatum) of learning processes. But cognitive structures do not
have the compelling implications for action of the assumed pattern
of normative evolution within the normativist paradigm; instead
their evolution depends on the relation between public discourse
and the trajectory of the (normative) institutionalization of practical
reason. Thirdly, reversing the emphasis of the previous point, the
communicatively mediated dialectical relation between the revis-
able outcomes of achieved ethical learning processes (macro-ethical
cognitive structures) and other cognitive implications of discursive
processes – ethical challenges, expressive orientations, functional
codes – is pivotal to the formation and effectivity of the ethical and
moral norms essential to social integration.
Cognitive Order, Collective Learning and the Public Sphere
I consider the approach briefly stated in the foregoing to be out-
standingly relevant to advancing the sociological contribution to
theory and research on public culture and the public sphere, though
it is also relevant to many other sociological problems. I want to
place this recapitulation of Strydom’s contribution to learning and
cognitive sociology in the context of ongoing work of mine directed
at respecifying the sociological theory of the public sphere in a man-
ner that would also be empirically fruitful. The following remarks,
then, will be directed towards some theoretical aspects of this task,
but due to space constraints will posit rather than defend some
important theoretical assumptions. I will do this in three steps, the
first consists of the potential incorporation of related sociological
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attempts to specify social order; the second consists of a dynamic ac-
count of reproduction processes within a unified theory of cultural
reproduction and innovation; and the third consists of sketching
some of the macro-sociological implications of the first two steps. I
will then finish the essay with a short conclusion.
One authoritative source of external objection to the theoreti-
cal approach sketched here – cognitively sustained normative prag-
matic – emanates from Luhmann’s systems theory whose naturalistic
framework of systemically structured sociality favours an actor-less
semantics rather than the emphatic pragmatic approach (Luhmann
1995; Miller 2002). Luhmann’s functional semantics does, how-
ever, comprehensively address the cognitive structures of formally
organized domains and perhaps even the formal organization of
all domains. Beyond Luhmann and yet in relation to Luhmann’s
conception of social systems, we can identify the achievement of a
cognitively sustained normative pragmatic organization of society –
the outcome of moral learning processes – as dialectically inter-
twined with functional organization with the crucial question being:
to what extent and in what ways can we continue to regard modern
societies as normatively organized by intentional action that can be
justified according to democratic standards? This dialectical process
was already the case in Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action
(1981) but here politics as a normative domain was ceded almost
entirely to the sway of functional principles taking effect through
the medium of power with the medium of discourse largely undevel-
oped (Habermas 1984, 1987). Habermas’ subsequent work returns
to the normative importance of political action but to my knowl-
edge he has not subsequently returned to the proper demarcation of
systemic and normative logics in the realm of politics, in spite of a
long and brilliant exegesis on the limits of the system of theoretical
conception of the public sphere in Between Facts and Norms (1996).
From another direction, the more recent work of Klaus Eder em-
phasizes a ‘third sphere’. He understands the ‘narrative construction
of the social bond’ as basic to the possibility of a public sphere (Eder
1999, 2006). Eder here understands the argumentation – that the
theoretical perspective intrinsic to a normative account of collective
learning ultimately depends on the formation of common social
bonds through the construction of narratives of identity. The forma-
tion of such bonds within ‘identity communities’ is particularistic,
even if the forms may be universal, e.g. ethnic identity, territorial
identification. While Strydom has expressed doubts about what he
understands to be Eder’s ‘symbolic’ turn, a normative-pragmatic
approach may be productively regarded as not just contextualized
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by functional complexes as indicated above but also by the ascriptive
categories of everyday identification. The task of cognitive sociology
operating in a normative register then becomes one of showing how
ethical learning processes anticipated in cognitive structures either
do or can become effective in forms of practical – democratic –
rationality in contexts characterized by non-normative functional
codes and non-universalistic identities. Something like the following
emerges:
LIFEWORLD
PUBLIC 
SPHERE
Fig 1: The cognitive 
Framework of the 
Public Sphere
SOCIAL 
SYSTEMS
B
CIVIL 
SOCIETY
A C
STATE
The diagram represents three theory traditions within a parametric
framework that essentially adds the later (OMahony1.grafflesystem-
lifeworld) to the earlier (state-civil society) version of Habermas’
account of the ‘space’ of the public sphere. Running through the
diagram we observe three ‘symbolic codings’, (A) is functional, (B)
is ascriptive identity and (C) is normative. It may be noted in pass-
ing that these also reflect three major theory traditions, functional,
phenomenological and critical. These three orders of coding are
taken to delineate the interoperating vectors for the constitution of
socio-cognitive structures of varying kinds. While all three kinds of
symbolic order operate to some degree in each of the poles – state,
system, civil society, lifeworld – the nature of the space caught within
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each vector shows that they gravitate towards certain of the com-
plexes rather more than others. Hence, the normative vector mostly
incorporates the lifeworld, the state and associated integrating pub-
lic complex of law and media and also civil society. The ascriptive
vector incorporates the space of civil society, lifeworld and state. The
functional complex mainly encompasses formally organized social
spheres and the state and public complex. My contention is that the
emergence of macro-ethical cognitive structures that underpin the
normative order takes place in heterogeneous conditions in which
normative autonomy has to be gained – and constantly defended
once gained – from functional and non-normative logics. How-
ever, the generation, justification and application of such cognitive
structures always remain conditioned by the other complexes. This
process also applies reciprocally but that is not my major interest
here. It is carried discursively within the public sphere. The genera-
tion of the cognitive structures can be understood as the outcome of
a discursive process of collective ethical learning and its normative
institutionalization as achieved practical rationality. These dynamics
are represented in the table below:
INTERACTIONAL 
ARENAS
COGNITIVE 
MODELS
DISCOURSE/ 
CONDUCT
COGNITIVE STRUCTURES: 
F U N C T I O N A L 
P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L 
NORMATIVE
COMMUNICATION
Fig 2: The Dynamic 
Circuit of Cognitive 
structure formation
The diagram above shows what might be termed ‘the cognitive
circuit of communication’. It invites a number of observations.
There are two possibilities: communication as reproduction – the
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conduct loop – and communication as discursive – cognitive –
innovation. To understand this in terms of the combined theories
of collective learning and practical rationality requires a two-stage
theory of institutionalization.
The first stage is the setting free of learning processes, dis-
cursively carried in the interactional arenas of the public sphere.
Here the cognitive content of institutional orders is re-worked and
potentially transformed by periphery-driven public communication
processes. The second is the material realization, that may never
be attained, of such learning processes in institutional designs, the
institutionalization of normative action rules. The circuit of commu-
nication extends from macro-meso-micro and the reverse. Following
Luhmann, we should assume that cognitive innovation can emanate
from non-agential macro patterns but contra Luhmann that the
normative-pragmatic integration of society requires decisive ethi-
cal and moral cognitive innovation (learning) by collective agents
capable of normatively stabilizing contingency.
The cognitive communicative circuit of the genesis of discursively
relevant pragmatic capacity, argumentation, coding and identity-
building processes in diverse arenas and multiple outcomes cannot
be properly understood outside of a macro-sociological framework,
that is tentatively sketched in figure 1 above. The schemata which
constitute cognitive structures are formed in the space between,
on the one side, the functional codes, normative commitments and
identity structures of differentiated societies and, on the other, by
the reconstruction of such symbolic structures in the interdependent
arenas of public discourse. We can understand collective learning
as the formation of new cognitive structures that mediate between
public discourse and established symbolic structures. In successful
cases, such structures evolve from a diffuse and interdependent
complex to a more defined and specific reality. For example, in the
normative sphere we witness an emerging macro-ethics of responsi-
bility; in the sphere of identity, we witness the rise of the credo of
the self-determination of nations from its nineteenth century origins
to its institutionalization in the twentieth century.
Conclusion
Strydom’s career-long interest is in the mechanisms that might
sustain a society as far as possible integrated through reasons, hence
in exploring the relation between macro-ethical learning processes
and institutionalized practical rationality. The emergence of an
ecological ethic of responsibility has been his principal empirical-
theoretical interest in recent times (Strydom 1999a, 1999d, 2002).
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We can witness in the recent massive re-evaluation of this ethic in the
last couple of years the projective value of a reconstructive sociology
of collective learning. Today the challenge for a discursive cognitive
sociology is in continuing to clarify in the first place how society
understands its own learning processes and in the second place how
globally and at other spatial levels these learning processes do or
do not transpose into advances in practical reason, for example,
one guided by ecological morality. To meet this challenge and to
continue the programme of sociological innovation that Strydom
himself, Miller and Eder have taken over from Habermas will
require a macro-sociological re-elaboration of the public sphere that
learns from other sociological theories and disciplinary interests
and is compatible with methodologies such as frame analysis that
promise to be empirically fruitful.
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RATIONAL ACTION,
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,
AND THE NARRATIVE
STRUCTURE
OF SOCIAL LIFE
THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF
DISCOURSE AND MARKETS – A
THEORETICAL ESSAY
Klaus Eder
Introduction
It will be argued that equally the theory of communicative action
and the theory of rational choice are bound to the specific Western
tradition of enlightenment thinking. In this the social and political
bonds have been reduced to the will of an individualistic actor,
which links each to the other either through discourses or through
markets. This is an assumption that provokes sociological theory
to think the social bond between actors as the weak bond between
rational individuals. It simultaneously underrates the strong links
that permeate the social practices (last but not least their religious
practices as an instance of social practices) through which social
relations emerge. Thus the theories underlying the concepts of
market and discourse need to be re-embedded in a theory of the
pre-discursive and pre-rational social bonds which are built into the
narrative structure of social life.
The theoretical landscape
The roots of the actually competing explanatory strategies in socio-
logy are Adam Smith and Hobbes. Both have given us the two
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models on which our perception of the social is based: that a so-
cial order emerges either through the rational pursuit of individual
interests or that social order is based on an obligatory systems of
rules which are grounded in a system of shared values. There has
always been a romantic counter-model to these two dominant mod-
els: that the social is built on a sense of community, on a shared
emotional attachment to a given lifeworld which is constructed
and reconstructed through ongoing social interaction. These three
models underlie the three theoretical paradigms that have shaped
the theoretical discourse: rational choice explanations, (Parsonian)
theories of social integration, and phenomenological theories of the
lifeworld.
These theories are coupled with each other in an interesting way.
They are complementary. The central problem of rational choice
explanations, i.e. the problem of the emergence and stability of pref-
erence structures, can be solved by the strong assumption of social
integration theories that societies are integrated via a collectively
shared value system, i.e. legitimate power (Parsons 1937). This pro-
vides the necessary contextual stability for rational choice theories:
the latter can start where the former (social integration theory)
ended. However, the assumption of a generally shared consensus
over values is hard to defend on empirical grounds. Phenomenology
provided a way out: it saved both theories by assuming smaller
units of shared values, plural lifeworlds which can even be incom-
mensurable. Giving up the idea of a unifying centre of society the
idea of a shared culture (values) could be saved on the level of a
particularistic social context. These contexts enable rational choice
theories to claim at least local validity for their explanations. And
they allow identifying normatively integrated social systems. The
grand theories work in fact in the context of particular ‘situations’.
This latter effect can be linked to another theoretical devel-
opment which is ‘situationalism’ (Knorr-Cetina 1988). Situational-
ism offers a sociological solution to the separation of the micro
(=RC) and the macro (=SI) level of social reality by linking macro-
phenomena such as ‘science’ to the micro-situations where science
is produced. Aaron Wildavsky (1994) has followed a similar path of
theoretical argument by embedding self-interested action in situa-
tions where they make sense. Self-interest is embedded in a context,
and context is culturally volatile and socially contingent. To ‘im-
prove’ RC-theories he asks not only ‘why do people go about getting
what they know they want’ but also ‘why do people want what they
want in the first place’, thus allowing for a diversity of motives
to be operative in the attempts of people to get what they want.
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 65 –- #107 i
i
i
i
i
i
RATIONAL AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 65
Wildavsky avoids the pitfall of replacing the rational actor by simply
another type of actor such as a ‘Kantian actor’. He also avoids the
pitfall of empiricism by the idea, based on the ‘cultural theory’ of
Mary Douglas (1988), of a limited number of ‘selves’ which account
for the diversity of social forms (Wildavsky 1989, 1994; Thompson
et al. 1990).
There is however a limit to this strategy of improving the theory
of rational action by contextualizing it. Rational action is tied to a
type of situation; there are situations where it is inappropriate to act
rationally since the type of situation does not provide a role set for
that kind of action. The situation that provides role sets which make
rational action appropriate is the market. The sociological theory of
markets (White 1981, 2002) claims that markets are role sets which
distribute actors over the social landscape and shape the network
of their relations over time. Rational action is embedded in markets
conceived as social structures.
This strategy of embedding social action in situations is not
restricted to the theory of markets. It can be used for any theory
of social action, above all for the theory of communicative action
(Habermas 1984, 1987). Communicative action is tied to a specific
type of situation which provides particular role sets for commu-
nicative action. Communicative action in this way is embedded in a
social situation of communication which is called ‘discourse’ which
works in a way analogous to the ‘market’.
These two concepts, market and discourse, will be used as
theories of situational accounts of particular sets of action events.
The argument is that both theories of social action refer to special
cases of situations where they apply. To develop the argument of
the situational embeddedness of social action, two steps will be
taken. Firstly, theories of social action will be looked at in terms of
making sense of the interrelatedness of the actors producing such
action events. This leads to a debate on markets and discourses as
forms of embedding social action. Secondly, the underperformance
of markets and discourses in real social situations is looked at. It
is argued that markets and discourses are themselves embedded in
social relations which transcend the logic of market relations and
discursive relations. The answer is then finally sought in a theory
of narrative bonds which provides a basis for generating situational
accounts such as markets or discourses. Markets and discourses are
conceived then as social constructions that have emerged from the
elementary structures of the social bond in the course of social
evolution.
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Bringing actors back in?
Actors and types of action
The social world is made up of what actors do, not of what actors
are. The essence of actors, their ‘subjectivity’, is relevant only to
the extent that staging this capacity is part of social life. The
social world consists of action events which happen regularly, which
can be classified independently of the psychological intentions and
drives of the actors. Actors are only needed from such a perspective
as the generators of action events. Whether these actors do this
because they love or hate each other, because they are rationally
or emotionally motivated, because they are egoists or altruists, is a
secondary issue. The real issue is what happens when, for example,
a lot of egoistically motivated action events happen relative to
other types of action in a historically and spatially specific situation.
What counts is the distribution of action events in a situation which
produces social effects beyond the motivations that make individuals
act.
Yet there is a basic theoretical problem here which is the clas-
sification of social actions (or action events). Classical approaches
solved the problem by using psychological criteria such as motiva-
tions. Max Weber, Talcott Parsons or Jürgen Habermas, to mention
the representatives of the most important ‘theories of social ac-
tion’, did so by distinguishing between traditional, instrumental and
value-oriented action. Rational action is a special variant claiming
a single motive to be decisive for human beings to produce action
events. As to whether there is some ontological or evolutionary
or empirical priority to one of these motivations has shaped much
of the debate on social action. For explaining the way in which
the social world works these debates have contributed little. The-
orists in the rationalist tradition were caught up in the attempts
to explain the emergence of reciprocity and even moral sentiments
by reducing them either to evolutionary advantages which rational
motivations provide or to leave them to emergent properties of
evolutionary adaptation (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich et al.
2004). Theorists in the deontological tradition were preoccupied
with the problem that people tend to disagree about the quality
of normative motivations. Habermas has turned this point on its
head by arguing that such normative dissensus is constitutive for
social life since it forces people to coordinate their normative views
according to rules which they share. These rules that coordinate
normative perspectives exist in institutions, in value systems, in
shared interpretations of the world, which again raises the question
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of what it is that gives to these rules of rules (i.e. socially shared
rules) their binding character. Habermas situates this binding char-
acter in the structure of the communicative situation as such. When
people start to communicate, they address others which implies that
there is an implicit ‘intention’ (not a psychological motive) which
is to establish a social relationship. The ‘performative’ function of
language produces situations in which the rules of communicative
action operate by the mere act of communication. The constitutive
rules of communicative action provide the meta-rules upon which
actors rely to coordinate their normative motives and intentions.
A more abstract answer which avoids the differences due to
assumption about the motives of social action has been presented
by Luhmann who argues that communication is oriented towards
finding some mode of continuing communication. Thus the con-
tingency of communication is what produces the permanent search
for keeping communication going. Evolutionary successful modes
of contingency reduction, which are functionally differentiated , are
retained for further use by emerging social systems in order to meet
the need of dealing with the growing complexity of communicative
events in the world. The Luhmann model cannot be really played off
against the Habermasian model since the latter appears as a special
case of Luhmann’s abstract notion of autopoietic social systems.
Other theories such as rational-choice theories can be equally seen
as special cases of Luhmann’s model of autopoietic systems.
Thus, we can start with the assumption that the basic problem
is not the different motives that actors might have when they act
but the modes of relating the diversity of motives that actors have
at their disposal. Modes of coordination cannot be reduced to the
diversity of motives, but rather constitute an emerging social reality
which is assumed to coordinate actors even when their motivations
do not coincide. Such a case has already been noticed in Coleman’s
attempt to explain the emergence of norms: rational actors have
an interest to follow norms because it is in their interest to stick
to them (Coleman 1990). When established, these norms are taken
up without recourse to the initial situation in which such norms
emerged. This is what characterizes the emergent character of the
social: to make rules work even when the initial motivational force
that created them has disappeared.
The issue of ‘intersubjectivity’
The theoretical term under which this emergent reality has been
subsumed is the term ‘intersubjectivity’. Intersubjectivity provides
a mechanism which coordinates action events in an interaction
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situation. The central thesis of normative sociology (from Weber
through to Parsons to Habermas) has been to locate this mecha-
nism in norms that provide the rules for generating intersubjectivity.
Through dealing with rules human beings can modify the forms
of intersubjectivity into which they have been socialized and which
have been forwarded through generations as ‘traditions’. The social
world is conceived as a world of shared rules which allow con-
structing the world as an empirical fact and as a moral fact. The
philosophical basis for this perspective is Kantian philosophy and
the deontological tradition of moral philosophy deriving from it.
The modern version of this tradition is the Habermasian discourse
theory. Intersubjectivity constitutes discourse and is reproduced
through discourse. The discursive situation is thus the key to so-
cial reality and it is through discourse that social actors succeed in
getting along in their social action that is oriented at their fellow
actors.
An ‘economic’ version of this intersubjectivity is the idea under-
lying game theory. In this theoretical tradition which runs back to
the non-Kantian English philosophical Enlightenment tradition, co-
ordination is built upon trial and error in figuring out the maximum
advantage an individual can realize in a given situation. Intersubjec-
tivity is here defined as an equilibrium which is reached by rational
actors in a given social situation. The situation that focussed this
form of acting together has been described as a ‘market’. A market
provides the mechanism through which individuals organize the
space of their social action while minimizing the interference with
the space of the social action of other actors.
These two models of intersubjectivity as an emergent property of
social relations among actors compete in social theory as mutually
exclusive accounts of social reality. Both claim different mechanisms
that allow people to coordinate their mutually exclusive action ori-
entations, be it diverging interests or be it diverging normative ideas
of good and right. Yet, theorists increasingly take into account the
complementarity of both models. Discourse as market or market as
discourse are theoretical topics which force us to look more closely
at how markets are mediated by meaningful social relationships
and how discourses are shaped by interests and sentiments. All this
invites us to think about a third way of explaining the emergent
property of social reality in ongoing social actions, a third way that
overcomes the dichotomy of discourse and market, social relations
that are overculturalized and social relations that are undercul-
turalized. Normative theories and rationalist theories provide two
extremes of a continuum which has to be made explicit and defined.
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The thesis is that this continuum can be identified as a narratively
constituted world which provides the elementary social bonds for
discourse as well as market.
The open problem of relating action events: the narrative bond
There are some empirical indications why these two models are
insufficient. A first argument has to do with the observation that
people do not successfully coordinate their views through commu-
nicative action in the sense of argumentative solutions to diverging
norms. They rather stick to norms that they have already internal-
ized. Normative debates do not solve the collective action problem –
on the contrary they often foster the problems linked to acting to-
gether. Whether it is an individual who does not succeed in living
together with others in a marriage, or groups who do not want to
live together or nations who do not want to cooperate, the issue
remains: what enables these individuals, groups or nations to act at
all against the respective others. What binds people together seems
to be based on something that is inaccessible for normative debates.
Pre-normative bonds transcend normative discourses – they already
exist before social actors enter discursive social relations.
A second argument refers to the idea of the invisible hand of
the market. This invisible hand needs the visible hand of the state
or some other institution to work. This is an old argument which
has been at the core of institutional economics emphasizing the
need for institutions in order to produce the effects that a market is
supposed to produce (North 1990). Here markets are grounded in
well-designed institutions which again poses the question of where
these institutions come from. The argument that it is rational to have
them is begging the question. Yet, markets do something important
from a sociological point of view: markets separate cooperating peo-
ple from others cooperating among each other, thus dividing up the
available space for social action and minimizing interference (White
2002). Markets, wherever they come from, are a social structure, a
structure of social relations in which patterns of reciprocal obser-
vation are fixed. To organize social relations as reciprocal interests
is a highly demanding social arrangement: it requires stripping so-
cial actors from their history and constituting them as ‘individuals’
following their interests in a social situation. This arrangement has
become centrally important in modern societies (this does not mean
that individuals do not exist in non-modern societies) and some
commentators, from Adam Smith to Karl Marx and further on,
even believed it to be its central social form.
There is a theoretical strategy to avoid these modes of narrowing
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down the social link (or relation) to either rational individuals or to
reasonable ‘Kantian’ actors. The key analytical term is ‘subjectivity’.
Subjectivity broadens the concept of the actor to include any action
events that make him a particular actor. This, in fact, avoids actor-
theoretical shortcomings in the tradition of sociological theory, but
it does not help us much in grasping the social link. Subjectivities
are linked to each other in contingent ways. It allows, in the
Luhmannian sense, that they always produce contingency which
generates the need for social relations. But the pattern remains in
the dark.
The following proposal is to argue that social actors make sense
of their action events and of the action events of others by invoking
narrative frames of plausibility that have been learned in the course
of becoming part of a ‘culture’. Actors produce signifying practices in
which they organize the world around them which is either resistant
to arguments or to real interests. This is what I call the narrative
bond which is the stuff out of which social relations are made. This
theoretical proposal allows us to link discourse and market by the
simple fact that both rely on an already constituted social world
which allows human beings to make sense of action events before
they enter in high (reasonable) or low (rational) communication.
To develop this argument I will first turn to the deficiencies of
the two ideal games that dominate social theory and then take up
the issue of the social bond on which such ideal games are based.
Ideal games that ideal actors play: Markets and discourse
Markets versus discourse
Social theory works as argued above with two competing idealiz-
ing notions of social relations: market and discourse. Market and
discourse are concepts that are constructed using the clause of
’ceteris paribus’. This clause allows abstracting from real life situ-
ations and formulating an ideal notion of social relations among
abstract universal selves. Both ideas have come up with the emer-
gence of the autonomous individual in the Western enlightenment
tradition. Their common ancestry is given by the common reference
to ‘rationality’ which has found two competing interpretations: the
rationality of an actor who is freed from constraints and capable
of acting on nothing but his own interests (which does not exclude
acting in the interest of all); and the rationality of an actor who is
capable of making use of his ‘reason’.
That markets work under the condition of ‘ceteris paribus’
means that they work as long as you disregard those factors that
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distort self-interested action. Thus markets are bound to situations
undistorted by traditional and other non-rational orientations. In
the ideal world of the market the actors act only in their own
interest which includes the interest of all since any reduction of
the common good would interfere in the long run with one’s own
interests. The market then provides the mechanisms through which
this coordination of self-interests works in time.
In the same vein discourses work under some highly specific
conditions which Habermas has called the situation ‘free of con-
crete action constraints’ (’handlungsentlastete Situation’). In the
ideal world of discourse actors communicate only in the light of
universalizable norms which restrict the link between acts of com-
munication to validity claims that must be accepted by the other
because he is forced to share them by the mere fact of engaging in
communicative action.
Both concepts have turned out to be strong concepts for identi-
fying some of the mechanisms explaining the dynamics of modern
societies. Yet, they differ fundamentally in the conceptualization of
the mechanism of coordination at work. The invisible hand of the
market is put against the transcendental condition of the possibility
of reasonable (rational) action in the world. This difference is at the
basis of much controversy over whether the notion of the market
can be assimilated to the notion of discourse or whether the notion
of discourse can be assimilated to the notion of the market in social
theory. In the following, another strategy is taken: to ground both
mechanisms in a more abstract concept of situational accounts that
covers both notions as sub-cases of a more general phenomenon.
Blending markets and discourses – the system-theoretical solution
A theoretical strategy to find some conception overcoming this
difference is found in the concept of ‘social systems’, especially in
the version that Niklas Luhmann has given to it (Luhmann 1995,
1997). Systems are self-organizing entities which use the elements
out of which they are made for their construction over time. This is
exactly what markets and discourses do. Markets use the elements,
i.e. self-interested actions, as elements for their construction over
time. The market is a mode of the self-organization of rational
interaction which closes this kind of interaction event off from
action events that are different. It is a system made up of nothing
else but rational action events. An analogous argument holds for
discourse. Discourse is made up of communicative actions in which
validity claims are made. Discourse organizes itself as a system
by nothing other than such events, thus closing itself off from
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non-discursive events in the world.
This system-theoretical conceptualization does not really tell
us anything new about markets and discourses. Yet, it allows re-
interpreting the idealizing assumptions that underlie the utilitarian
and the deontological tradition as functionally equivalent ways of
relating communicative events in the world. The theoretical advance
proposed here is that not actors, but action events are related and
distinguished from non-social modes of relating action events. In
this sense the system-theoretical account offers nothing more and
nothing less than a methodological argument for analyzing markets
or discourses as social realities ‘sui generis’.
Thus, the system-theoretical account of social situations is tied to
some assumptions about the type of events through which systems
constitute themselves. Taking markets and discourse as systems that
are distinct requires an additional theory which is the theory of
functional differentiation. Functional differentiation explains why
these two different modes of relating action events are irreducible
to each other: rational action is functionally specified in the sphere
of the economy, whereas communicative action is tied either to the
sphere of politics (based on practical reason in the Kantian sense),
to the sphere of science (based on pure reason) or to the sphere of
art (based on aesthetic judgment). Thus, any social system emerging
in the course of social evolution seems to produce an ‘ideal game’
that is played by ‘ideal actors’.
The assumption of a diversity of ideal games which ideal actors
play, in a theory of functional differentiation of autopoietic social
systems, runs into a difficulty: these systems do not tell us about
the social bond that holds people together beyond their particular
involvements in functionally specific systems. In his work Luh-
mann especially notes this problem when dealing with the public
sphere (public communication) and with religion (private com-
munication) (Luhmann 2000a, 2000b). Both crosscut functionally
specific systems and provide some basic understanding within which
the practical problems of life are perceived and experienced. This
‘cultural framing’ transcends the specific language games of mar-
kets and discourses that have emerged in the course of evolution. It
rather provides an elementary language which provides the ‘context’
for differentiating systems with their functionally specific language
games.
Thus, we have to take into account an ‘undifferentiated sphere’
beyond functionally differentiated systems. This sphere is neither
rational in the utilitarian/game-theoretic sense nor communicative
in the deontological sense. Whether this sphere is considered to be
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a system is a secondary issue. The important point is that it does
not fit the theory of functional differentiation. Differentiating out
functionally specific systems necessarily poses the question: from
which world do such systems emerge? There is a ‘rest’ in functional
differentiation which remains to be specified. The argument that
modernity is characterized by the predominance of functionally
differentiated systems does not contradict the idea of such a ‘rest’ –
on the contrary. The critical accounts of ‘modernity’ do nothing
other than to point out elements of such a ‘rest’. By differentiating
out ideal games which rationalist or deontological actors play,
the social world of elementary social relations has become visible
as never before. It is a world in which a constitutive mode of
communicating with the other is set: people linked to each other by
some kind of elementary language game.
Going beyond market and discourse: what binds people into
networks
How to get at this elementary language game? As argued, this
language game is embedded in basic social relations among human
beings. The term network provides a concept for addressing this
issue of elementary social relations. Networks manifest regularities
that emerge whenever human beings relate with each other, whether
in functionally differentiated systems such as science (Knorr-Cetina
1993) or for market and discourse this holds also. Markets and
discourses are networks which are based on selective language
games.
The argument is that such selective language games presuppose
a conception of a non-selective language game upon which markets
and discourses can be built. Taking seriously the claim that real
actors construct ‘uno actu’ markets and discourses from networks of
social relations, implies a strong theoretical programme: to assume
a language game that constitutes the social relations from which real
actors construct under certain conditions functionally specific ideal
games such as markets or discourses. The ideal games that ideal
actors play are embedded in real games that real actors play.
Real games that real actors play: The narrative bond
Cheating, fighting, loving. . . : understanding the world we share
When we observe markets or discourses, then we observe actors
following certain role prescriptions that are specific to these two
types of ideal games. In these ideal games people also play real
games: the encounter between thief and victim or mother and son,
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between right-wing radical and bystanding public or professor and
student. Real games which real actors play are numerous: they cheat,
fight, love, care, are unhappy etc. While doing these out of necessity
they enter neither markets nor discourse and yet social life goes
on. They live in a world in which they behave as real actors, relate
to each other as real actors and play games before they enter the
idealizing games of rational action and communicative action. They
do what Bourdieu has described as permanent struggles in a social
field which is not a struggle over interests (which it can become
too) but which is a struggle within a story that holds in a particular
situation.
We can describe an endless number of such situations which
share one property: they do not rely in the final instance on some
inbuilt drive to rational action or on a will to reach consensus, but
on a shared interpretation of a situation which these actors have
internalized in the course of growing up in a social environment.
This shared interpretation of a situation is based on an understanding
of a situation that is made sense of ‘equally’ by those going through
such situations.
By establishing a social bond we store this link in our memory
as something that has worked or did not work. We make sense of
such experiences in terms of stories that store such relations. Our
interactions with others work as long as we can rely upon stories
that make sense of the action events that we produce in our action.
This holds also for any ‘economic’ or ‘communicative’ action event.
They work to the extent that the social link is based on shared
story. This is the guarantee to not talk at cross purposes and to
not misunderstand continuously the rational motive of the other.
Thus social bonds are based on a narrative bond that precedes the
ideal games that we play. The narrative bond allows playing real
games. Narration is the elementary language game through which
social relations are established and reproduced. Narratives provide
structural accounts of situations which orient actors in the story as
well as actors who know these stories. Living with stories is the
constitutive moment of social bonds.
Making sense of the narrative bond – embedding market and
discourse
The narrative bond should work as any language works: stories have
to be told, and are thus linked to the structure of language. This
structure requires nothing more than subjects, objects, actions and
some rules that relate them. Narratives are defined by a very specific
set of rules that links actors and objects by some actions. Narratives
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tell about nothing other than about social relations, and often do so
in terms of heroes fighting against villains, winning or losing, and
creating social situations within which people make sense for further
interaction. Thus, situations are recognizable for people since they
fit the narrative scripts which organize the social world they live in.
Stories help to structure the world around us and to orient actions
in such a way that interaction can go on, either in a peaceful or in an
inimical way. Stories underlie equally groups of religious believers
in new religious movements as well as feuding groups in Sardinia.
They tell people that the way they act is the way things have to
take place. They are rather resistant to empirical evidence as well
as moral arguments. They are defended with fervour since they are
linked to some basic rules of organizing social relations that have to
be saved from irritations.
Some societies offer possibilities to distance from such narrative
bonds by offering a narrative-free world of economic exchange or
argumentative debate. Such possibilities allow for freedom from and
for reflexivity toward the narrative basis of social life. Market and
discourse do exactly that. Yet, they remain tied to the narrative
bond that they cannot do away with without risking to destroy the
social bond. Markets are embedded in the narrative structure of the
lifeworld as well as discourses are.
Actors in markets, whether they are producers or consumers,
follow narrative rules when they choose goods for production or
consumption and when they set the price for goods. Markets help
to maximize the possibilities for rational action to enter stories –
but then it has to fit the story, otherwise the product will not survive
the market. The stories vary, and a good analysis shows why specific
markets work in different ways.
In discourse, actors, whether speakers or the public, equally
follow narrative rules that guarantee the conditions for further
debate. Without some basic understanding of what the other says,
without some narrative fidelity, people do not succeed to talk
with each other. Discourse is much easier among people who
are culturally homogeneous than among people of highly diverse
backgrounds. Discourse easily breaks down before even entering the
argumentative level. The strength of the narrative bond is the basic
variable explaining the working of discourse, the construction of
a consensus of a dissensus, a situation in which people can argue
about what they disagree upon.
Markets and discourse are embedded in narrative bonds and
offer possibilities for intervening into these narrative bonds by
adding either rational motives or moral arguments to the story.
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Sometimes they change the story, yet they never step out of the
story. Some political philosophers believed that they would do so
by developing the idea of the ideal market or the idea of the ideal
discourse as the basic relationship that creates social bonds. The
reflexivity of this reflexivity turns us however back onto narratives:
also, discourses are part of narratives organizing the social life of a
particular people at a certain time.
Social networks, in which markets and discourse are embedded,
are constituted through narrative bonds that are actualized in con-
crete social situations. Therefore a theory of situational accounts is
needed that gives an explanation of the making of the social bond
which constitutes markets and discourses as special situations made
out of narratively constituted networks.
A theory of situational accounts
Taking market and discourse as special forms of situations which
emerge in the course of social evolution implies a theoretical move
away from the debates which claim theoretical primacy either to
market or discourse. It leads us beyond such claims toward a
theory of situational accounts. Such a theory of situational accounts
does not stop short of the observation of everyday interaction.
It extends to discourses as well as markets as special modes of
establishing social relations. This allows embedding the logic of
rational choice and the logic of rational debate in narrative networks
of social relations, or in short: in narrative networks. Therefore, the
elementary structures of social communication point to a level of
analysis that is grounding rational choice and argumentative debate:
the analysis of the narrative forms organizing social communication.
Social evolution specifies the functions and the scope of networks
generated by these elementary structures of social communication.
By generating markets as narrative networks, the exchange of goods
and services is organized in a socially meaningful way. By generating
discourses as narrative networks, the exchange of arguments is made
a meaningful exercise. By restricting the scope of relevant action
events in such situations, markets become specialized on rational
choices and discourses on good arguments. These two cases are
historically consequential modes of generating social networks. Yet,
they are not the theoretical key to understanding the mode of or-
ganizing social relations. They are derivatives of a more elementary
form, i.e. general narrative networks. Narrative networks provide
the prerequisites for entering the risky game of rational choice or
the risky exchange of arguments. Another situation worthy of closer
inspection is reciprocity, in concrete interaction situations, which is
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at the basis of much theoretical debate on community life and social
capital in modern societies. From the theoretical point of view of
this essay this is just another case of a narrative network in ongoing
processes of generating action events by social actors.
A theory of situational accounts is a narrative theory which
explains the variation of the elementary structures of social situations
over time. Their rules might be grasped by taking serious the
narrative mode communication which precedes any functionally
specified mode of communicating with others such as rational
choice or argumentative debate. It takes us back to what real people
really do.
’On the shoulders of giants’
This essay does not claim to have invented something new. On the
contrary, arguing this way is like sitting ‘on the shoulders of giants’
(Merton 1965). The giants are Durkheim (1968 [1912]), Mauss
(1969) and Lévi-Strauss (1967, 1971). This trias of social thinkers
has sensitized us for the way in which social relations are mediated
by symbolic forms. Reciprocity rules are cultural constructions that
provide a narrative bond, an argument that Mauss has forcefully
presented. A similar argument was taken up by Lévi-Strauss in his
analysis of the elementary structures of kinship and then extended
to the narrative bonds created by mythical representations of the
world, which is a world full of narratives underlying the social
relations among people. And finally, it is Durkheim who provided
the foundations for these theoretical ideas when looking into the
elementary forms of religion.
Arguing that social relations are mediated by stories not only
reminds us of the basic stuff out of which human communication
is made, but also the experience that it is through stories that we
acquire our capacity to relate to other people, and of the fact
that such ideas are around already. Looking anew at the three
giants might help to push this old idea once again toward a theory
of the social bonds which avoids the idealizing assumptions of RC-
theory and communicative action theories as well as the reductionist
assumption about our genetic heritage that are so fashionable these
days.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF GLOBAL ETHICS
FOR CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY
Gerard Delanty
The idea of a global ethics is in need of some clarification. In ac-
cordance with modern deontological ethics, global ethics does not
posit a universal condition that must be realized. Most conceptions
of global ethics have a political and critical character rather than
being primarily grounded in universalistic principles that transcend
specific contexts. For this reason the question of global ethics is
particularly interesting for critical social theory, which has tradi-
tionally been concerned with the critique of the present from the
perspective of critical-normative idea of a just society. In this chapter
I argue that global ethics is primarily an expression of cosmopolitan
political community and can be seen as a form of socio-cultural
transformation. Societies can learn through ethics, as Habermas has
claimed and, as Piet Strydom has argued, collective learning takes
the form of cognitive shifts which are primarily worked out in the
communicative processes of the public sphere. Global ethics is one
such form of collective learning by which global issues enter into
specific contexts. The outcome, I argue, is a cosmopolitan public
sphere increasingly based on consciousness of the need for global
ethics.
The notion of global ethics must be distinguished from a false
universalism, that is a western conception of the world. In this
respect, cosmopolitanism as the context to understand global ethics
is relevant in that what is suggested by the term is a post-universal
ethics where there is a greater recognition of the context in which
ethical claims are made. Rather than a universalization of the
particular – as in the universalization of western values – a global
ethics arises from the particularization of the universal. In addition,
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there is the question of the political subject: governments, non-
states collective actors, humanity, individuals. This is the question
of who are the actual social carriers or agents that give global
ethics substance, whether an institutional framework such as a legal
normative order or social processes. The argument proposed here
shifts the emphasis away from specific actors to the public sphere
itself as the context in which to locate global ethics.
The debate about global ethics is often confused as several
problems – normative-philosophical, sociological, legal-political –
are conflated. For instance, is the aim of a global ethics to find
within the existing cultures of the world a common value system
that can be called global and which might be the basis of a global
ethics? Is the aim of a global ethics to impose a western human
rights regime on the rest of the world? Is the aim simply to create
a normative framework to promote diversity, and thus consisting
of a commitment to something like ‘unity in diversity’? Or is the
aim to create an entirely new ‘one world’ value system that people
might choose if they were free to do so, as Peter Singer (2003)
believes? There are complicated normative, cognitive and socio-
cultural questions at stake here.
Part of the solution to these problems consists of distinguishing
between a global universalism and a post-universal cosmopolitanism.
The argument will be that global ethics should be conceived of in
terms of a broader notion of cosmopolitan community and of which
it is one strand. Cosmopolitanism consists of ethical, legal and
political dimensions, but is an essentially open-ended process that
is incomplete and what we are witnessing today are only diverse
manifestations of it. Global ethics is not then an expression of a
higher principle of justice that is in tension with local attachments
and loyalties, but is expressed in cosmopolitan loyalties which are
both local and global. In this sense, global ethics is compatible with
modern deontological ethics in so far as it is a reflexive application
of universal principles and as such entails a certain relativization of
universalism.
Locating Global Ethics
The strongest argument against a global ethics comes from the
political right. The most well known argument against a global
ethics is the ‘clash of civilizations theory’, which claims that the
major regions of the world rest on civilizations that are based on
incommensurable values. In this approach civilizations are locked
in a cultural conflict over basic values. This is a ‘neo-orientalist’
argument in that it makes the incorrect assumption that civilizations
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are coherent wholes when in fact they are internally divided. An
argument that also derives from the right, albeit from the radical
right in Europe, is that the major cultures of the world are in-
commensurable and need to be kept separate in order to protect
them.
It may be suggested that the idea of global ethics is replacing
the idea of Western Civilization as a singular and universalistic
condition. The relativization of civilization as plural has been linked
to reconsiderations of the ontological assumptions of the values
on which civilizations are supposed to be based. It is becoming
increasingly difficult to see these values as primordial or given.
The current opposition to the US war against Iraq is proof of the
inadequacy of the notion of ‘The West’ as a coherent civilizational
entity. The civilizational perspective is important. A critical and
reflexive view of the idea of civilization as a condition that is not
underpinned by a specific cultural, political or geographical set of
given facts suggests a view of civilizations as on-going processes
which create the very terms that define them. This points to an anti-
essentialist notion of civilization as a transformative process in which
various elements and dynamics shape a broad spectrum of societies
in terms of their cultural orientations and institutional patterns
(Arnason 2003). So civilizations are not defined as closed systems
locked in conflict with each other and based on primordial cultural
codes. Civilizations have also been shaped in inter-civilizational
encounters: they are not self-positing. Virtually every major world
civilization has been influenced by another civilization. Thus any
account of civilizational history will have to address the inter-
civilizational dimension as much as the intra-civilizational. It can
be noted that civilizations, and in particular encounters between
civilizations, have been important carriers of globalization, including
the consciousness of globality.
It has been increasingly recognized that globalization is not a
recent development, but goes back a long time and can be related to
the rise and expansion of the early world civilizations. Civilizational
encounters arising as a result of trade, diasporic movements, world
religions, imperial expansion were early instances of globalization.
The rise of global connections was a direct consequence of civiliza-
tional encounters. Such encounters, which cannot be all explained
in terms of wars and violent clashes, were decisive in shaping the
worldviews of those civilizations that came into contact with each
other. It has very often been the case that arising out of these
encounters new civilizational forms emerged or new orientations
within existing civilization took place (cognitive frames). Increas-
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ingly, the logic of the encounter (adaptations, direct borrowings,
cultural translations, mutual learning) has shaped the civilizations of
the world.
There is then considerable reason to locate global ethics in the
context of the development and interaction of civilizations. With
respect to the various civilizations that make up the wider civiliza-
tional constellation, the internal pluralization of those civilizations
must be emphasized. This internal pluralization can in part be ex-
plained by the wider inter-civilizational context, but it is more than
this. Indeed, the very notion of a civilization suggests a diversity of
social and cultural worlds that also bear some common patterns.
As mentioned earlier, it has been argued by various scholars that
civilizations have at their core certain cultural orientations that are
common to the various social worlds of which they are composed
(Arnason 2003). These orientations by no means provide stable
reference points that constitute a received body of traditions such as
a heritage or a self-enclosed world that remains unchanged. In the
case of Europe this is strikingly evident in the Christian tradition,
often seen as the defining aspect of European civilization. From
a civilizational perspective this tradition has been internally highly
pluralized and its core ideas have given rise to conflicting interpre-
tations of the world. Globalization can be seen as giving rise to such
conflicting interpretations of the world; it gives leads to the raising
of ethical questions and presents challenges to given value systems.
The context to locate global ethics is in such conflicting interpre-
tations of the world rather than in a particular set of global values
as such. Global ethics emerges when different cultures come into
contact and where what is shared or common is less given values
or beliefs but ways of seeing the world. This suggests above all a
conception of global ethics in terms of communication and, from
the perspective of Piet Strydom’s social theory, cognitive frames.
Communitarian and Liberal Positions
At this point we can consider one of the main objections to global
ethics. Communitarian political philosophy has been concerned to
refute the very idea of a global ethics. Michael Walzer, a leading
liberal communitarian thinker, argues that there are no global values
upon which a global ethics can be based (Walzer 1983). Walzer
distinguishes between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ ethics, depending on how
embedded they are in community. Thick ethics is one that is firmly
rooted in a living community and is therefore more real than thin
ethics. He sees ethics as necessarily ‘thick’ and a global ethics cannot
be ‘thick’ because it cannot be rooted in a cultural form of life.
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While he does not deny that people have moral views and feelings
about people in other parts of the world, these sentiments do not
amount to anything more than a ‘thin’ morality and certainly not to
a global ethics.
A counter argument to this view is that, firstly, Walzer reduces
consciousness of global issues and concerns to trivial concerns. His
assumption is that global issues are simply not important and that
people primarily identify with local issues. This perspective totally
neglects the tremendous impact of global issues and sets up a stark
dichotomy between the local and global. He does not see that even
a ‘thin’ morality can be sufficiently ‘thick’ to be significant.
A second problem is that Walzer conflates culture with an un-
derlying consensus. This view of culture as an ordered system of
symbolic meaning has been heavily criticized. Culture is diverse,
fragmented and based on contested values and fragile loyalties. This
pluralization of culture has entered the sphere of democracy, pre-
senting new challenges (see Gutmann 2003). Culture is no longer
exclusively a basis for thick identities. A more differentiated view
of culture draws attention to its contested nature. Such a view of
culture would see global ‘thin’ ethics as being as ‘thick’ as many
allegedly thick moralities.
The communitarian position can be contrasted to liberal ap-
proaches. From the perspective of moral universalism, John Rawls
has given an argument that offers a basis for global ethics (Rawls
1993, 1999). While Rawls’ earlier work was based on a culturally
neutral theory of political justice which presupposed the nation-
state, he moved towards a greater recognition of the need for a
conception of ethics that could address conflicts between different
cultural worlds and which was not limited to the confines of the
national polity. This is especially evident in his last major work, A
Law of Peoples, (Rawls 1999) and an earlier essay in which he advo-
cated the idea of an ‘over-lapping consensus’ and is relevant to the
debate on global ethics (Rawls 1987). Rawls argues for a minimal
universalistic ethics that is based on the recognition that despite the
huge differences that divide them people do share common ground.
In this view, a global ethics might be constructed on the foundations
of whatever common ground can be found between people who
otherwise share very little.
While this argument is very useful in seeing how cultural conflict
can be reduced with zero-sum conflict translated into negotiable
conflict and commonalties gradually built upon, it mostly pertains
to cases of cultural or moral conflicts over conceptions of the
common good. It does not provide a basis for a global ethics in
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areas where there are no major conflicts but where the challenge
is to find common solutions to societal problems. Many of the
challenges of a global ethics are not in fact impeded by the lack
of common cultural values. Rawls’ model, moreover, assumes that
the common principles already exist in some form and only need
to be generalized. It is not a position that challenges existing ethical
assumptions and, despite his accommodation of major conflicts
over competing conceptions of the common good, does not seek
fundamentally new or global perspectives.
Although different in their approach to the idea of a global
ethics, Rawls and Walzer are not so far apart. Neither position
fully accepted a firm cultural foundation for global ethics. Rawls’
deontological moral universalism did not give much room for global
culture other than a recognition of the need for common ground.
It is the nature of this common ground that it cannot be ‘thick’
in Walzer’s sense. The result, then, is a self-limiting global ethics
that would have to be too thin to be meaningful or relevant to the
proliferation of numerous developments that articulate in different
ways global ethics. Such developments cannot be understood in
terms of a notion of common ground, but are indicative of new
cognitive models of the social world.
Universal Cultural Values Approaches
Anthropological arguments offer an interesting alternative to the
liberal position, but ultimately suffer from the same problems.
Rather than look for universal moral values in global culture or
in natural law or some kind of universal human traits, a recent
tendency in political theory is to look for different cultural versions
of universalistic values. These attempts aim to reconcile relativism
and universalism (see Cowan 2001). With regard to the debate about
human rights, for instance, some critics argue that universal moral
values exist in all human cultures and although the specific form
these values take differs, they are nonetheless universalistic in spirit
(Renteln 1990).
Thus UNESCO and the UN supported World Commission for
Culture and Development argue that a global ethics has a foun-
dation in the recurrent moral themes in all the major religions of
the world. It has been noted by many scholars that the ontological
and transcendental visions of the great religions of the world –
Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Ju-
daism, Islam and Christianity – all recognize in different ways the
idea of human vulnerability, the fundamental equality of all human
beings and the desire to alleviate suffering. There is, for example,
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an interesting literature on Confucian conceptions of civil society
and human rights (Madsen 2002; de Bary 1998).
While these arguments tend to run into difficulty when they
attempt to base a legal order (such as human rights) on traditional
cultural values, such as those associated with religious cultures,
a sound cultural basis has been established for values that are
global. A particularly good example of such an approach is Sissela
Bok’s argument in her book Common Values (Bok 1995). She
outlines three kinds of global values: those relating to duties of
mutual support and loyalty, values relating to constrains on violence
and dishonesty, and those relating to procedural justice. From this
perspective we can begin to see how a global ethics might be
conceived and which is not open to the charge of either minimalism
or exaggerating cultural differences.
The theologian, Hans Kung, in Towards a Global Ethic has
also proposed a similar notion of a global ethics (Kung 1993). He
outlines four shared principles essential to a global ethic: affirming
respect for all life, economic justice and solidarity, tolerance and
truthfulness, and equal rights and partnership between men and
women. This is an interfaith and transcultural kind of a global
ethics, which is oriented towards achieving global understanding.
The main drawback with the cultural values approaches is that
such approaches tend to look for a global ethics on the level of
cultural recognition, or intercultural understanding. The assumption
appears to be that a global ethics already exists within the cultural
traditions of different civilizations or ethnic groups and all that is
required is the recognition of this. Hans Kung, for instance, argues
that all the major religions have a global ethic because they believe
in a God. It is difficult to see how a global ethics understood
in such cultural terms might be related to the legal and political
dimensions of globalization. At best such arguments establish contra
neo-orientalism that there is no civilizational obstacle against the
possibility of global ethics. However, such approaches do have merit
in demonstrating a wider conception of global ethics than in the
narrow liberal model.
Global Ethics as Collective Responsibility
While much of the universal values approach is concerned with the
relativism-universalism problem, which it attempts to dilute, Hans
Jonas in a classic work defended the possibility of a global ethics
of collective responsibility (Jonas 1985). One of the first major
works on a planetary ethics, Jonas was particularly responding to
the rise of global threats to humankind, especially those emanating
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from modern technology. In his view philosophical thinking on
ethics, dominated by the Kantian tradition, has been too confined
to a narrow notion of the subject of responsibility. He defended
the case for a collective ethics and one that was global in terms
of its responsibility, for only a global ethics could provide an
adequate solution to the problems facing the world. While this was
an important work in opening up ethics to the new challenges, it
remained trapped within a limited horizon, seeing the aim of global
ethics solely in terms of human survival. Jonas assumed, too, that a
global ethics might simply be based on a new version of the Kantian
‘moral imperative’.
More recent theories of responsibility have shifted the debate
on collective responsibility beyond Jonas’ limited vision to a con-
cern with risk and wider political and ethical concerns. In recent
times, inspired by a revival of interest in the Kantian notion of a
cosmopolitan world order, the idea of a global ethics is discussed
in terms of a universal normative order that is closely linked with
globalization (see Archibugi 1998; Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann
1997). These positions vary from those of David Held and Anthony
Giddens, who tend to assume that global culture or global civil
society, will produce new normative principles, to weaker claims,
such as those of Castells, about the nature of global flows. Such
accounts – which are not explicitly concerned with global ethics but
with global governance – suffer a too strong faith in the promises
of globalization to deliver a global ethics and moreover assume that
a global ethics derives from global processes and one world ethics.
Peter Singer is one such example of an approach that seeks to
find a global ethics emanating from the moral and political necessity
to find global solutions to global problems (Singer 2003). In his
book, One World: The Ethics of Globalization he argues a global
ethics is a response to the need for a global ethical solution to
global problems associated with climate change, the role of the
World Trade Organization, human rights and humanitarianism, and
foreign aid. His argument is that nation-centric solutions are no
longer morally compelling and we need to adjust our ethics to the
reality of the global world.
This, too, is where Piet Strydom has made a contribution with
the argument that collective responsibility should be understood in
socio-cognitive terms as a development arising out of the cultural
horizons of contemporary society in much the same way as the
early discourse of rights emerged out of the cultural horizons of the
previous two centuries (Strydom 1999). This perspective has been
heavily influenced by the discourse theories of Apel and Habermas,
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which will now be considered.
Discourse Ethics and Global Ethics
In a series of papers on discourse ethics and global ethics Karl-Otto
Apel has argued that a global ethics must be conceived both in terms
of an anti-foundational ethics and, what he has called, a discourse
ethics, which correspond to developments that are characterized
primarily by communication and which are not constrained by na-
tional borders (Apel 1978, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1996a, 1996b, 2000,
2001). Apel believes that a global ethics is not rooted in specific
cultural worldviews and is, like all kinds of ethics, procedural rather
than substantive. In this sense, he argues that global ethics is ‘thin’
but this does not mean it is thinner than any other kind of ethics.
Moreover, he argues a global ethics is empirically demonstrable
in the growing volume of transnational debates, movements, and
politics; it is not then just idle speculation or a hopelessly utopian
project but a real force in the world.
This is one of the most promising conceptions of global ethics
and one that is capable of distinguishing between the different
normative levels, ethical, legal and political. What is distinctive
about it is that it is primarily a discursive ethics: consensus is not the
basis but the goal to be reached. For Apel, a discourse ethics that is
global, will be the basis of a binding international normative order.
Where he differs from globalization theories is that in this approach
a global ethics is the basis of an international normative order and
not the result. In fact, he speaks of a ‘second order’ globalization,
counter-acting the economic or ‘first order’ globalization. In his
view, then, globalization is a challenge for a global ethics, the aim
of which is to bring global forces under morally binding values.
The version of a discourse ethics represented by Habermas de-
parts only in one respect from Apel’s. Where Apel sees the goal
of a global ethics to be a legally binding order, for Habermas it is
the nature of discourse that it can never be concluded. The radical
openness of the discourse ethics presupposes a degree of indeter-
minacy. Thus where Apel anticipates the closure of the discourse
ethics, Habermas sees it as an on-going dialogic rationality, the aim
of which is not necessarily closure in a legal framework or political
process. This is apparent, for example, in the different reactions of
Apel and Habermas to the Kosovo war, with the latter taking a less
stronger position on the need for a political response in the absence
of a legal framework (Apel 2001; Habermas 1999).
In this view global ethics must be understood in terms of on-
going debates, the emergence of a global public sphere (as distinct
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from a global legal order) and socio-cognitive evolution. Whether
on a national, local or global level, a discourse ethics is the on
going raising of truth claims which is realized in the communicative
cultural logics of modernity, such as self-confrontation, reflexivity
and the permanent critique of cultural values. For Habermas, all
that is left of moral universalism today is precisely this capacity
for critique. There is a debate, which we will not enter into here,
as to whether Habermas’ notion of a universal dialogic rationality
betrays an ‘Occidental understanding of the world’ or whether it
can be generalized to all societies that have crossed the threshold
of modernity (Delanty 1997). The answer to this question will
obviously depend on what we mean by modernity and whether it
can lose its occidental and orientalist assumptions.
The Challenges Facing Global Ethics
A few preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the previous
discussion. It is now widely accepted that ethics today must entail a
largely procedural dimension and cannot be based on foundational
principles. Substantive conceptions of ethics as rooted in particular
cultural traditions are too restrictive, in the context of culturally
mixed societies and competing conceptions of the common good,
to be a basis for widespread acceptance. While ethics may be based
on certain moral values, modern conceptions of ethics are almost
entirely post-traditional and procedural. Deliberative theories of
justice and ethics, such as Apel and Habermas’ notion of a discourse
ethics, are the strongest statement of this view of ethics, which
is particularly relevant to global ethics. A global ethics is a non-
foundational ethics which demands the recognition only of common
ways of dealing with problems rather than an appeal to an underlying
consensus.
A global ethics must be capable of resisting false universalisms.
Only very recently is the universalization of the western view of
the world being resisted. One of the tasks of a global ethics is to
provide a basis for the critical scrutiny of all societies, both western
and non-western. For this reason the notion of universalism needs
to be replaced with the limited universalism of ‘cosmopolitanism’ –
a concern with the limits of one’s own culture. There is no reason
why certain values cannot be promoted without justifying them as
‘western’ or as ‘rational’ but simply because, as Rorty has argued,
they work best and can be defended on pragmatic grounds (Rorty
1998).
One of the biggest problems for global ethics is the question of
its social carriers. What is the evidence that a global ethics exists?
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Is it a purely utopian aspiration – at best as Peter Singer thinks a
response to its necessity – or is it a real force in the world? We
can find some evidence that a global ethics actually exists but it
is important to stress that this exists only as an emergent process
and is evident in the expression of new kinds of cosmopolitan
community. A global ethics is not an ethics that exists exclusively on
a particular dimension of globalization. While global forces certainly
have awakened a global ethics, it is rather to be found in the ethical
consciousness within all political communities throughout the world
and consists of their capacity to look beyond the limited horizons
of the local context. The subject of global ethics can thus be anyone
and is not a particular globally mobile actor. A global ethics is
the ultimate consequence of the dialogic rationality of modern
ethics. Contemporary political communication in the public sphere
provides huge evidence of global ethics.
The significance of global ethics cannot be fully accounted for
in purely moral terms. It is above all a creation of the rise of
cosmopolitan community. This has at least three major dimensions,
legal, political and ethical. Legal cosmopolitanism is reflected in
the increasing salience of international law and globally enforceable
legal norms. This is one of the oldest traditions of cosmopolitanism,
with its origins in Kant. Political cosmopolitanism is represented
in the emergence of global civil society, as reflected in global so-
cial movements, international non-governmental organizations, and
governance beyond the nation-state. Ethical cosmopolitanism is the
concrete form global ethics takes and is induced by globalization.
Globalization entails a tension with cosmopolitanism. Where glob-
alization is a global force, cosmopolitanism arises in the reaction of
the local to the global. Cosmopolitan community is community that
is produced in the interaction of the local with the global (Delanty
2003).
Globalization can be defined simply as the intensification of
modernity across the entire world, in all spheres ranging from capi-
talism to technology and science and communications and popular
cultures. Global modernity is the emergent form of modernity today
and is nothing more than the fact of intensified interconnections
resulting from accelerated social transformation and diminishing
boundaries between the different parts of the world. But this means
the continued transformation of localities and globalities. Global-
ization is articulated through such processes as cross-fertilization
and societal interpenetration, dynamics of differentiation and inte-
gration, all of which produce convergent and divergent patterns.
Its diverse forms are varied and shaped by whatever responses lo-
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calization generates. This connection of the local and global has
been much discussed (see Robertson 1992) and does not need to
be repeated here other than to mention that globalization, which
entails agency, is articulated in local contexts, leading to different
kinds and degrees of indigenization, creolization, vernacularization,
hybridization, cosmopolitanism, transnationalism etc. Globalization
is not universalistic; it does not rest on a universal moral or cultural
foundation; as a tendentially global dynamic and consciousness it is
as much an agent of localization/particularization as universalism.
Yet on the other hand it intensifies the longing for universalistic
ideas and frameworks, while making their realization impossible.
Globalization induces cosmopolitanism which is to be found within,
not beyond, all societies and cultures.
It is possible in a limited sense to speak of a global ethics as
a macro-political ethics emerging with global modernity taking on
an enhanced momentum. There are many ways global modernity
can lead to, what Jürgen Habermas calls, a limited universalism
based on the communicative rationality contained within the socio-
cultural structures of all societies that have crossed the juncture of
modernity. In his social theory modernity entails the setting free of
these cognitive potentials on the global stage. While the resulting
developments cannot always be too easily seen in terms of a dialogic
rationality, the indeterminacy and contingency of global modernity
does suggest something like a global ethics of debate based on
flows of communication. There is, in principle, no reason why
global modernity cannot be seen in terms of communication since
it is widely believed that globalization is not necessarily leading
to a universalistic moral order or some kind of a global order.
The consciousness of modernity has been intensified as a result
of developments as diverse as information and communication
technologies, especially the Internet, migration, multiculturalism,
tourism, global warming and risk.
Conclusion
My conclusion is that the signs of a global ethics are evident in many
cosmopolitan currents in the world today. It is more than the sum
of individual ethics but is not a collective ethics as such or a basis
for a global order of governance. A global ethics is evident in ways
of thinking, feelings, social movements and struggles, in soft laws as
well as in international laws, tribunals and treaties. A global ethics
is an emerging ethics and cannot be easily translated into legal and
political forms since it is as yet largely a cultural phenomenon, or
in Strydom’s terms a cognitive process, and does not have a clearly
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specified subject or institutional form.
Global ethics represents an important challenge for critical social
theory. Habermas introduced a strong ethical dimension into critical
theory, which previously had failed to connect the moral point of
view with a conception of the political. Grounding ethics in commu-
nication, as the context in which all normative models of society are
formed, ties ethics to the cultural and political project of modernity.
Piet Strydom’s work is characterized by this concern with the com-
municative nature of ethics. His distinctive contribution has been
to develop a critical theory of communication around a cognitive
theory that emphasizes macro-frames which structure communica-
tion under conditions of political contestation and as they do so the
social world is discursively constructed. This approach suggests the
salience of global ethics for an analysis of contemporary society, for
global ethical discourses are becoming increasingly embroiled in the
shaping of the social world. From the perspective of a cognitively
oriented critical communication theory global ethics can only occur
in the plural and in ways that undergo transformation in the process
of emergence. So, rather than look at global ethics in terms of uni-
versal moral principles or in terms of common cultural values, from
the perspective of a critical social theory it is best seen as a process
of social construction in which communicative processes intertwine
with moral and political standpoints. The discursive construction
of the social world takes place within the wider context of global
communication. Global ethics plays a major role in the discursive
construction of the social world by structuring and contextualizing
public discourse, as examples ranging from human rights, environ-
mental concerns, health and security, social justice and solidarity
illustrate.
As Strydom has argued, such processes of discursive transforma-
tion are open-ended due to the contingency that is the outcome of
public sphere. The upshot of this is that global ethics can take a
huge variety of forms, from the micro-level of individual identities
to global protest movements and inter-governmental policy-making
as well as forms of consumption. It is likely to be one of the principal
contexts for social identities in the future and a promising ground
for sociological research on globalization.
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RATIONAL ACTORS
AND PARADIGM WARRIORS:
REVISITING AND GENDERING
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES
Louise Ryan
Introduction
This chapter examines the issue of gender in social movement
research and, drawing upon the work of Piet Strydom, argues for
a gendered analysis of the configuration of old and new social
movements. Despite the fact that large numbers of social movement
activists and supporters are women, social movement theorists have
been slow to analyze the gendered dynamics of movements. With
a few exceptions, most leading social movement theorists are men
and in some cases they unwittingly acknowledge their masculinity
by referring to themselves as ‘paradigm warriors’(Goodwin and
Jasper 2004). As one commentator has argued, these male theorists
appear to reside in a ‘gender-neutral’ (Charles 2004) universe.
Specific schools of thought such as Resource Mobilization Theory
and its off-shoot Political Process Theory have been criticized for
their conceptualization of a rational political actor (Gould 2004).
This conceptualization not only neglects the emotional component
of movements (Gould 2004), but also obscures actors’ gendered
identities (Charles 2004). It is surely all the more ironic that the
identity-oriented paradigm of social movement theory has been
equally slow to analyze gender-identity. This may be in part because
the focus on ‘new’ social movements has led theorists to concentrate
on a narrow range of movements and ignore other movements that
do not fit easily into this framework.
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In attempting to challenge this gender-invisibility, Taylor (1999)
has argued for a feminist re-appraisal of social movement theory. In
her own work she focuses on women’s movements and highlights the
ways in which gender underpins the identity, culture and dynamics
of these movements. In this chapter, I explore the benefits of a
gendered analysis of social movements and consider some of the
implications for social movement theory. Firstly, I argue that the
focus on new social movements underestimates the diversity and
complexity of so-called ‘old’ social movements. Secondly, I suggest
that a gender-sensitive approach to social movements reveals some
of the continuities between new and old movements. The work
of Piet Strydom is particularly useful in helping to challenge the
linearity of many social movement theories. In my research, I draw
on Strydom’s analysis to explore the early women’s movement and
challenge not only the conceptualization of this as an ‘old’ movement
but I also examine the issues of gender identity and gender politics
that underpinned this movement in the early twentieth century.
As an undergraduate student at University College Cork in
the mid-1980s, I found Piet Strydom truly inspiring. His courses
were challenging and complicated and not for the faint-hearted.
His lectures necessitated total concentration and his essay topics
required students to read the mighty tomes of Habermas and other
cutting edge European thinkers. Several years later when I decided
to do my PhD in sociology, I was drawn back to UCC by the
opportunity to work with him once again. By this time I had
immersed myself in feminist theory and gender politics. Choosing a
man as my supervisor may have seemed odd, but at that time Piet
Strydom was supervising several feminist theses. For a sociologist,
my choice of subject matter also appeared somewhat unusual. I was
told that the Irish suffrage movement was the appropriate domain of
historians not sociologists. I countered this criticism by explaining
that I was analyzing the suffragists using the identity-oriented school
of social movement theory. However, I was then told that it was
anachronistic to apply theories derived for ‘new social movements’
to a historical movement. He never doubted the logic of what I
was attempting to do. His supervision was invaluable. He was very
giving of his time and always seemed to make himself available to
his many post-graduate students. As a PhD supervisor myself now,
I marvel at just how much time he spent with all his students.
Sitting in easy chairs in his office, there was a calm atmosphere
and never any sense of being hurried or harried. However, these
were not cosy little chats, one had to be fully alert for a supervision
session with Piet Strydom. His sharp mind probed and prodded my
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many draft chapters. He offered insight and enabled me to analyze
complex concepts and theories. He was generous and supportive,
while always pushing me to develop my ideas further, probe more
deeply and analyze more critically. Spending an hour with him was
a real work-out for the brain. I emerged inspired, if somewhat
drained.
Over the last decade I have been delighted to see Piet Strydom
gain the international recognition that he truly deserves. His many
books and articles will, I am sure, inspire many more budding
sociologists. Since completing my PhD, I have continued to teach
and research in the area of social movements. In my work I have
argued that a case study such as the suffrage movement challenges
notions of what constitutes an ‘old movement’. In addition, I suggest
that the new social movement theoretical framework may prove very
useful in facilitating a deeper and more wide-ranging understanding
of the suffrage movement (Ryan 2001, 2006a). Rather than a simple
‘votes for women’ lobby group, the suffrage movement can be
understood as complex and multifaceted; illustrating several of the
characteristics usually only associated with ‘new’ or contemporary
movements.
Social Movement Theories
The study of social movements is one of the most lively and interest-
ing areas of sociology. Since the 1960s social movements have been
a rich vein for empirical research and theoretical analysis. Social
movements provide a framework for understanding the dynamics
of various social issues including: civil rights, feminism, environ-
mentalism and the peace movement. Like many of the movements
it studies, social movement theory is fractured, highly charged and
argumentative. It is divided by competing concepts, paradigms and
priorities. These divisions are often reinforced by the influences of
certain ‘founding fathers’.
The study of and approach to social movements has changed
utterly during the last fifty years. Classical perspectives were initially
established during the inter-war years to account for the rise of
fascist and communist organizations in America (Hourigan 2003).
Prior to the 1960s, one of the most influential thinkers in the
area of collective action was Smelser. He employed a structural-
functionalist concept of collective behaviour focusing on structural
strain and individual discontent. The relationship between the indi-
vidual’s discontent and consequent participation in collective action
was explained through a rather haphazard process of communi-
cation such as rumours. For Smelser collective action was usually
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spontaneous and resulted in irrational and abnormal behaviour, for
example, riots.
However, in the 1960s the rise of collective action through the
civil rights and anti-war movements forced social scientists to re-
consider the complexities and diversities of these forms of social
protest. Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), associated with the-
orists such as McCarthy and Zald, came to prominence in the USA
in the early 1970s. According to this perspective, social movements
were instrumental groups made up of ‘rational actors’ who, being
excluded from elite politics, employed the available resources to
further their own interests. The sudden emergence of these move-
ments was seen as the result of a shift in the societal resources
and political opportunities that facilitated collective action. During
the early 1980s, a new strand of RMT emerged, associated with
the work of McAdam and Tarrow, this has come to be known as
Political Process Theory (PPT). Based predominantly on studies of
the American civil rights movement, this approach focused on the
macro-structural factors that either facilitated or hindered social
protest (Goodwin and Jasper 2004). The RMT approach to the
study of social movements has been very influential and, for exam-
ple, has been used to analyze and explain the rise of the suffrage
movement in the USA (Chafetz and Dworkin 1986).
However, that is not to imply that RMT and PPT are easily
applicable to feminist research. While the focus on the ‘rational
actor’ has provided PPT with a necessary corrective to the view
of social movements as irrational, erratic and dangerous mob rule,
Gould (2004) argues that the ‘rational actor’ obscures an insight
into how actors actually think and feel. She uses her research
on the AIDS awareness movement, ACT UP, to engage with the
concept of the ‘rational actor’ and the question of emotions in
social movements. She argues that a study of emotions provides
an insight into the meaning that social movements have for their
participants. According to Charles (2004) the concept of the rational
actor cannot be assumed to be gender neutral. It is based on an
image of masculine rationality and thus excludes any consideration
of so-called feminine attributes such as emotions. I will return to
this critique of the ‘rational actor’ later in the chapter.
RMT and PPT can be further criticized for their ethnocentricity
(Hourigan 2003). There is a tendency to universalize from the North
American experience, while little attention is paid to European
analyses of social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 2004). As I have
argued elsewhere, the omission of wider analyses and theorization
is a particular weakness of PPT (Ryan 2006b). Much of the current
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debate within PPT centres on the dichotomous construction of
‘political’ versus ‘cultural’ and it would be unhelpful if this split
became further polarized as American versus European. However, it
is easy to see how this handy spatial split could occur and continue.
In my view, the work of American theorists such as Craig Calhoun
(1995) and Verta Taylor (1999) could be utilized to bridge the gap
between these two competing paradigms of social movement theory
(Ryan 2001).
New Social Movements
Whereas so-called ‘old’ social movements attempted to
gain access to the state through parliamentary poli-
tics and focus mainly on economic redistribution, ‘new’
social movements focused increasingly (though not ex-
clusively) on issues like social identity, culture, lifestyle
and human rights concerns. Such movements tend to
be defined by their focus on post-material values, their
detachment from an identifiable political ideology, and
their use of novel and unconventional methods of poli-
tical action (Todd and Taylor 2004: 19).
The work of French sociologist Alain Touraine (1985) and the Italian
Alberto Melucci (1980, 1985) has been instrumental in theorizing
NSMs (New Social Movements). According to Touraine, in modern
times there have always been two main movements – elite and social
movement vying against each other. From the middle of the 1800s
to the 1960s the main social movement was the labour movement
that vied against the capitalist state. However, Touraine claims that
there has recently been a shift away from this type of conflict to
a new scenario. In post-industrial western societies groups like the
anti-nuclear movements emerge to oppose the technocratic elites
who control information and decision-making in society (Touraine
1985, 1998).
Against the backdrop of the students’ movement and anti-nuclear
movements in Europe, the school of New Social Movement (NSM)
theories developed in the 1970s-1980s to explain the emergence
of these new and different forms of social protest. However, the
theorists associated with the NSMs perspective are based in different
countries, writing in different languages, so it has not been as
cohesive as RMT or PPT (Hourigan 2003). Nonetheless, NSM
theory has been highly influential and continues to inform many
studies of protest groups and social mobilization (Della Porta and
Diani 1999; Todd and Taylor 2004).
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Melucci (1980) in his early influential essay, ‘The New Social
Movements: a theoretical approach’, claimed that NSMs were mar-
ked by direct participation and a rejection of representation. ‘Hence,
the importance of direct action and of direct participation, in other
words of the spontaneous, anti-authoritarian, anti-hierarchical na-
ture of the protests originating in these movements’ (220). In the
face of criticism he has been forced to defend many of his earlier
arguments (Melucci1995a), still presumptions about leadership and
organizational structure continue to inform images of contempo-
rary social movements and, therefore, perceptions about how earlier
movements were organized.
Similarly, the German theorist Claus Offe wrote that NSMs are
marked by concerns about the body, nature, identity, culture and
sexuality. Prominent among their values are autonomy and an op-
position to control, regulation, manipulation and bureaucratization:
The NSMs consist of participants, campaigns, spokes-
people, networks, voluntary helpers and donations. Typ-
ically in their internal mode of action, NSMs do not
rely, in contrast to traditional forms of political organi-
zation, on the organizational principle of differentiation,
whether in a horizontal (insider versus outsider) or in
the vertical dimension (leaders versus rank and file mem-
bers)’ (Offe 1985: 829).
In contrast to the ‘old paradigm’, Offe adds that NSMs display
a ‘poor’ and at best ‘transient’ demarcation between leaders and
members. He argues that formal organization and large-scale repre-
sentative associations marked the internal modes of action of ‘old’
movements, while informality, spontaneity and a low degree of
vertical and horizontal differentiation mark ‘new’ movements.
Theorists such as Offe, Melucci and Touraine assume that NSMs
differ markedly from earlier movements. Of course, the main move-
ment with which these newer movements are compared is the
labour movement. The distinction between new and old movements
is intended as far more than merely temporal, it symbolizes a sig-
nificant shift in the interests of social movements (Eyerman and
Jamison 1991: 23). Drawing on the work of Habermas, many theo-
rists assume that NSMs are responding to increasing administrative
intervention in the social and symbolic processes, the so-called col-
onization of the life world. NSMs accept the state and the economy
but want to create more space in civil society for social autonomy,
plurality, right to difference, etc. based on the universal principles
of the formal democratic state (Arato and Cohen 1984)
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In a recent examination of the relationship between politics and
social movements in Britain, Todd and Taylor (2003) employ the
concept of NSMs to explore the transformation of political activity.
Drawing on the work of Giddens, they put forward the view that
people are no more apathetic or alienated than before but express
their participation in civil society in different and diverse ways. They
suggest that people in Britain are more involved in collective activity
(though not party politics) than in the past. Instead of engaging
with the economic battles of traditional politics many people are
turning towards issue-based politics (such as ‘race’, animal rights
and environmentalism) promoted by NSMs. ‘Rather than consisting
in competing for state power, individuals and groups are finding
new ways to affirm themselves and realize their potential’ (24).
However, I find Todd and Taylor’s acceptance of the old/new
dichotomy highly problematic. In addition, it sits uncomfortably
with several of the chapters in their edited collection, most notably
Martin’s (2004) chapter which begins with the bold statement ‘the
term new social movements is problematic’ (29). Disagreement
between editors and contributors is perfectly acceptable if it is
acknowledged and discussed but in this case there is little or no
discussion or even acknowledgement of these marked differences
in opinion, approach and definition. The weakness of this book
is symptomatic of how the term NSM has tended to be used by
researchers, theorists and commentators.
However, whilst theorists like Melucci continue to emphasize
that NSMs represent new forms of mobilization and action, others
are critical of the dichotomy between new and old social movements
(Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Bagguley 1992; Ray 1993; Calhoun
1995; Martin 2004). Using the cognitive praxis framework Eyerman
and Jamison (1991) have attempted to compare old and new social
movements. However, like many of those discussed above they focus
attention on the environmental movement as an NSM and the labour
movement as an old social movement. By so doing, they immediately
face qualitative differences between the two movements. They refer
to the early women’s movement as an example of a nineteenth
century social movement but they fail to explore the movement in
any way. The similarities of the old and new women’s movement
are therefore not discussed within the dimensions of the cognitive
praxis framework. However, despite selecting very different types of
social movements to represent old and new social movements, they
discover some similarities. They say: ‘It is our contention that, like
the new social movements, the old social movements also provided
space for new thought to emerge, and indirectly for new institutions,
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vocations and scientific theories’ (80).
They expand further on old social movements, claiming that
such movements ‘opened new public spaces in which new social and
political identities could take form’ and thus ‘redefining politics and
reconstituting the political arena’ (151). Through the work of these
early social movements women won acceptance in the political
arena. While this at least acknowledges the importance of early
social movements, it comes close to the point made by Jean Cohen
(1983) that old social movements were primarily concerned with
the inclusion of the excluded. This point is reiterated by Eyerman
and Jamison (1991) in the following quote:
In addition to their concern with politics in this nar-
rowed meaning, the social movements of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century were active in what
are now called cultural areas as well. They were con-
cerned with issues of education and access to ‘bourgeois’
culture (153).
But despite the similarities which Eyerman and Jamison discover
between old and new social movements, they are at pains to reiterate
the differences between the movements.
‘Contemporary social movements are new because they occur at
a distinct stage in societal development, involve new actors equipped
with different orientations and identities, and aim at achieving quite
different ends than old movements’ (153).
Thus despite the usefulness of cognitive praxis frameworks in
comparing old and new movements, I believe that this approach is
weakened by a linearity which appears to accept the development
from working class movement to ecology movement as a fairly
unproblematic progression. While attempting to overcome the ahis-
torical approach to NSMs, Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 61) seem
to accept Touraine’s notion that in each period one dominant so-
cial movement represents the struggle inherent in that society be it
industrial or post-industrial society.
Any simplistic, polarized construction of old and new move-
ments omits the continuities and similarities that persist over time
across various movements. This weakens the explanatory power
of NSM theory in two key ways. Firstly, narrow constructions of
new social movements simplify the diversity of social movements in
contemporary society. Martin (2004) in common with several critics
has argued that the conceptualization of ‘new’ social movements
needs to be reassessed. Theorists like Offe and Melucci have con-
structed NSMs as lifestyle and identity oriented. These movements
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are perceived as being concerned with ‘post material’ issues such as
alternative health care, etc. and seek to defend civil society against
colonization by the state. Melucci argues that his original analysis
of NSMs has been much misunderstood and simplified both by
those who use the concept and those who have criticized it (Melucci
1995a). He says that it was only ever intended as a temporary critical
tool to help understand the types of movements that were emerging
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, i.e. in the post-industrial, infor-
mation society. However, regardless of how Melucci himself may
have intended the concept to be used, there is no doubt that the
term NSMs has been taken on by a wide range of theorists and has
influenced the way a generation of social protest has been analyzed
and understood. While Melucci continues to defend the newness
of NSMs, one of problems with his work that leaves it open to so
much criticism is its ‘high level of abstraction’ (Martin 2004: 42). It
is rarely applied to detailed case studies of particular movements.
Recent empirical research suggests that many NSM theorists have
been highly selective in their examples of ‘new’ movements and
fail to consider the wide array of contemporary movements that
continue to be concerned with ‘old’ issues. For example, Martin
(2004) shows that many ‘new’ movements such as the peace and
environmental movements continue to campaign around material
issues such as global poverty and Third World debt (42). Women’s
movements continue to campaign around material issues such as
reproductive health, welfare and safety.
The second way in which the old/new movement dichotomy
weakens the explanatory power of NSM theory is through narrow
constructions of ‘old’ social movements that have led to the sim-
plification of these diverse and complex movements. Because older
social movements were assumed to have a dominant and centralized
leadership structure, it has been assumed that these movements can
be understood simply by studying the decisions of the leaders. As I
have argued at length elsewhere, this assumption about leadership
underestimates and misrepresents the loose nature of leadership
and the diffuse nature of decision-making within some ‘old’ social
movements (Ryan 2001). I believe that before we embark on an
appraisal of NSMs it is necessary to firstly understand what old
social movements really stood for. Old social movements have been
described as campaigns for material and instrumental needs, centred
on issues like citizenship. However, if old social movements are
defined simply in terms of the labour movement then this is not
representative of all the many smaller social movements
that existed in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Indeed, as Larry
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Ray (1993) argues, movements like the women’s suffrage move-
ment were not only concerned with citizenship but also raised issues
around identity. The difference between the ‘old’ women’s move-
ment and the ‘new’ women’s movement, he claims, may not be as
marked as some theorists have implied. He strongly disputes the
old/new dichotomy: ‘claims to novelty are exaggerated and ahistori-
cal since contemporary demands have long histories, and movements
like environmentalism, pacifism, feminism were significant around
1890–1900 or before’ (61).
According to Nickie Charles (2004), the identity-oriented school
of social movement theory has not developed a gendered approach.
This is remarkable given the fact that women are very active in
the movements so beloved by NSM theorists, e.g. peace and envi-
ronmental movements. Despite their interest in identity, most male
theorists ignore gender. As Charles says ‘it is almost as if social
movement theory exists in a parallel gender-neutral universe’ (262).
The failure to focus on gender and feminist issues means that the
continuity of issues and campaigns within women’s movements has
not been fully explored by NSM researchers.
Gendering social movements
In her work on social movements, collective action and identity,
Verta Taylor (1999) comments that the study of social movements
has remained remarkably ‘gender-neutral’:
Despite considerable interest in women’s movements,
until recently political sociologists and sociologists of
social movements rarely evoked gender as a force in
the emergence and development of social movements.
This is not surprising, since the field of social move-
ments, especially compared with other areas of study,
has been remarkably untouched by the gender scholar-
ship produced in the social sciences over the past decade
(8).
Taylor argues that movement mobilization, leadership patterns, stra-
tegies and ideologies are all gendered. The failure to analyze these
gendered roles and processes has meant that important aspects of
social movements have been ignored or simplified. In developing a
theory which addresses the intersection of gender and movements,
she draws upon ‘recent theoretical formulations that combine the in-
sights of classical collective behaviour theory, resource mobilization
theory, and new social movements theory’ (12). First, in examining
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political and cultural opportunities she explores how shifting gender
differentiation and gender stratification contribute to the mobiliza-
tion and formation of collective identities. Second, she examines
gendered mobilization structures, arguing that mobilization may be
underpinned by inequalities embedded in the informal and formal
organizational structures of the movement. She draws on Joan Acker
who has argued that ‘gender divisions and hierarchies are a subtext
in the structure of all organizations’ (18). Taylor suggests that some
women’s movements may set out to challenge these gendered struc-
tures and so create more diffuse, loose, local and fluid movements.
In the third aspect of her theoretical framework, Taylor draws upon
the school of NSMs to understand issues of identity formation.
Similarly to Melucci (1995a, 1995b),Taylor suggests that people do
not bring ready-made identities to a movement but that identities
are formed through the collectivity. The processes through which
those identities come to be gendered are very significant and cannot
be ignored. Taylor concludes:
The ignoring of a wide range of women’s collective
action by mainstream social movement scholars has led
to a preoccupation with movements operating in the
political and economic arenas rather than the cultural
arenas, an emphasis on formal organizations and ex-
clusion of more fluid and diffuse forms of association,
the accentuation of cognitive factors and negation of
emotions in social protest and a focus on institutional
change strategies rather than identity politics (26).
Taylor’s analysis is particularly apt in relation to ‘old’ or so-called
first wave women’s movements. Using the concept of ‘movements in
abeyance’ she has explored the latent feminist activity that took place
in the United States during the apparently nadir period between
the first and second waves of the women’s movement. Her research
shows that feminist activism during the 1940s-60s provided a crucial
seedbed for the growth of the women’s movement in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. Thus the so-called second wave feminist movement
did not emerge out of a vacuum but had roots that stretch back to
the nineteenth century. Taylor’s view of ‘movements in abeyance’ is
helpful in highlighting the links and continuities between old and
new women’s movements.
A dichotomy which constructs NSMs as ‘cultural’ and old move-
ments as ‘political and economic’ not only ignores the cultural
dimension of earlier movements but also negates the continuities
between movements across time. Movements such as the suffragists
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engaged with culture as well as politics and economics. To dismiss
the movement as simply a political reform group underestimates
not only the breadth of their interests, but also the diversity of their
campaigns. As Karen Offen (1992) has argued, the tendency towards
a dichotomy of old and new women’s movements has lead to the
unhelpful split between so-called first wave and second wave fem-
inism. This linearity not only grossly misrepresents the complexity
of the early women’s movement but also obscures the continuities
that may exist across time.
Challenging linearity
Nonetheless, many of the concepts developed by NSM theorists are
extremely valuable and the analysis of collective identity formation,
self-reflexivity and submerged networks as cultural laboratories is
very useful in understanding the internal dynamics of social move-
ments. However, the extent to which this analysis is only relevant
to ‘new’ movements remains a contentious issue. In attempting to
explore the continuities that may exist between ‘old’ and ‘new’
movements it is important to re-examine the linearity embedded
in the work of Touraine and Habermas. In this section I will draw
on the work of Piet Strydom and others to challenge the simplistic
old/new binary.
If the work of Touraine, Habermas and other members of the
school of new social movement theory are combined then the
following diagram of the development of social movements may be
seen.
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Commercial Period
Aristocratic Elite 
Enlightenment
Bourgeois
Emancipation
Movement
VERSUS
Industrial Period
Capitalist Elite
Comtemporary Period
Technocratic Elite
Labour Movement
New Social Movements 
(ecology, feminism, anti-
nuclear)
Diagram of Linear Social Movements
This configuration of the development of social movements has been
criticized by Strydom (1990) for its ‘crude linearity’ (159). Instead,
Strydom’s (2002) work highlights the usefulness and fruitfulness of
‘non-linear modes of thought’ (105). In addition, he also rejects ‘the
equally rough cyclical explanations’, according to which ‘new social
movements are a pendulum-like reactive reappearance of age-old
anti-modern discontent’ (1990: 159). Instead, building on the work
of Klaus Eder, Strydom supports a synthesis approach that combines
the complementarities of both explanations. He argues that:
The history of modernity is not merely the history of
major progressive social movements such as the bour-
geoisie and the labour movement, but the history of
the interrelation of these major social movements and
counter-movements opposed to them, such as the early
romantic movement, the social utopians, the anarchists
and the avant-garde (1990: 159).
The major movement of any social period ‘pitted an alternative
project against the dominant modernizing elite’, counter movements
such as utopians or the avant-garde were challenging the elites while
simultaneously engaged in a critique of the major social movement
(159). As Eder (1993) has argued ‘counterculture movements have
existed since the beginning of modernity. The social movements
that created civil society have always been accompanied by sectarian
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groups looking for a more spiritual form of life in civil society’
(136).
These counter-movements were concerned with aspects of moder-
nity screened out by the dominant movements but they were by no
means irrational or regressive actors. According to Strydom (1990),
these counter-movements ‘were concerned with the basic relation
human beings establish with their world and which structures their
outlook’ (160). For example, counter-movements have focused on
the question of nature for the last three centuries, however, only
in recent decades has this issue eventually become a major con-
cern. While the elite and the labour movement clashed on issues
of workers’ rights, counter-movements considered the impact of
industrialization on our relationship with nature. Thus, as well as
rejecting both linear and rough cyclical approaches to the study
of social movements, ‘the synthetic approach distinguishes between
a dominant and a suppressed modernity’ (160). While Strydom’s
research focuses primarily on nature, risk and the environment, he
acknowledges that other movements, such as the feminist move-
ment can also be explained within this synthetic approach (Strydom
1990).
This approach has been very helpful to me in my analysis
of the suffrage movement as a social movement. The polarized
construction of old and new movements omits the continuities and
similarities that may exist across movements over time. As I have
argued elsewhere suffragists, while pursuing legislative and political
reform, also had cultural dimensions, for example challenging the
social construction of gender (Ryan 2001). Narrow constructions
of ‘old’ social movements have led to the neglect of these more
complex dimensions of the suffragist movement. If we define old
social movements purely in terms of the labour or chartist movement
then this may not be entirely representative of all the many smaller
social movements that existed in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
The feminist movement has been in existence for over 150 years,
though most of that time it had been quite latent. Apart from the
mass mobilizations of the 1960s and 1970s, women had previously
mobilized in many countries world wide (including developing coun-
tries like India) at the beginning of the twentieth century in pursuit
of legislative reform and cultural/attitudinal change. The synthetic
approach devised by Strydom and Eder may facilitate an analysis of
the early feminist movement as a social movement that has been al-
most ignored up to now. While Eder develops his theoretical analysis
of social movements through the ecological movement, he has little
to say about feminism and the emergence of the women’s movement
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as a counter-movement over time. While Habermas sees feminism in
the tradition of classical emancipatory movements, Strydom (1990)
points out that ‘the dialect of movement and counter-movement
applies also to the feminist movement – a movement consisting of
various branches, the most important of which are definitely not the
emancipatory ones’ (161).
Thus from the following diagram it can be seen that alternative
social movements have existed throughout modern history. These
groups have frequently not shared in the debate or struggle between
the main social movement and the dominant elite.
† This diagram was devised as part of my PhD research based on the work of Strydom and Eder. I 
am grateful to Piet Strydom for allowing me to adapt his model for my own research. 
Commercial Period
Aristocratic Elite 
Enlightenment
Bourgeois
Emancipation
Movement
VERSUS
Industrial Period
Capitalist Elite
Comtemporary Period
Technocratic Elite
Labour Movement
New Social Movements 
(ecology, anti-nuclear, 
feminism, etc.)
A Non-Linear Diagram of Social Movements 
†
Alternative Social Movements
Romantics
Feminists
Suffragists/ Women's Movement
Avant-Garde Art
Social Utopians, etc.
Natural Food Groups
Radical Feminism
Alternative living
These alternative or countercultural social movements have been
largely ignored by sociologists because they were surpassed and
pushed off the public agenda by the larger class and labour issues
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which came to
dominate public debate and hence historical accounts of that period.
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This synthetic approach represents an important corrective to the
linearity of the old/new dichotomy and provides an example of how
continuities may be traced across social movements over time.
The women’s movement
Craig Calhoun (1993) cites the women’s movement as an example
of an early social movement that illustrates continuities over time
. However, as feminist scholars such as Nickie Charles and Verta
Taylor have argued the invisibility of gender issues within social
movement theory may explain why the women’s movement has not
been fully researched as an example of a social movement.
Ray (1993) has suggested that the differences between the old
and new women’s movements may not be as marked as some the-
orists have implied. He shows that early women’s movements such
as the suffrage movement were not only concerned with citizenship
but also raised issues around identity. Research on suffrage activism
has tended to focus largely on the pursuit of the vote. Thus the
movement may be misunderstood not only as a single-issue pres-
sure group but also as a reformist campaign demanding inclusion
in formal democratic institutions. However, a new historiography
of the early women’s movement has been emerging over the last
decade. This work reassesses the complexity and multifaceted na-
ture of feminism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(Offen 1992). My research has sought to go beyond the narrow
focus on enfranchizement to uncover the complexity of identities,
actions and motivations behind the suffrage movement (Ryan 2001).
Drawing on the theorization developed by Strydom and Eder, I have
argued that the early women’s movement represented an alternative
or countercultural movement which engaged with and frequently
criticized the dominant discourse and agenda of the government
and the main social movement of that period, for example, the Irish
nationalist movement.
I have written at length about the early women’s movements in
Ireland and Britain and it is not my intention to go back over those
discussions here (Ryan 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997). I will instead offer
a short summary. I have also drawn upon Calhoun (1995) to question
whether or not the following criteria are unique to NSMs; Issues of
Identity, Defending the Lifeworld, Politicization of Everyday Life,
Non-Class based mobilization, Non-hierarchical/Non-instrumental,
Direct Action, Overlapping Commitment.
Issues of identity were clearly important to all suffragists, terms
like ‘suffragist’ and militant ‘suffragette’ were powerful signifiers not
only of strategy but also belief and commitment to a controversial
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cause. However, issues of identity ran deeper than that and the
notion of being a ‘feminist’ as opposed to simply a suffragist
illustrated the concern with a wider array of interests than just
enfranchizement. The extent of differences between the sexes was
hotly debated and such analyses were often complex and indeed
contradictory. Feminists frequently argued that men and women
were simultaneously different and equal. The qualities of female
identity were seen as both equal and in some cases superior to
traditional masculine qualities (Ryan 1996, 1997).
Pacifist campaigns against World War 1 offer just one example
of the many global links between feminist groups in the early
twentieth century (Delap, Ryan, and Zackodnik 2006). Gatherings
like the Hague Peace Congress and the Zurich Peace Congress, and
organizations like the Women’s International League for Peace and
Freedom, gave feminists a transnational platform. Melucci (1995)
argues that there is a planetary or transnational dimension to NSMs.
But clearly movements such as the suffragists had begun to develop
a transnational focus long before the age of global communications.
According to Calhoun (1995), NSMs are assumed to be particu-
larly involved in ‘politicizing everyday life’. However, as he points
out, feminist groups have long been associated with the slogan ‘the
personal is political’. While this may be considered unique to post-
1960s NSMs, there is evidence to suggest that so-called ‘first wave’
women’s movements were also concerned with the complex rela-
tionship between privacy and the public sphere (Offen 1988; Holton
1992). In discussing the activities of early twentieth-century Irish
feminists it is important not to focus exclusively on their campaigns
for access to the formal political sphere and extending the roles of
women in the public sphere generally. I challenge Cohen’s (1959)
claim that the suffrage movement was merely concerned with the
inclusion of women in formal political institutions. Eyerman and
Jamison (1991) have also described old social movements as being
concerned with access to ‘bourgeois culture’ (153). Nonetheless,
this emphasis on access and inclusion underestimates the degree of
feminist critique. These women certainly sought inclusion on juries
and all public bodies and committees. In addition, there was also
a critique that went further and challenged male defined morality,
male defined laws and rules, male controlled work practices (Ryan
and Ward 2007).
For example, several feminists called into question the public/pri-
vate split. By calling public attention to private abuses of women
and children in the home, they offered a critique of social structures
rather than merely demanding inclusion in them. These women
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attempted to reveal the widespread nature of domestic violence in
Irish society and pointed to economic dependency as a key factor
in forcing women to keep their abuse silent and hidden. In other
words, early twentieth century feminists challenged the dominant
codes of knowledge, authority and morality in society. They wanted
to change society rather than merely be included in it; ‘society as at
present constituted must go’ (Sheehy Skeffington 1913).
It may appear, on the surface, as if feminists wanted to enhance
the regulation of all aspects of life in order to protect women and
girls against violence and abuse. However, I argue that, in common
with many social movements, their agenda blended together both
a defence of the integrity of the lifeworld and demands for its
regulation. As Strydom has argued, the women’s movement had
many branches and facets not all of which were emancipatory
(Strydom 1990).
Calhoun indicates the range of strategies and tactics employed by
social movements in the nineteenth century. He points to the suffrage
movement as a good example of direct action tactics (Calhoun
1995). In the Irish context militancy was not as widely used as
in Britain. Most suffragists were constitutional rather than militant
suffragettes. Nevertheless, women did employ a range of inventive
strategies aimed at achieving publicity for their various campaigns.
Within the conventions of early twentieth century norms and values,
women continued to be denied space within civil society. Therefore,
every march and public gathering addressed by women was a
defiance of tradition. Throughout its eight-year history, the Irish
Citizen newspaper (1912–1920) testifies to the inventiveness of
women and their ‘direct action’ methods of gaining publicity.
Membership of the suffrage movement was fluid and flexible and,
although each group had its own elected committees, presidents and
secretaries, the movement as a whole was fairly non-hierarchical. As
I have argued at length elsewhere, there was no one leader, though
clearly some suffragists were more famous than others, several dif-
ferent women exerted influence over the movement (Ryan 2001). As
editor of the Irish Citizen for many years Hanna Sheehy Skeffington
might be seen as particularly important. However, as the founder
of the umbrella group Irish Women’s Suffrage Federation, Louise
Bennett was certainly influential. As one of the oldest campaigners,
Anna Haslam was revered by many. The diversity and fluidity of
membership reflected the range of different but overlapping cam-
paigns within the movement. Pacifism, nationalism, trade unionism,
child welfare, education campaigns, and temperance were all im-
portant aspects of feminism and members were often involved in
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several of these either simultaneously or serially.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter has been two-fold. Firstly, drawing on the
work of Strydom and Eder I have sought to challenge the linearity
that underpins much of the old movement/new movement split. I
have argued that in many cases, different movements are used by
researchers to illustrate old and new movements, such as labour
and ecology, thus the continuities that may exist over time within a
movement such as the women’s movement have been overlooked.
This relates to my second aim in highlighting the absence of a gender
sensitive approach to the study of social movements. Most social
movement theorists are men and although some of these ‘paradigm
warriors’ pay lip service to the women’s movement, they rarely
embark on a serious analysis of feminist movements. Behind this
apparent gender-neutrality there is often an assumed masculinity
embodied in concepts such as the rational actor. This obscures and
simplifies the complexity of gender issues within social movements
not only in the present but also in the past.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Arato, A. & Cohen, J., ‘Social movements, Civil Society, and Problem of
Sovereignty’, Praxis International, vol. 4, no. 3, 266–283 (1984).
Bagguley, P., ‘Social Change, the Middle Class and the Emergence of New
Social Movements: a Critical Analysis’, Sociological Review, vol. 40,
26–48 (1992).
Calhoun, C., ‘New Social Movements of the Nineteenth Century’, in
Traugott, M. ed., Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action (London:
Duke University Press, 1995).
Chafetz, J. S., Female Revolt: women’s movements in world and historical
perspective (N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld. Totowa, 1986).
Chafetz, J. S. & Dworkin, G., Female Revolt: Women’s Movements in World
and Historical Perspective (N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld. Totowa,
1986).
Charles, N., ‘Feminism, Social Movements and Political Order’, in Todd,
M. & Taylor, G. eds., Democracy and Participation: Popular Protest
and New Social Movements (Lanham: MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 2004).
Cohen, J., ‘Rethinking Social Movements’, Berkeley Journal of Sociology,
no. XXVII, 99–113 (1983).
Delap, L., Ryan, L. & Zackodnik, T., ‘Self-Determination, Ethnicity And
Empire: Feminist Nationalists In Britain, Ireland And The United
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 116 –- #158 i
i
i
i
i
i
116 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
States, 1830s To World War One’, Women’s Studies International
Forum, vol. 29, no. 3, 241–254 (2006).
Eder, K., The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and cultural
dynamics (London: Sage, 1993).
Eyerman, R. & Jamison, A., Social Movements: a Cognitive Approach
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
Gould, D. B., ‘Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back
into the Study of Social Movements’, (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2004).
Groves, J. McAllister, ‘Learning to Feel: the Neglected Sociology of Social
Movements’, Sociological Review, pp. 434–461 (1995).
Holton, S., ‘The Suffragist and the Average Woman’, Women’s History
Review, pp. 9–26 (1992).
Hourigan, N., Escaping the Global Village: Media, Language and Protest
(Langham: Lexington Books, 2003).
Martin, G., ‘New Social Movements and Democracy’, in Taylor, G &
Todd, M eds., Democracy and Participation (London: Merlin Press,
2004).
Melucci, A., ‘The New Social Movements: a Theoretical Approach’, Social
Science Information, vol. 19, 199–226 (1980).
Melucci, A., ‘The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements’,
Social Research, vol. 52, 789–816 (1985).
Melucci, A., ‘The New Social Movements Revisited’, in Maheu, L. ed.,
Social Movements and Social Classes (London: Sage, 1995).
Melucci, A., ‘The Process of Collective Identity’, in Johnston, H &
Klandermans, B eds., Social Movements and Culture (London: UCL
Press, 1995).
North, P., ‘Exploring the Politics of Social Movements through ‘Sociological
Intervention’: a Case Study of Local Exchange Trading Schemes’,
Sociological Review, vol. 46, no. 3, 564–582 (1998).
Offe, C., ‘New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institu-
tional Politics’, Social Research, vol. 52, 817–68. (1985).
Offen, K., Beyond Equality and Difference (New York: Routledge, 1992).
Porta, D. Della, Social Movements: An Introduction (London: Blackwells,
1999).
Ray, L., Rethinking Critical Theory: Emancipation in the Age of Global
Social Movements (London: Sage, 1993).
Ryan, L., ‘Women without Votes: The Political Strategies of the Irish
Suffrage Movement’, Irish Political Studies, vol. 9, 119–139 (1994).
Ryan, L., ‘Traditions and Double Moral Standards: the Irish suffragists’
critique of nationalism’, Women’s History Review, vol. 4, no. 4,
487–503 (1995).
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 117 –- #159 i
i
i
i
i
i
PARADIGM WARRIORS 117
Ryan, L., Irish Feminism and the Vote (Dublin: Folens Publishers, 1996).
Ryan, L., ‘A Question of Loyalty: War, Nation and Feminism in early
twentieth-century Ireland’, Women’s Studies International Forum,
vol. 20, no. 1, 21–32 (1997).
Ryan, L., ‘The Cult of Personality: Reassessing Leadership and Suffrage
Movements in Britain and Ireland’, in Johnson, A., Barker, C. &
Lavalette, M. eds., Leadership and Social Movements (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2001).
Ryan, L., ‘An Analysis of the Irish Suffrage Movement Using New Social
Movement Theory’, in Connolly, L. & Hourigan, N. eds., Social
Movements and Ireland (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2006).
Ryan, L., ‘Rethinking Social Movement Theories in the Twenty-First
Century’, Sociology, vol. 40, no. 1, 169–176 (2006 b).
Skeffington, H. S., Irish Citizen (1913).
Strydom, P., ‘Habermas and New Social Movements’, Telos, vol. 85 (Fall),
156–170 (1990).
Strydom, P., Risk, Environment and Society (Buckingham: Open University,
2002).
Taylor, V., ‘Gender and Social Movements’, Gender and Society, vol. 13,
no. 1, 8–33 (1999).
Todd, M. J. & Taylor, G., Democracy and Participation: Popular Protest
and New Social Movements (London: The Merlin Press, 2004).
Touraine, A., The Self Production of Society (Chicago: Chicago Press,
1977).
Touraine, A., The Voice and the Eye (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981).
Touraine, A., ‘An Introduction to the study of Social Movements’, Social
Research, vol. 52, 749–88 (1985).
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 118 –- #160 i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 119 –- #161 i
i
i
i
i
i
7
LINKING KNOWLEDGE,
COMMUNICATION,
AND SOCIAL LEARNING:
CRITICAL THEORY’S
IMMANENT CRITIQUE
OF CAPITALISM’S
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Tracey Skillington
In spite of varying political experiences and frames of reference,
first, second, and now third generation critical theorists have always
retained the Marxist intention to not only make sense of the
social struggle for justice and equality, but also to make a critical
contribution to it. As Eder (2007) explains it, ‘the first really
“social” theory, the social theory of Marx, is transformed from its
initial nebulous steps into a theory doing the job Marx wanted it
to do: not only to explain the social world, but also to understand
why people engage in changing it’ (405). Although it has been
radicalized and extended, Marx’s ideological critique still offers the
starting point for an immanent critique of capitalism’s contemporary
structures and inequalities.
Indeed, critical theory today continues this legacy of immanent
critique by placing the praxis of the knowing and acting subject at the
heart of critical sociological research. The social actor becomes the
primary agent linking everyday meaning making practices, knowl-
edge production, and normative integration. From Horkheimer’s
insights into the ‘administered society’, Adorno’s fears about the
damaging impact of a technocratic consciousness, and Strydom and
Eder’s work on the social construction of nature, critical theory has
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 120 –- #162 i
i
i
i
i
i
120 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
always forged a clear connection between knowledge production
and social praxis.
Even first generation critical theorists like Adorno, Horkheimer,
and Marcuse did not simply wish to account for, or explain the
process of knowledge formation. Additionally, they set out to evalu-
ate its potential, and critically assess its integrative role, radicalizing
the Kantian concept of immanent critique along the way. The latter
was intended to demystify the apparent objectivity of modernity’s
administrative rationality by showing it to be constituted by the
actions and cognitions of strategic actors. In the case of the early
critical enterprise, immanent critique was intended as an emancipa-
tory critique, one that sought to reconstruct social theory in a way
that would incorporate some of the more compelling insights of
Marx, Weber and Nietzsche.
Inheriting the Frankfurt School’s critique of positivism, as a
‘blindly pragmatized thought’ whose clarifications on the nature of
social life depict social action without the actor and praxis without
the author. Habermas sought to re-insert agency into the equa-
tion. His interest in a philosophy of praxis and its relationship
to knowledge and understanding was defined, at least initially, in
terms of an ‘anthropology of knowledge production’ (Wiggershaus
1994). Adorno (1982) refers to positivism’s ‘desubjectivization’ of
the research subject and its tendency to de-humanize the subject
in Against Epistemology: A Meta-Critique. Habermas would later
refine this position through an empirical-analytical emphasis on
‘cognitive interests’ or ‘knowledge interests’. With the publication
of his Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), Haber-
mas now began to explore various forms of cultural knowledge
or ‘rationality structures’, sometimes referred to as transcendental
‘structures of consciousness’, and to differentiate these from the
cognitive reasoning of the individual.
While Adorno’s explorations of critical theory’s immanent cri-
tique of technocratic consciousness, in particular, would remain
embedded in the philosophy of consciousness, Habermas would
alternatively ground his critique in the inter-subjective context of
daily linguistic exchange. For Adorno, the only protection offered
to reason against the spread of an instrumental rationality was in
the aesthetic realm. In contrast, Habermas believed that reason did
not have to make such a retreat, given its inherently dialogic nature.
Once the definition of emancipation as the increased technical mas-
tery of nature was rejected by the Frankfurt school, there appeared
to be no other moment of human rationality to appeal to besides
aesthetic reason. Habermas argues that the critique of instrumental
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reason need not appeal to a utopian reconciliation with nature. For
Habermas, instrumental reason can only be effectively challenged
through a communicative reason rather than a purely subjective one.
A communicative reason had the potential to openly fight against the
excesses of an instrumental rationality embodied in the reasoning of
the capitalist administrative state. Habermas in this instance makes
a key contribution to critical theory’s reformulation of a concept
of social action based on a model of communicative action and a
politics of radical inter-subjectivity.
Strydom (1999) has further developed this re-orientation in
critical theory, towards a politics of inter-subjectivity, by introducing
the concept of the ‘extended other’ into the debate on modernity’s
communicative potential. This thesis argues that the public is always
present in some form in contemporary communication processes.
New media technologies continue to diminish the significance of
spatial remoteness by bringing increasingly global publics into the
spectrum of the present. As a consequence, the reverence shown
towards absent and anonymous publics has become so extensive
that it has profoundly altered the conditions of reproduction of the
modern ‘communication society’ (Strydom 1999:5).
In Knowledge and Human Interests (1987), Habermas began
to shape the foundations of his theory of communicative action.
Using insights derived from the tradition of hermeneutics, and
Gadamer in particular, he sought to understand the process of
knowledge production and understanding within the context of
a linguistically mediated inter-subjective exchange of meaning in
everyday life. Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1984) like Habermas,
acknowledge those structures of autonomy and rationality in the
lifeworld that provide meaning and logic to protagonists of a ‘politics
of transfiguration’ (Benhabib 1986). In their struggle to realize
modernity’s unaccomplished emancipatory potential, such critical
actors juxtapose societal norms with actual social relations and
highlight any discrepancies. Discursive communication plays a vital
role in this regard, as highlighted by Eder (1996), Strydom (2002),
Snow and Benford (2000), Ridgeway (2006), all of whom stress the
significance of frames of meaning or schemas of interpretation to
the cognitive project of social communication.
Parallel to capitalism’s promotion of an instrumental rationality,
with its excessive means-end, calculating reasoning designed to sat-
isfy the imperatives of modernity’s administrative structures, runs
a ‘communicative rationality’ that celebrates modernity’s capacity
for dialogue and democratic change, especially when it is infused
with a politics of fulfilment and transfiguration. Critical theory, as
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it has been defined through the work of Habermas, Benhabib, Stry-
dom, and Eder, continues to celebrate modernity’s communicative
potential by accentuating the validity of an everyday production of
knowledge to a philosophy of social praxis. Indeed, this empha-
sis on the everyday to meaning-making practices has encouraged
a reformulation of abstract social theoretical categories like social
structure, formal and substantive rationality, alienation, and the
communicative dimensions of liberal democracy in terms of their
social activation at the ground level in ‘live’ discourse contexts.
Following the linguistic turn in the critical tradition, spearheaded
by Habermas, contemporary critical social research evaluates the
current demands for justice and a recognition of human worthiness
in terms of the ontological condition of inter-subjectivity, that is,
social practices of mutual understanding, conflict, and learning in
everyday social meaning making practices. This greater attention to
the process of inter-subjectivity and social relations between actors
reaches a new climax in Eder (2007) and Strydom’s (2007) exposi-
tions of cognitive social theory and Miller’s (2002, 2007) insights
on ‘collective argumentation’ and social learning. Collectively, this
renewed emphasis on social communication as an evolving, yet dy-
namic process of negotiation of cognitively ordered meaning systems
encourages critical theory more generally to reflexively rethink the
contemporary nature of social reality, rationality and critique, as well
as the constitutive role of the social actor in this global cosmopolitan
era (See Beck and Sznaider 2006; Delanty 2006; Thompson 2005).
Linking knowledge with social praxis: A critical approach to
framing
A critical approach to frame analysis uncovers the vital links between
the culturally produced product knowledge and the active cogni-
tive process of interpretation. According to this perspective, the
significance of frames lies far beyond the contingency of immediate
situations in that they provide actors with the necessary ‘cognitive
tools’ with which to make sense of the social world around them
(Eder 2007). The ‘critical’ approach to framing builds on insights
derived from various traditions including socio-linguistics, critical
hermeneutics, the social constructionist paradigm, combining these
with a Habermasian model of discursive communication to add
empirical credibility to critical theory’s ethos of emancipation. This
critical framing approach to research thus remains true to the central
normative project of critical theory in its evaluations of the diagnos-
tic and prognostic dimensions of the discourse actor’s knowledge
interests, especially their emancipatory potential. Snow and Benford
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(1988) distinguish between ‘diagnostic framing’ (the identification
of a problem and the attribution of blame) and ‘prognostic framing’
(outlining a better future scenario).
Cognitive frames of meaning, as identified by Goffman (1974),
are seen by Eder (2007) as arising from deep within the culture
and the inter-subjectivity of everyday communication processes. In-
terpretative frames constitute important structures of consciousness
articulated in and through discourse. They represent key cognitive
resources used by social actors to interpret the social world. Oper-
ating from a classically critical social theory perspective, Strydom
(2004) describes this approach to framing as a ‘reconstructive-
empirical sociology, one that makes use of public discourse and
frame analysis, as well as institutional analysis’ to evaluate an ‘ob-
jective societal framework’ (26).
One of the chief distinguishing features of this critical framing
approach to social communication is its concern with the ‘pre-
interpreted world’ which forms a relatively familiar backdrop against
which actors creatively weave both inherited and invented cultural
fibres or resources together to frame their distinctive perspectives
on an issue. As Snow and Benford (1988) highlight, collective action
frames provide the actor with an interpretative tool with which to
simplify and condense aspects of the ‘world out there’ in ways ‘in-
tended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner
by-stander support and to demobilize antagonists’ (198). Strydom
(2004) describes such creative practices of meaning making, involv-
ing an activation of culturally available as well as new structures of
rationality, as contributing to social learning processes and revisions
to modernity’s knowledge order over time.
As an epistemological approach to research, a critical frame anal-
ysis evaluates more general, theoretically significant categories like
collective learning, resource mobilization, cultural schemas, etc. in
terms of how they can be linked to the social actor’s meaning-making
practices in everyday life. In other words, the flow of meanings in
everyday life are allowed to guide the development of critical social
theoretical insights, forcing critical theory to confront its own ideal-
izations with empirical detail on real life social processes. Essentially,
what this means is that critical theoretical schemas are viewed in
relation to how the social actors, using a variety of everyday shared
cultural resources, are conditioned by their ‘habitus’ in how they
respond to social change, conflict, even crisis; how the actor ‘acts
out’, in a culturally significant and cognitively rule bound way, var-
ious social struggles, perceptions, thoughts, norms, and facts at the
ground level in ‘live’ discourse contexts, so to speak. Individuals in
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these circumstances learn together and thereby generate collective
learning processes on account of their participation in such social
interactions.
Continuing to work with generalized social theory categories, a
critical approach to frame analysis draws parallels between lay beliefs
and ordinary language frames on the one hand, and theoretical
components of a critical theory perspective, on the other.
Coupling critique with crisis: Evaluations of the State’s current
administrative rationality, as a new wave of crisis unfolds
In Legitimation Crisis (1976), Habermas explains how the individ-
ual’s experience of ‘lived crisis’ is a socially significant pre-condition
to practices of social learning. ‘Lived crisis’ here signals the emer-
gence of feelings of exploitation, injustice, resentment, insult within
the lifeworld of individuals, and can be distinguished from ‘systemic
crisis’ which relates to a malfunctioning of objective contexts of
relations, such as economic relations (Benhabib 1984).
Individuals interpret their needs, desires, motives for their actions
in the light of values and norms available to them socio-culturally.
While ‘lived crisis’ may be experienced individually at least initially,
it is interpreted socially in communication with others. In this way,
actors’ sense of injustice or moral injury emanating from within
their lifeworld is extended into the public realm. It is through
communication and discourse that actors share their sentiments of
neglect and dissatisfaction with certain societal norms (that is, their
experiences of a ‘lived crisis’) and thereby make them a component
of inter-subjective learning. Critical theorists such as Eder and
Strydom have assessed this generative capacity of the lifeworld to
stimulate cognitive learning processes, for instance in relation to an
ecological communication.
In Legitimation Crisis (1976), Habermas posited the existence
of a fundamental tension between the lifeworld and the corrosive
impact of an administrative structure geared towards the impersonal
demands of the market and capitalist growth. Because of its empha-
sis on economic expansion, the administrative system is said to offer
too few possibilities for problem solving than are necessary for its
continued efficiency and legitimacy. In this seminal text, Habermas
not only diagnoses an impending social crisis, he also evaluates
this experience of crisis in the light of its future emancipatory po-
tential. In this way, Habermas sought to establish a more organic
link between critical theory’s interpretation of ‘critique’ and the
social experience of ‘crisis’. This objective saw that the explanatory-
diagnostic dimension to critical theory was re-accentuated in the
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 125 –- #167 i
i
i
i
i
i
KNOWLEDGE, COMMUNICATION, LEARNING 125
work of Habermas. Just as Marx’s critique of fetishism had sought
to unpackage the laws of capitalism, Habermas’ critique of admin-
istrative rationality, seeks to demystify the pseudo-objectivity of late
capitalism’s functionalist enclosure and render social actors respon-
sible for their actions. Habermas foresaw a dangerous contradiction
emerging between this administrative system’s steering mechanisms,
increasingly attuned to the beat of the capitalist market on the one
hand, and meaningful values, purposes, and ways of life derived
from stable cultural identities, on the other.
If only to validate Habermas’ insights more than thirty years
after the publication of Legitimation Crisis, current administrative
structures again seem in danger of losing their legitimate authority
and potential for justification. Arguably, this has been due mainly to
the way current administrations’ justificatory regimes are framed. In
the Irish political context, such regimes are primarily geared towards
evaluations like ‘value for money’, efficiency, ‘good housekeeping’,
the need to ‘balance the books’. Ireland’s health care services have
been singled out for major institutional reform on the grounds that
this is the highest area of public expenditure, both of revenue and
major capitalist development programmes, today. With both income
expectations and public finances forced to adjust recently to a slower
rate of economic growth, Irish state spending on health must be
curtailed if Ireland’s long-term economic survival is to be secured,
according to Government reasoning. In the process, Ireland’s health
care services are being made more vulnerable to market forces as
key service components are prized open to attract private market
investment. In spite of Government’s call for prudence, Ireland
spends just 8.3 per cent of GDP on health care, which is less
than most other European countries apart from the UK (Measuring
Ireland’s Progress 2007; Transforming Health 2007). Forging ahead
with Government’s plans to rationalize health care services, the State
is said to be working with the Health Service Executive to ‘measure,
manage and reduce’ the time it takes to admit and discharge patients
from hospital (Transforming Health 2007: 39). The Minister for
Health and Children aims to achieve ‘service guarantees’ that can
be sustained only if there is ‘overall budget discipline and a drive
for efficiency, effectiveness and value for money’ (27).
The Irish government’s position on the marketization of public
health care is carefully articulated through a discourse on service
provision, services created with the reported interests of the citizen’s
‘independent living’ in mind. The desire to provide as many ser-
vices as possible in the community, outside of expensive long-term
hospital care, is dismissed by opponents as a violation of citizens’
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rights to proper health care. The use of tax incentives to promote
the development of private ‘super-clinics’ and the increasing trend
towards ‘for-profit medicine’ are developments which opponents
rigorously condemn (McManus 2006).
Like all justifications, government discourse on managerial effi-
ciency and ‘sound system design’ requires a factual validity that, in
the case of the health care service for instance, remains unconvinc-
ing. The trend towards the privatization of the health care service
is portrayed as part of ‘the European trend’. It is said to be ‘against
European developments to cut off a role in public health policy for
the private sector’ (PD 2007: 41). Such evaluations also presuppose
a generalization of interests around market imperatives, which is
currently alienating many of its publics in Irish society.
Up close and personal: Ireland’s current public health care crisis
In the Irish policy context, public health management discourse has
become increasingly politicized since the late 1980s. Components
of this discourse have proven to be highly controversial and en-
ter public consciousness usually via a high profile media debate.
What emerges is an increased demand for public justification of the
rationale behind the actions and decisions of the state to cut pub-
lic spending and restrict service sector recruitments. Dissatisfaction
with the public health care system is based on a knowledge that
derives from the socio-cultural lifeworld of citizens. Such knowl-
edge stems from context-specific episodes of cognitive learning,
where citizens’ direct perceptions and experiences of institutional
inefficiency and neglect are collectively shared, via discourse with
other actors and used to validate a claim of injustice against Irish
citizenship entitlements. Through an intimate connection with the
experience of neglect and risks to health in public hospitals for
instance, excessive waiting lists for life threatening operations, or
growing public awareness of the dangers posed by new pathogens
like methicillin resistant staphylococcus aureus bacteria, otherwise
known as MRSA in public hospitals, critical actors connect their
immediate everyday world with a normative world in need of in-
terpretation. For instance, negative experiences become important
experiential links between the normative safeguarding of public ex-
pectations on health care entitlements and a cognitive learning on
the reality of hospital management, patient care, quality of service,
as well as the consequences of Government’s long-term policy on
health care. Collectively shared cognitive suppositions about the
nature of Ireland’s health care service, for instance, including a
growing cognition of the risks posed by infections like MRSA, make
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a vital contribution to both inductive and deductive variants of
knowledge shared by actors in the public domain.
Because the instrumental reasoning of the administrative state is
geared mainly towards systems maintenance while its legitimation
practices are pre-occupied with the ‘reasons for’ a further marketi-
zation of social services, it seems unable to adequately address such
public grievances. Indeed, the growing cognitive awareness of cri-
sis and neglect provides vital counterfactual evidence to contradict
the justifications offered by the administrative system for its new
action models for health care provision. Such criticisms would seem
all the more pertinent given the extent today to which a globally
triumphant capitalism, following the collapse of state-socialist alter-
natives, has managed to realize its dream of a truly ‘market society’,
as Knorr Cetina (2006) describes it: the capitalist market system,
now more robust and invigorated than ever, has become a kind of
ringmaster, disciplining governments and their administrations to
conform with the greater needs of the economy.
The administrative state today, vaguely resembling its post World
War II predecessor, has come to embrace what Boltanski and Chia-
pello (2005) define as a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (enterprise culture,
lean efficient management, values like flexibility, cost effectiveness,
high performance, speed of service delivery, figures and statistics)
and shows a general reluctance to curtail its worst effects. This ‘new
spirit of capitalism’, emerging from a post-industrial phase of cap-
italist development operative since the 1980s, places an emphasis
on flexible organizations, networking, and less hierarchical levels
to administration. The ‘new spirit of capitalism’, which continues
to sustain capital accumulation and the principles of its legitima-
tion, is as influential as its predecessors, in that it does not just
represent a set of beliefs shared by a few, but rather represents a dis-
tinctive mentality, even a govern-mentality that connects the value
complexes and institutional practices of the micro political con-
text of administration with the disciplining logic of global capitalist
markets.
The social consequences of this new spirit of capitalism are
clearly visible in the administrative state’s ongoing project and drive
to enact new ‘action models’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2002) for
the various service sectors like health and transport. Such action
models centre on a new health reform agenda and business plan
that introduces health impact assessments, new auditing procedures
of functions and structures of administration in the health system,
annual accounts of funding and allocations, income guidelines, a
review of clinical pathway systems by service providers, one-day
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procedures, best practice models for customer care, standardized
performance indicators, as well as a strategic partnership with
private hospital providers. Such models are partially symbolic in
character in that they promote new presentations outlining how
public health, for instance, should be organized (that is, in line with
an economic neo-liberal worldview). The symbolic dimension to
such action models, applying a calculating instrumental rationality
to service provision, provides a set of coherent cognitive frames of
meaning for guiding policy action on health. Such frames, including
a social partnership frame and a free enterprise frame, gradually
remove any moral condemnation of the pursuit of profit, or the
transformation of health or education into a market commodity.
In 2006 the Irish Minister for Health and Children, Mary Har-
ney, (Harney 2006), captured the essence of this ‘new spirit of
capitalism’ when she explicitly drew a parallel between Europe’s
more effective health care systems and ‘the best companies in the
world’. Both are said to share the same ethos, as she accounts for
the various ways in which ‘customers’ and ‘patients’ can be used as
interchangeable descriptive categories. The Minister recommended
that we draw strength and solidarity from our common position
as ‘stakeholders’ in Ireland’s health care service – one that now
reportedly costs the government 25 per cent of its total daily public
expenditure. The Minister goes on to say that like all businesses,
the health care system is immersed within a high-risk culture, one
focused on the issue of patient safety. While opponents define this
theme of patient safety in terms of state responsibility, Government
in this instance advises us to ‘get away from a blame and recrim-
ination culture’ and accept risk as part of the learning cycle. In
this address she stated that: ‘We need to acknowledge that adverse
events will happen and to have a culture that can deal with that. In
the airline industry, for example, you are not only required by law,
by virtue of contract of employment, to report adverse events you
are rewarded for doing so and it is not seen as a black mark against
you’ (Harney 2006: 8).
New action models for health care provision gradually redefine
whole areas of social responsibility as matters of personal provision,
reflecting self-determined decisions and in the process, attempt to
create congruence between the responsible moral individual, an
economic individualism, and the pursuit of ‘independent living’ (QF
2001).
In addition to having a strong symbolic dimension, such action
models promoted by the administrative state are also structural in
nature in the sense that they induce new institutional procedures,
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routines, and modes of practice including a rationalized specializa-
tion of tasks, the breakdown of large integrated work units into
a series of smaller groups that are connected through a network
of contracts (temporary employment contracts, subcontracting, out-
sourcing activities no longer considered the main business of health
care professionals for instance), and new management structures,
like the Health Service Executive, which was established by the
Health Act 2004. Once old institutional practices come to be seen
as having failed in one of their primary aims, that is, the minimiza-
tion of costs, they cease to make sense from the point of view of
this new spirit of capitalism and the changing economic climate.
Particularly with the introduction of the Irish State’s new health
reform agenda, traditional institutional practices become vulnerable
to re-engineering or restructuring programmes (Offe 2005).
As a component of the more general marketization of social
services, the rationalization of public health care provision has
drawn quite a lot of attention recently. Social theorists like Colin
Leys (2001) and Steven Lukes (2005) go so far as to say that the
‘ethic of public service’ has been so distorted by market relationships
and the associated language of commodity producer and consumer
that we need to remind ourselves what citizenship consists of today;
what are its requirements and preconditions?
A questioning of this regime on the grounds of citizenship enti-
tlements is also simultaneously the preoccupation of many protest
actors whose critique is anchored in socio-cultural lifeworld ex-
periences. This group of actors expresses alarm at the extent to
which citizenship rights, including the right to sufficient health care
services, have been eroded by a capitalist principle of marketability.
In spite of its enthusiastic embracement of this ‘new spirit of cap-
italism’, Ireland’s administrative state, like that elsewhere, remains
embedded in a social and political context that is often less than
sympathetic about such new practices and modes of reasoning. In-
deed, the ‘organized irresponsibility’ (Beck 1992, 1996) of attempts
to make health care provision bend to the requirements of flexible
capitalism has given rise to many unforeseen problems in the Irish
context, for example, the spread of epidemics, antibiotic resistant
pathogens, poor service delivery, misdiagnosis, problems with sub-
contracts and outsourcing, poor levels of communication and a lack
of cooperation between service providers.
A social critique of Ireland’s reform agenda for the health care
services has arisen directly from a discourse on democracy and civic
entitlements. We may say that the roots of such a discourse remain
firmly embedded in the socio-cultural lifeworld, as Habermas (1976)
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had predicted more generally. Indeed, the Irish government, in a
policy document outlining its health strategy for a seven year period
from 2001 briefly acknowledged such a lifeworld critique and refers
to certain health inequalities which have been identified recently,
viz., the issue of eligibility and barriers to accessing health care
services, describing these as a major bone of public contention into
the future (QF 2001).
The institutionalization of a distributive justice frame in the first
half of the twentieth century ensured that the amorality of the
market was resisted by a publicly funded ethos of welfare provision
that provided basic social services to citizens in need. Collective
consciousness of government’s commitments to an institutionally
embedded, material form of distributive justice for its citizens re-
mains pervasive and contradictions that arise between this and a new
neo-liberal agenda of marketization often lead to social conflict.
Indeed, the Irish Government’s efforts more generally to infuse
health care services with a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ becomes a source
of intense political conflict between the state and its sympathizers
on the one hand defending a re-organization of its management
structures along more commercial lines, and opponents on the
other, condemning such efforts on the grounds that they are an
infringement on the public’s entitlements to basic ‘citizen services’
(Crouch 2003). A more politically organized corpus of opponents
adopts a frame of capitalist invasion to describe developments in
the Irish health care services since the late 1980s. This coalition,
including groups like the Irish Patients Association and Families
Against MRSA, queries the extent to which Government’s new
‘health reform agenda’ realizes the civil liberties of Irish citizens,
and argues instead that the ongoing marketization of Ireland’s health
care services reduces Irish citizens to market players, recognizing
them only as consumers rather than as equal recipients of health
care entitlements.
Protest in this instance, has entailed a re-activation of more latent,
yet publicly available democratic principles of equality, justice and
fairness. In a relatively acrimonious climate, the state defends its
decisions on health care policy reform on the grounds that it must
‘balance the books’ in such a way that health care does not become
a burden on the state. The Irish Minister for Health and Children
presented the issue in the following terms: ‘We’ve long past the day
for action. I think most people know that there is no alternative.
Essentially if we keep going the way we are, its going to hit 16 per
cent of GDP in Europe by 2020 and 20 per cent in the US and
it isn’t sustainable’ (Harney 2006: 51). It is at this point that the
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state attributes a preponderant role to explanatory factors beyond
our personal control, like global macroeconomics, technological or
demographic changes (Boltanski and Chiapello 2002); forces which
we must adapt to or face economic ruin. Externalizing responsibility
for such structural changes was a strategy also employed by the
Progressive Democrats, the then junior coalition partner in the
Irish government, during the 2007 General Election campaign. ‘We
have seen innovation in the interplay between public and private
sectors. This is now the European trend... It is against European
developments to cut off a role in public health policy for the private
sector’ (PD 2007: 42).
In opposition to this kind of historical determinism comes the
critical actors’ increasingly vocal attribution of blame and responsi-
bility for crisis to the state and any ideological agenda it may have.
Opponents, no longer content with the state’s argument on global
economic trends, force state actors into a position of defence. They
demand a fuller justification for the state’s ideological position and
indeed its role in creating such crises. Protest actors like Families
Against MRSA, the Irish Patients Association, Action UK, the British
Medical Association, and World Alliance for Patient Safety, have
been strategic in leading the national, and indeed, international de-
bate on MRSA in public hospitals, for example, into a wider political
debate on crisis in the health care sector, and onwards and upwards
into a legal debate on citizens’ rights. In this instance the critical
actor re-interprets scientific discoveries about the presence of MRSA
through a new mode of reasoning. This extends the chains between
cause and effect when it strategically applies wider processes of
signification, above and beyond a scientific explanation, to the pro-
cess of understanding the ‘why’ of MRSA from a socio-political
standpoint.
Experiences of neglect or professional negligence, characteristic
of a ‘lived crisis’, are evidenced as a source of injustice against
citizens’ entitlements. The current health care service is defined as
‘unjust’ because of the suppression of patients’ rights to be informed,
and as ‘unethical’ because of hospital management knowingly allow-
ing MRSA infection to spread in hospitals without taking sufficient
measures to control or eliminate it and other epidemics, as well
as ‘unlawful’ from a legal standpoint. Together these various di-
mensions of the problem of MRSA are portrayed as ‘unintended
consequences’ of the breakdown of bureaucratic efficiency and ac-
countability in the health care service.
The extreme rationalization of public health care in the name of
speed, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, etc., while welcomed by Health
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Minister Mary Harney (2006) as introducing ‘a radical simplicity’ to
health care management and delivery, for opponents it has brought
Weber’s (1930) diagnosis of a loss of meaning, empathy, an ethics
of care and collective solidarity to a whole new level of articulation.
The ‘irrational’ rationality of the health service administration from
the point of view of values of freedom, justice, equality, and respect
for human integrity is currently being laid bare by the critical actor.
At least in the Irish political context, bureaucratic failure is being
symbolically annexed to a capitalist manufacture of uncontrollable
health risks and uncertainties.
Learning through crisis: Framing citizenship and injustice through
public health care
Such a critique of the bureaucratic state’s rationalizing tendencies is
not an outright rejection of modernity’s cultural legacy but indeed,
its completion, according to Habermas. One can distinguish the
distortions ignited by a one-sided rationalization of the economy
and administration under capitalism from the rationalization of the
lifeworld. In this instance, it is the destructive impact of capitalism
which comes under attack, rather than the rationalization of the
lifeworld.
Such a socio-cultural critique continues to raise questions of
accountability, responsibility, democracy, transparency and in this
sense, such actors collectively become social carriers of an alternative
body of cognitive structures on public health care provision. The
latter reflect such actors’ ‘prognostic framing efforts’ (Snow and
Benford 2000). For instance, they call for a fundamentally more
equitable system based on a substantive justice embodying ideas
of equity and respect for the sick and the vulnerable, rather than
a neo-liberal philosophy. The desire is for a more communicative
rationality to be applied to public health care management more
generally.
Actors’ diagnostic framing efforts have led to the development
and articulation of an ‘injustice frame’ (Gamson et al. 1982, 1992;
Klandermas 1999) in relation to the health care sector. Like all in-
justice frames, this frame demarcates a clear ‘victim’ of bureaucratic
injustice and amplifies this victimization through high profile cases.
Victimization becomes a prominent part of a more international di-
alogue on health care provision, citizenship rights and entitlements.
The inspiration for a new frame of justice being applied to health is
a cumulative pattern of local responses to perceived social injustices,
all of which remain rooted in lifeworld experiences of neglect and
moral injury.
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While surrounding circumstances may vary from case to case and
context to context, the overall demand for public health care justice
crystallizes the analogous experiences of many groups into common
frames of justice with resonance and mobilizing capacity at both the
local, national, and increasingly, international levels of the debate.
The critical actor coalition’s frames in this instance have a high
degree of cultural resonance due to the scientific credibility of their
framing practices, and the relative salience of the issue of public
health. Their empirical referents, to concrete cases, lend themselves
to being read as indicators of their diagnostic frames. The resonance
of issues like MRSA or hospital overcrowding is conditioned by
how congruent it is with the public’s everyday experiences with
the health care services. That is, the degree to which it enjoys an
‘experiential commensurability’ (Benford and Snow 2000).
Symbolic constructions of justice-injustice, in this instance, are
fashioned simultaneously from the bottom up (local actors discov-
ering a pattern to their respective grievances with the health care
services) and from the top down (as a citizenship entitlement legally
inscribed in our constitution). A shared definition of the problem
encourages these actors to form more generally shared systems of
categorization on inequality and injustice. As Ridgeway (2006) ar-
gues, actors in such social relational contexts not only combine
existing schemas or frames, such as justice frames, to construct a
local definition of a problem, they may also extend such existing
frames beyond primary interests in a way that abstracts from the
local experience.
This particular injustice frame contains specific claims to the
distinct character of public health care grievances. These claims
include:
1. the right to accurate information about a situation (hygiene,
cause of death, injury, misdiagnosis, etc.);
2. a prompt, respectful and unbiased hearing when claims of
negligence are being made;
3. democratic participation in deciding the future of our health
care services and;
4. compensation from government for having inflicted injuries
on victims and their families.
These various dimensions of health care injustice are unified by a
strong emphasis on citizen rights, democratic process, and respect
for the experiential knowledge of reality of those most directly
affected by health care problems. All of these claims are firmly
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grounded in existing cognitive structures on fairness, justice, and
rights.
Betrayal of the dream of health and longevity, given its cultural
significance as a more general marker of progress in the western
capitalist world, makes an inadequate health care service a powerful
blow to individual dignity and violates the latent symbolic coupling
of justice and health. Injured parties describe a process of cognitive
awareness, a realization that capitalist social imaginaries of pros-
perity and longevity have been inverted and all that is assumed to
institutionally embody safety, existential security, care, and sound
medical treatment, (for instance, the public hospital) are turned into
their opposite; are exposed as components of a sick body, an in-
fected site, a source of contamination, even death. Indeed, protesters
use this highly evocative imagery of transformation from ‘dream’
to ‘nightmare’ to arouse public reaction/outrage at the discovery of
viral contamination, overcrowding in Accident and Emergency (Ca-
sualty) rooms, inferior patient care, poor staff to patient ratios, and
lack of hospital hygiene. The mobilizing potential of such imagery
partly stems from citizens’ deep sense of betrayal, loss of meaning,
and the direct experience of neglect by a publicly funded health care
service.
The fact that the current social critique of public health care
crisis is grounded in direct experiential knowledge of mistreatment,
misdiagnosis, or malpractice etc., (all side-effects of an overly ratio-
nalized system of heath care), is of particular interest to a critical
social theory perspective. The critical actors’ knowledge and expe-
rience of neglect in this instance derives from their participation
in the ‘cognitive reference system’ of the socio-cultural lifeworld
(Habermas 1987:136). Honneth (1995) explains how such experi-
ences of insult to the dignity of the self are articulated to attest to
those aspects of administrative procedures considered to be morally
unacceptable. The collective realization that all is not well with the
health care services illustrates Klanderman’s (1997) idea of ‘cogni-
tive liberation’ – waking from the dream to an unacceptable and
morally offensive institutional reality.
Conflict now centres on the apparent failures of health care
administrations, failures which seem to multiply daily as malpractices
become a costly embarrassment or indiscrete element of a system
that continues to slide into system malfunction in a very public
and media sensitive manner. As legal battles are waged against the
state and evidence of malpractice mounts up, a space for alternative
critical perspectives and lines of argumentation is beginning to
emerge. Hence, in the midst of such crisis, a certain degree of social
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learning becomes evident. As Max Miller (2002) reasons, conflict
in this instance becomes a dissensus-driven mechanism of learning
through discursive exchange between the state on the one hand and
competing social actors on the other.
The crucial question, of course, as Miller (2002) highlights, is
who actually learns? Not all actors may be open to a process of
learning to the same degree. This is why in the recent examples of
MRSA infection of Irish hospital patients law has been called upon
to resolve disputes with government administration. The Irish State
has learned to accommodate a ‘non-institutionalized opposition’ to
its structures of bureaucratic rationality and institutional models
of action which it continues to support in spite of evidence of
malfunction. As Habermas argues in Legitimation Crisis (1976:129),
not only can it learn to live with this kind of opposition; it can
also survive without fundamentally addressing the problems which
inspire such opposition in the first place. So is it a case of protesters’
grievances bouncing off of rubber screens? The fact that opponents
are now bringing their grievances to a legal context would suggest
that administration’s apparent indifference will not be tolerated
by aggrieved citizens. Such actors now activate latent citizenship
entitlements to equality and an impartial hearing before the law, as
well as other civic liberties.
Law ensures that a moral reasoning will be applied to health is-
sues to address citizens’ grievances. Conflicts will be resolved legally.
In many instances, law is thought to be the only secure medium
guaranteeing citizens’ civic autonomy. Law, in this instance, is called
upon to perform an ‘integrative role’, as Habermas (1998) explains,
to restore legitimacy and sentiments of justice especially when the
Irish political process fails to overcome the crisis tendencies of public
health care administration. At least in relation to recent legal cases
taken by private citizens against Ireland’s various former health
boards, legal discourse, has temporarily been nourished by ‘the
communications of unsubverted publics’ rooted in ‘the associational
networks of civil society’ (Habermas 1998:441).
Conclusion
Crisis management increasingly becomes the daily reality for the
Irish health care service due to its growing estrangement from the
socio-cultural lifeworld. Critical actors argue that the deployment
of administrative power in this country is more attuned to an
economic imperative than a communicative one, thus amplifying
public sentiments of alienation, injustice and inequality. From a
critical theory perspective, this development is interesting because
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of the capacity of a ‘lived crisis’ in this instance to generate both
sentiments of moral injury and ignite a ‘politics of fulfilment’. In the
proven absence of a sufficient ethics of care and patient empathy
to offset the deep impersonalism of Ireland’s overly rationalized
system of public health care administration, law is frequently called
upon to establish a solidarity between ‘strangers’ (Habermas 1998)
who are bound up in contractual relationships, like those between
the health care professionals and their patients in this context.
This chapter attempts to explore certain lines of continuity that
connect the insights of early and more contemporary critical theory
and research focused on the social costs of the state’s instrumental
rationality. For instance, recent social research conducted by critical
theorists like Eder (1996) and Strydom (2000) reflects their efforts
to expand the contemporary social relevance of critical theory’s
explanatory-diagnostics – its emphasis on crisis and the articulation
of discourses on rights, justice and responsibility. As well as its
anticipatory-utopian dimensions – efforts to reconstruct the internal
dynamics of contingent social learning processes and episodes of
social conflict. The persistent crises and ‘pathogenesis’ of modern
society which Strydom (2000) highlights, an example of which has
been explored here, has been sustained, he argues, by ‘the absence
of a participatory politics of conflict and a more general culture
of contradictions’(266). This diagnosis is followed by a focus on
processes of communication between actors, as the emphasis char-
acteristically shifts from ‘critique’ to ‘critical reflection’. As Strydom
(1999) highlights, such processes of communication designate the
central activity through which controversial validity claims, rules
of argumentation, and cognitive frames of meaning are disputed,
challenged and debated in public.
In relation to crisis in the Irish public health care sector, there
is accumulating evidence of a degree of societal learning. Recently
added to a diagnosis of social crisis in the Irish institutional context is
an evaluation of the present state of public health care in the light of
its future potential. Processes of social learning in this instance may
prove to be an important first step to a re-politicization of the Irish
political sphere more generally which does appear to have fallen
foul of a debilitating pathogenesis in recent decades, as Strydom
(2000) maintains.
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RIGHTS, RECOGNITION
AND CONTINGENCY:
OPENING A DISCUSSION
ON A RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS
Séamus Ó Tuama
Introduction
Neither a cosmological justification of rights as deriving from god
nor a natural law justification of rights is defensible in this posttra-
ditional era. Hannah Arendt (1973) spoke of ‘a right to have rights’
(296) in the context of the human misery of the Holocaust and the
displacement of peoples following World War II. The point she raises
though has relevance throughout human history, even prior to the
emergence of bills of rights as she clearly demonstrates (297). Her
incisive discussion disrobes bills of rights, extricating rights from a
tight legal set of definitions and instead presenting them in human
terms. In relation to stateless people or others deprived of human
rights she says: ‘their freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom, for
nothing they think matters anyhow’ (296). In terms of fundamental
rights, it is not enough that they are legally enforceable. At their most
fundamental level all humans require recognition, a human who is
not respected, has his or her dignity assaulted. This is important at
two levels. It is important in terms of the quality of life, autonomy
and identity of each individual and it is also important in terms of
how we begin to formulate clear and irrefutable justifications for
human rights. To begin to chart such a justification I will explore
firstly the concepts of recognition, respect and dignity and secondly
how they are socially and politically framed communicatively.
After World War II great strides were made to enshrine human
rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set an interna-
tional standard, many countries adopted new constitutions and bills
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of rights or significantly advanced existing ones. However despite
all these advances, concerns continue to arise about human rights.
The twenty-first century opened with a whole range of human
rights issues from the treatment of prisoners in connection with
the so-called war on terror (Guantanamo Bay, Extraordinary Ren-
dition, Abugraib); human rights abuses in major powers like Russia
and China being relegated behind economic interests; Genocide in
Darfur (so soon after Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia); the con-
tinuing dismal outlook for the majority of the world’s population
in less developed countries; issues like discrimination against girls
and women; rogue states like North Korea and Burma systemati-
cally denying rights to their citizens, the list could go on. On the
other side we may count many important advances, at national level
new constitutions, bills of rights, human rights legislation, stronger
courts and public opinion in support of human rights. On the
international plane the emergence of the United Nations with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and important advances like
the legally binding Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989),
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and European
Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court (and
its predecessors from Nuremberg onwards), greater recognition for
cultural, racial and religious minorities and greater public awareness
of human rights violations have all helped to improve the landscape.
Yet clouds hang over human rights, we certainly cannot claim that
they are universally respected nor that the trend is necessarily in-
evitably towards their expansion or adherence to at either national
or international levels. In the developed world for instance we see
instances of a reduction in legal guarantees for certain categories
of people (especially suspected terrorists) and the situation vis-a-vis
non-nationals has tended to become more stringently codified, but
not necessarily more liberal.
The instruments for recognizing, defending and enforcing human
rights are essential for a decent human rights regime. Establishing
such frameworks universally is a slow process. In the end this
can only happen if we can defend human rights in all and every
circumstance for every human being. That task was not begun
today, major liberal figures like Locke and Kant already set out
universalistic arguments for human rights in the eighteenth century.
But as Arendt (1973) points out: ‘human rights cannot be expressed
in the categories of the eighteenth century because they presume
that rights spring immediately from the “nature” of man’ (297).
What she essentially challenges is both the idea of god given
rights and rights deriving from natural law. The problem this leaves
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is that these are the bases on which liberals justified human rights,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, some articles
of which are openly dismissed even in states with high standards of
human rights. The key point is that there is still no clear recognition
that all humans are truly equal.
To pursue the goal of sketching a starting point off which
we can defend the right of all humans to have rights I wish to
explore two theoretical spheres. The first concerns establishing a
fundamental benchmark for human rights, which I believe to reside
in the concept of recognition, and which I think is missing in most
rights theories. Second is the process through which recognition
is mediated and this I believe can be found in the communicative
contingency theories of double contingency (largely corresponding
with individual rights) and triple contingency (largely corresponding
with solidaristic rights).
Rights, Recognition, Respect and Dignity
On what basis can we claim rights? On what basis do we owe
solidarity to our fellow humans? For Arendt it comes back to
humans sharing the human condition and thus having an innate
right to human rights. She says ‘the right to have rights, or the right
of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by
humanity itself ’ (298).
This essentially poses two challenges, firstly to develop a sustain-
able justification for human rights in a posttraditional world, which
secondly can secure a genuinely universal realization of human
rights. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from the
opening words of the Preamble and Article 1 state this intention:
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’
(Article 1) it is clear that neither the spirit nor the letter of the
declaration have been taken very seriously by many members of
the United Nations. While rights can be declared universal they are
interpreted and implemented in legal contexts defined by political
boundaries and agreements. This means that the right to have rights
is not universally interpreted, leaving us with a world where the
most fundamental rights are arbitrarily denied by many regimes, ter-
rorist and criminal groups. And while it is not always highlighted in
rights discourses, the issue of respect in both the private and public
domains has a serious impact on the realization of human rights
for individuals. This is a topic which Honneth (2007) explores with
reference to the family, where he presents two paradigms a Kantian
(Legal Model) and a Hegelian (Affective Model). His discussion
highlights a deep problematic between Kant’s legal-rights approach
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 144 –- #186 i
i
i
i
i
i
144 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
and Hegel’s ‘mutual guarantee of care and devotion’ (153). The key
point of Honneth’s discussion is: ‘that individual subjects have to
be able to lay claim to the principles of universal justice whenever
they see themselves no longer recognized with the dignity of a legal
person’ (156).
Brunkhorst (2005) says that an international legal framework
exists that excludes the possibility of anyone landing in a context
where they could be treated as a ‘stranger with no rights’, but this
merely masks a fundamental problem. That problem goes right back
to Hobbes’s discussion on the state of nature and the social contract:
‘It only provides legal permission for an independent exercise of
power by those who are strong enough to enforce their own rights
or the rights of those they want to help’ (143).
We have essentially two problems. We have not given sufficient
attention to a defensible justification of rights in a posttraditional
context nor do we have the means to universally enforce those rights
that we have enumerated. They are not totally distinct problems.
Both are pressing issues that impact on the gains we have made in
the recognition and enforcement of human rights. Terrorists on a
constant basis dismiss human rights and too often states respond by
rolling back hard won civil liberties. On a global level the majority
world continues to suffer starvation, malnutrition, disease, lack of
education, social and health services, war and a general lack of real
life chances in the face of the basic rights enumerated in Article 25
(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The denial of
rights continues within states for a variety of reasons including race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, disability, language,
education, wealth among others. In simple terms we have made
substantial progress since the middle of the twentieth century, but
we are still abandoning millions of people in terms of recognizing
their rights. We are at a point where there is an urgency to push on
with the rights agenda, not a moment for reflection or retrenchment.
In order to do that we need to come back to the fundamentals, that
is, as Arendt (1973) puts it, on what basis do humans have ‘a right
to have rights’ (296).
The problem we face must be contextualized in a changing global
political climate. We are at an historical moment in which the nation
state is undergoing significant change, with more than one possible
way forward. One way, I might say more hopeful from a rights
perspective, is in the direction of cosmopolitanism as discussed by
Delanty and Beck (2006) another less hopeful scenario like that
identified by Hannah Arendt. Benhabib (2004) speaks of Arendt’s
analysis of the conquest and plunder of Africa by European states,
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in which civilized white men engaged in outrages against the local
populations that would not be tolerated at home. Arendt borrows
the phrase ‘The Heart of Darkness’ from Joseph Conrad to label this
type of activity, which she sees returning to Europe itself through the
inter-war totalitarian movements. The denial of respect for the ma-
jority of the world’s population today is a reenactment of the ‘heart
of darkness’, by other means, and like the emergence of totalitarian-
ism in the last century is equally capable of infecting the developed
world. Unless we have clear irrefutable justifications for rights and
means for maintaining them both morally and legally then we are
always exposed to the possibility of regression. If social and cultural
rights could be retrenched at the end of the twentieth century in the
face of an economic crisis, in part precipitated by the oil crisis of
1973, then it seems improbable that our full complement of rights
would survive in an exacerbation of global conditions emerging
in the context of the risk society, be that through environmental
factors like an ecological disaster or a climatic crisis, exhaustion
of fossil fuels, or our capacity to deal with the debt crises or war
or migration. On top of all this we have serious issues around the
nature of government, constitutionality and the role of international
law.
Arendt’s concept of ‘a right to have rights’ resonates today as
loudly as in the period in which she wrote. The fragmentation
of populations and displacement of individuals has increased in
momentum at the turn of the twenty-first century. Not even the
international recognition of refugee status has managed to protect
refugees. European states and the developed world in general still
exhibit the ‘heart of darkness’ in terms of policies towards the
developing world in battles over resources, debt, war, the HIV/AIDS
crisis. This point was made forcibly by British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown in his speech to the United Nations on 31 July
2007, in which he recounted failures by the developed countries
to address the crisis of the less developed world: ‘So it is time to
call it what it is: a development emergency which needs emergency
action’ (Brown 2007).
In the face of this emergency it is not surprising that large
numbers of economic migrants wish to gain access to the same life
chances as those lucky to be born in the developed world, but they
have not been universally welcomed, despite many potential social
and economic benefits (Weinstein 2002). Even within the European
Union member states placed barriers in front of citizens of new
member states preventing them from travelling to take up work
(Jileva 2002). Many states have enacted laws to reduce the rights
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of migrants to have rights, for example eliminating birth right to
citizenship for children born of non-national parents, as happened
in Ireland in 2004. This heart of darkness continues to exhibit itself
in national policies on migrants (Pajnik 2007), but not just migrants
it also extends to citizens and residents and especially Islamic ones.
Even in those places where rights are respected for citizens the
same protections often do not extend to migrants. This is justified
through the creation of boundaries that mark off territory and re-
define rights not as universal, but specific, for some the rights may
approach the ideal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
but for outsiders they may be limited. It is contradictory to pro-
nounce human rights as universal on one hand, while simultaneously
delimiting rights to some human beings for instance on the basis of
accident of birth, economic disadvantage or gender.
The idea of formal equality is central to liberalism, yet that formal
equality is not always distributed equally. Formalistic obstacles by
way of law, constitutions and political boundaries for instance are
frequently used to avoid accepting mutual responsibility for this
deficiency. It would be erroneous to suggest that the trend is entirely
negative in terms of formal rights, it is still the case that the
panoply of formal rights continues to expand. This does not mean
that the spread is always uniform nor that certain groups don’t
continue to suffer systematic disadvantage. This clearly has ongoing
implications for the life experiences of very many people. It also
indicates that while human rights can be stated to be universal, and
that formal rights are essential to liberal rights, exceptions are made
for political, cultural, religious, economic or other reasons, thus
pragmatically dismissing the universal aspect of rights (universality
and the exception are mutually exclusive) and abridging formal
rights to certain categories of citizens or certain categorization
of human beings. Both the practical and theoretical aspects of
this problem are at variance with instruments like the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the conception of human rights
as being universal, immutable and inalienable.
In the developed world there has been an ideological and prag-
matic relegation of social rights from the latter part of the twentieth
century as is evident in the decline of the welfare state. Ideologically
those rights can be designated as extraneous to liberal rights, or
from a neo-liberal perspective perhaps as a counterweight against
the full realization of rights. If we look at this from the perspective
of Hayek for instance, his primary concerns are the promotion of
liberty, resistance to collective tendencies and by extension greater
reliance on market forces. His view is based on individualism and
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individual effort, it eschews any distortion of the market, holding
that societal progress is an aggregative process rather than an inte-
grative one. ‘The market and the price mechanism provide. . . a sort
of discovery procedure which both makes the utilization of more
facts possible than any other known system, and which provides
the incentive for constant discovery of new facts’ (1978: 236). His
philosophy relies on rational actors being at liberty to make rational
choices, not just for their own freedom, but for the good of society:
‘liberty is essential in order to leave room for the unforeseeable
and unpredictable. . . It is because every individual knows so little’
(1960: 29).
He endorsed the idea that any individual can at best have only
a partial perspective on what might be termed the common good.
This is because any individual cannot be expected to understand the
full range of issues and secondly because the idea of the common
good is nebulous, leaving but few areas of common agreement. From
this perspective he sees the idea of central planning as a hopeless
venture. He dismisses the notion of a single ethical code as equally
problematic as ‘no such complete ethical code exists’ (1991: 43).
Democracy exists in a sort of straitjacket, as it cannot really deliver
the level of governance required in a complex society. On one side
this presents the idea that ‘the responsible authorities must be freed
from the fetters of democratic procedure’ (1991: 50). For Hayek
democracy should not be viewed as a ‘fetish’ but recognized as
‘a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and individual
freedom’ (1991: 52). Although he contests the idea of the common
good, his position would seem to place ‘freedom’ as the goal
of society, and thus the ultimate common good. His solution is
primarily directed at reducing the role of the state, a reduction
of regulation and the advance of freedom through formal equality.
Pursuing this utilitarian orientation makes redundant the need for
social rights, but it also undermines the premise for formal liberal
rights. Sustaining liberty has a utility in terms of the operation of
the market and ceding to it the capacity to achieve certain goals that
may deliver a common good. But it seems that it is utility rather than
humanity that occupies the central core of the philosophy. Liberty
is not in this understanding a right owing to all humans on the basis
of their common humanity and inherent equality, but a tool for
achieving a utilitarian goal, an effective market and a consequent
common good (even if this is not necessarily explicitly recognized).
If utility could be achieved through the denial of liberty, as many
political regimes espoused, then we are left bereft of a grounding
principle to underpin human rights. Their value is utilitarian rather
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than essential.
I contend that this is both erroneous and potentially deleterious
to a human rights regime. Its foundations are more about where we
are in terms of rights rather than a principled argument supporting
rights. It points to a fundamental flaw in the grounding of rights in a
posttraditional society, transcendental assumptions no longer apply,
and the arguments in support of formal rights seem to be grounded
in utility. This problem partly arises on the assumption that rights are
built on a chronological base, in which social rights are an add-on.
But we are left without a base onto which the scaffold is built. This
problem I believe can be addressed with reference to the concept
of recognition developed by Honneth. What his analysis provides
is the seeds from which we can acknowledge both the essence and
essential nature of rights as humans. It also inverts the assumptions
that T.H. Marshall (1973) proposed and is ironically supported by
his opponents. Social rights far from being an add-on are in fact
an act of recognition of the factual equality of all humans and it is
from that starting point we can develop a theory to support formal
rights rather than vice versa.
Mutual recognition is essential to participation in human society.
It is the essential building block of human society being at once the
means by which we participate socially and develop our self-image.
Through the process of mutual recognition we come to understand
the nature of human interaction, we develop concepts around
rights and responsibilities initially at the level of our interaction
with others. This needs to be understood at a basic level, our
day-to-day engagement with others from infancy, prior to any
theoretical abstraction around such concepts or indeed their legal
status. Honneth (2002), who has been at the fore in clarifying
the meaning of recognition and respect, essentially works with
the young Hegel’s ‘three modes of recognition – love, rights and
solidarity’ (501). Through this triumvirate we begin to see the levels
at which recognition operates and how it underpins the very essence
of human society. And has deep consequences for the practical
meaning of society and citizenship.
Recognition goes to the very heart of what it is to be a citizen
as well as what it is to be a human being. Honneth rightly points
out, that a person can only be called free ‘in the full sense of the
word’ where she knows that she is recognized by others in a way
that she can rationally reconcile with her own self-concept (509).
This has profound importance if we claim to value a society based
on equality, democracy and rights. This latter point of course raises
many other issues.
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Honneth contextualizes recognition as an essential aspect of a
social contract. He says that the act of mutual recognition enables
individuals to become members of society as it allows for ‘an
awareness of how rights and duties are reciprocally distributed’
(501). This is a very serious contention. It makes a statement about
how society emerges and is sustained. In that regard it is as much
about the social contract as Hobbes or Locke and is probably no
less controversial. In the first instance it holds within it a contention
about the meaning of rights and places the beginning point of
rights at a fundamental level, it is about the essentials of humans as
social actors and about the meaning of society as a social construct
reliant upon the support of its members. In short he says that:
‘a given society’s chance of meeting with the uncoerced support
of its members depends on its ability to organize the relations of
recognition’ (501).
It depends on individuals being able to achieve ‘positive forms of
relation-to-self ’. This is a complex idea, with many manifestations,
including the dichotomy between the Kantian (legal paradigm) and
the Hegelian (affective paradigm) discussed by Honneth (2007) and
in debates between cultural relativists and proponents of universal
rights. There are symmetries between both dichotomies as Don-
nelly’s (1984) summation of the relativist position shows, vis-a-vis
Honneth’s (1984) application of the Hegelian paradigm to the fam-
ily: ‘If traditional practices truly are based on and protect culturally
accepted conceptions of human dignity, then members of such a
community simply will not have the desire or need to claim such
civil rights’ (417).
The two related terms of dignity and respect also need some
clarification, especially in the context I will use them here. Pritchard
(1972) uses the term dignity, which is related to Honneth’s concept
of recognition. Dignity is what is recognized. It is at the core of
much liberal thought, we see it in Locke’s famous quote on life,
health and liberty:
The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it,
which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another
in his life, health, liberty or possessions (Locke 1690,
Second Treaties, Chap 2: 6).
Dignity is the essence of the ‘being all equal and independent’
conceptualized by Locke. It is the label to describe what makes
us inherently human and of sharing essential human qualities in
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common – the commonality of the human experience as opposed
to the particularity of the individual. It resides with the individual
as a part of that collectivity, regardless of his or her particular
circumstances. The third term ‘respect’ to me signifies that which we
owe to each other as humans, given our common dignity. It resonates
of Kantian philosophy: ‘Every human being has a legitimate claim
to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to
respect every other’ (Kant 1996: 209).
The three concepts are related in that dignity is concomitant
with being human, recognition is the act of recognizing dignity and
respect has an obligatory dimension in that all humans being of equal
dignity are due respect as fellow humans, which emerges through
the act of recognition.
Dignity
Recognition
Respect
I do not suggest that these distinctions are always reflected in the
literature and may in fact be presented interchangeably.
Miller (2001) suggests that individuals encounter disrespect pre-
dominantly in mundane contexts where their ‘experiences of every-
day injustice involve some form of disrespectful treatment’ (530).
He identifies the three spheres of ‘voice’, ‘interpersonal sensitivity’
and ‘accountability’ as being central to individuals’ need for recog-
nition. Voice refers to the right ‘to have their say and to be listened
to in their dealings with others’ (531), this matters even if it does
not effect the outcome. Interpersonal sensitivity is about people’s
belief that ‘they are entitled to polite and respectful treatment from
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others’ (531). Accountability holds that individuals ‘are entitled to
explanations and accounts for any actions that have personal conse-
quences for them’ (531). What is very important in Miller’s analysis
is that he places the business of respect and recognition at the level
of personal self-regard rather than at the level of external indicators.
This again emphasizes its fundamental quality and consequently its
place in the development of concepts of rights. He points out that
individuals feel a greater sense of indignation through the intrinsic
statement against their feelings of prestige than from the fact that
they have received less than they had anticipated in an exchange
context: ‘the perception of distributive fairness often has less to do
with an outcome’s exchange value than with its symbolic or status
value’ (530).
To carry this discussion forward it is useful to review two practical
applications of the concepts of dignity and respect as applied to the
operation of the legal system (both in the USA). These are relevant
as recourse to law for redress, recognition and enforcement of rights
is a sine qua non. Pritchard (1972) looks at the relationship between
dignity and justice, while Taslitz (2003) looks at respect in the
application of law.
Pritchard holds that justice cannot be achieved in the absence
of a sense of human dignity ‘principles of justice should reserve a
prominent place for human dignity. If this is not done. . . claims of
justice will be at best legalistic and at worst arbitrary’ (Pritchard
1972: 300–1).
He also explores how low self-regard or sense of dignity can
reduce both the recognition of injustices against the self, but also
injustices against others.
Pritchard’s definition of dignity and self-esteem are useful both
in distinguishing their difference and establishing the centrality of
dignity. His clear premise is that all people have dignity, it is an
innate quality of being human. The importance of this and his
later exploration of the practical human experience of having one’s
dignity affronted pushes us to place dignity as a fundamental catalyst
both for the emergence of rights and why rights can be considered
inalienable.
He presents human dignity in the context of a pre-political mo-
ment: ‘One can feel resentment, shame, or pride without explicitly
spelling out to himself either that or why he is feeling like that’
(301). This is not a very extensively explored approach to rights,
but I believe it is an essential starting point, a position also found in
Honneth’s work. Pritchard also is clear that human dignity resides
in everyone regardless of his or her status: ‘It is something shared by
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all men regardless of the office they may hold or the social standing
they may have’ (301). Following Lynd (1958) he links the concepts
of shame and loss of self-esteem to ‘a feeling that one has lowered
or even lost his dignity’ (302).
Pritchard refers to personal integrity in his analysis. This is a topic
of considerable importance today given the growing encroachment
on personal integrity for instance by increased surveillance of ev-
eryday activities. This may range from closed circuit television on
streets, in shops and the workplace to deeper more penetrating
surveillance like monitoring of private telephone conversations,
emails, text messages and even library borrowing records.
States are in part responsible for increased surveillance of citi-
zens. It is currently being justified as a means of countering terrorism
and/or acting against organized crime. This justification has validity
and there is little doubt that crime can be reduced through surveil-
lance. However, that is not the end of the issue, there are also issues
around respecting human dignity and allowing individuals to get on
with their lives with as much integrity as possible. The stock answer
is that if a person is not doing something illegal then they have noth-
ing to fear. That answer is based on very weak premises. What of
John Locke’s fear of association with his most famous contributions
to liberalism, had his political opponents greater access to means of
surveillance and forensics would he have risked that project? What
of Nelson Mandela breaking the law, a law that only much later
and after considerable bloodshed and pain, could be finally declared
illegitimate. People taking risks and doing, saying and writing things
that breach the mores of their societies are engaged in a change pro-
cess. It would be foolish to say that this is always beneficial, it is easy
for instance to point to something like child pornography or racial
hatred as repressive manifestations. However, the history of civil
society is paved with examples of people speaking out against the
accepted norms of the day and against the economic and political
interests of their societies for the ultimate good of humanity. Shifts
in the political, religious and cultural values that have delivered
liberal civil societies owe much to activities that in their own day
would be considered clandestine. Efficient surveillance would at the
least have delayed such developments. This justification needs to be
measured not only in free societies but also repressive ones. It needs
to be measured against the capacity for legal and political rights to
obtain effectively, even in free societies. A proper balance between a
demonstrable and defensible common good and personal autonomy
needs to be struck. This is one of the key ideas of liberalism and
the curtailment of which, liberals rightly object, is one of the most
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obnoxious and destructive aspects of repressive regimes past and
present. Going down the road of deep level surveillance presents
crime prevention and security advantages but it has substantive
costs.
Before leaving this topic it is important to note that both private
citizens and corporations also engage in surveillance activities and
the consequences have implications for personal autonomy. Surveil-
lance by private citizens includes the distribution of compromising
and offensive images and information about individuals through mo-
bile phones, personal web pages, social networking websites, blogs
and so on. There are a host of other types of surveillance activities
by those engaged in crime, including the targeting of vulnerable in-
dividuals and populations like children, the elderly, homeless people
and minorities.
A global industry operates on the basis of delving into the private
lives of celebrities, often it must be admitted at their own invitation
and frequently for considerable fees. It has been a driving force
in transforming the magazine industry over the past number of
years, even if it now seems to be reaching a peak (Ives 2007; Long
2007). There are few boundaries in delving into every aspect of
celebrities’ lives from the most intimate details of their personal
lives to their mundane activities and those of their networks of
friends and relatives. Full colour pictures of suspect provenance,
revealing aspects of personal lives that at best have only tangential
news interest, but are more likely to be of high exposé value are
typical of this genre. In a report on the Reuters Newsmakers Event
‘Who needs journalists anyway’ journalist John Thompson includes a
quote from Guardian newspaper’s digital publishing director Simon
Waldman on a strategy used by celebrity magazine Heat:
It’s a combination of news values and the way the market
functions. Heat magazine will pay 200 for an unposed
photograph of a celebrity. You wonder where all this is
leading if any minor celebrity has to put up with having
a cameraphone stuck in their face wherever they go. Is
this really the society we want to live in? (Thompson
2006)
Taslitz (2003) discussing law and respect in the American context
explores the importance of respect in the application of justice,
specifically in terms of how the police address individuals and groups
within society. ‘Each person feels respected when he is treated as
significant and of equal worth with every other person. . . But respect
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is also about inclusion, about being considered full members of the
wider political community’ (27).
His discussion is particularly relevant as it puts ‘respect’ into
a debate about the just and equal application of the criminal law
both for groups (most especially minority or excluded groups) and
individual members of those groups. In short he highlights serious
deficiencies in the American legal system in terms of how certain
groups and individuals are more likely to be designated as criminals.
He proposes that the state has an obligation to ‘embrace salient
groups as equal partners’, while at the same time ‘individuals must
also be treated as unique, judged for what they do rather than what
group they belong to’ (29).
What Taslitz is highlighting is a set of practical outcomes for
individuals and groups when the legal system, in both the police
(and other executive arms) and the courts, fails to recognize those
individuals and groups as full citizens (or full humans) worthy of
the same respect as all other human beings. Even under the strong
protection of the American constitution they nonetheless experience
rights on a lower plane than other citizens and are more vulnerable
to their violation. A point reiterated by Birzer and Birzer (2006):
‘The general scholarship on the United States criminal justice system
offers evidence of a long history of not only racial, but also cultural
and class group biases in its administration’ (644).
Goodey (2001) is more equivocal in terms of the experience in
Britain, but nonetheless acknowledges:
. . . the black community have repeatedly expressed their
anger towards what they perceive as over-zealous polic-
ing of their community. However, if one were to com-
pare the Asian experience of policing with that of the
Afro-Caribbean community, one would be hard pressed
to find the extent and degree of complaints in any
research to date. . . it could indicate the unwillingness
of particular groups within the Asian ‘community’ to
complain about the police (443).
At issue here is not just a denial of recognition on the side of the
police, but a hitherto reluctance or inability by members of the
Asian community to call on their political and legal rights. At an
international level Henrard (2000) refers to the concept of ‘indirect
discrimination’ in the context of human rights standards. These she
points out can initially seem ‘neutral but have a disproportional ef-
fect on a group or person (and this without objective and reasonable
justification)’ (77).
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Tyler and Wakslak (2004) found interesting results in terms of
the perception that the police profile certain individuals or groups
as being likely criminals. One key point is that profiling generally
reflects ‘negatively on the police, and as undermining legitimacy’,
which is not surprising. What is more concerning is that white
Americans changed their views of profiling significantly in the Post-
9/11 period from seeing it as ‘police prejudice’ to seeing it more
as ‘associated with the need to identify terrorists in a situation in
which ethnic and cultural factors are diagnostic of possible terrorist
activity’ (275).
Some of the more pertinent nuances of the meaning of respect
were not drawn out by Tyler and Wakslak, however they do point
to some outcomes that reveal its connections with human rights
in the context of the discussion here. They speak of disrespectful
treatment of citizens by police sending ‘a negative message’ (277).
Far more importantly they point to a dialectical moment in which
a citizen constructs an encounter negatively ‘when they are treated
without respect’ (277). In this case the citizen may wrongly label
the encounter as being a result of police profiling, but what is more
pertinent is that the citizen knows there is something inherently
wrong with the encounter, even if he or she cannot accurately
articulate exactly why it is wrong. A point made by Honneth (1994)
when referring to ‘the violation of intuitive notions of justice’ (262)
that arises through a denial of respect or social disrespect, ‘connected
to respect for one’s own dignity, honor, or integrity’ (262). This
point on social disrespect points to a pre-political conceptualization
of the meaning of respect.
Honneth finds common ground with both Ikäheimo (2002)
and Laitinen (2002) in defining recognition, in Hegelian terms,
as: ‘ “attitudes” of love, legal respect, and esteem in the one basic
attitude (albeit with differing emphases) that can be conceptualized
generically as “recognition” ’ (Honneth 2002: 506). However the
precise meaning of the term recognition is somewhat contingent,
dependent as it is on linguistic meaning, or for instance on whether
it is related to early childhood experiences of identity formation,
or whether it is a moral struggle. The exact nature of the meaning
of recognition needs much more elaborate exploration than I can
engage in here.
A key issue I see in Honneth’s exploration of the theme, from
a contemporary political perspective, is the need to contextualize it
in an action setting. In seeking the good life or self-understanding
as a communicative process it is necessary in Honneth’s terms
that the individual be protected both in terms of civil-legal type
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rights congruent with classical liberalism, but also ‘a basic standard
of living’ which might be equated with Marshall’s notion of social
rights or indeed to the sorts of economic independence envisaged by
Rousseau. He emphasizes the necessity for legal guarantees because
they ultimately offer the context in which the individual is at liberty
to pursue an individualized notion of the good life. Entering into this
discussion, although not drawn out particularly by Honneth (1995),
is the communicative context. He alludes to this by way of pointing
out that it is not merely a process of ‘monological choice’ (236).
Not being one of monological choice poses deeper questions about
the communicative process. As Habermas (1990) puts it ‘those very
relationships of reciprocity and mutual recognition around which
all moral ideas revolve in everyday life’ (130).
McCarthy (1990) offers a lucid account of the nature of social
recognition and builds links between the individual and society.
He reiterates the relationship between socialization and identity
formation – ‘personal identity is from the start interwoven with
relations of mutual recognition’ (x). In the following passages he
explains the centrality of ‘mutual recognition’ both to individual
identity and society. It is a ‘reciprocal vulnerability that calls for
guarantees of mutual consideration to preserve both the integrity
of individuals and the web of interpersonal relations in which they
form and maintain their identities’ (x).
His brief discussion highlights both the nature of recognition
and its societal context. Indicating that recognition is clearly a com-
municative process and very importantly that the communicative
process can be understood both in the realms of double contingency
and triple contingency. He emphasizes the centrality of recognition
stating that ‘it is precisely notions of fairness, impartiality, respect
for the integrity and dignity of the individual’ that underpins the
capacity of a society to tolerate otherness and difference (xii, f/n
12).
Communicative Contingency
The concept of double contingency is closely associated with the
work of Talcott Parsons in the middle of the twentieth century,
but as Vanderstraeten (2002) points out it also finds a place in the
work of Niklas Luhmann. The idea is an important one in terms
of how we understand the social. It is a bridge between social
psychology and sociology, but also has direct implications for the
political realm. Vanderstraeten neatly defines the context of double
contingency: ‘When one focuses on the interaction of ego and alter,
the analysis has to shift from the orientation of a single given actor
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to the consideration of two or more interacting actors as a system’
(79).
Interaction between ego and alter is contingent in so far as it
‘transcends the purely individual or subjective level’ (80). All social
interactions are uncertain or contingent as no one can be absolutely
certain of how the other will react to or understand what is being
communicated. It is doubly contingent in so far as the engagement
of ego and alter opens up contingency firstly on the part of ego
and alter and secondly in terms of what they communicate and
understand. Parsons and Shils (1951) offer a cogent encapsulation
of this; ‘ego’s gratifications are contingent on his selection among
available alternatives. But in turn, alter’s reaction will be contingent
on ego’s selection and will result from a complementary selection
on alter’s part’ (16).
The description of this communicative process and its centrality
to the creation of the social is vouchsafed. The term double contin-
gency itself is a bit misleading, because while it captures the nature
of interaction with the use of the term ‘double’ (ego and alter) the
arising contingency operates not in a binary fashion, like a reflection
on a perfect mirror nor even one with a double lens, but is in fact
more like reflection off a multiplicity of surfaces. Parsons (1951)
more explicitly refers to ‘the second contingency factor’ (94) that is
the action of alter vis-a-vis ego, which gives ‘double’ a more con-
crete reference point. In Vanderstraeten’s words ‘the contingency
of what an actor actually does in the context of an elementary
interaction situation and the contingency of the other’s reaction’
(80), this he suggests to be ‘double “double contingency” ’(81), but
even that does not capture the chaotic potentialities of communica-
tion. Parsons addresses the chaotic potentialities by suggesting that
communicative interaction is social in nature and thus governed by
a normative set of rules largely shared by ego and alter.
For an interactive relationship ‘a common system of symbols is
the precondition’ (Parsons and Shils 1951: 105), emphasizing that
they see it as dependent upon a normative or cultural set of rules
and expectations. Parsons (1951) claims that for an interaction
system to be ‘stabilized is for the interests of the actors to be bound
to conformity with a shared system of value-orientation standards’
(38). Interaction in that sense is not in a chaotic context, but rather
has twin stabilizing features for both ego and alter in that both can
hold ‘realistic possibilities’ for the interaction and simultaneously the
anticipation of a shared ‘meaning’. This does not discount a nebulous
landscape of communicative outcomes influenced by a myriad of
factors including subjective, cultural, environmental and temporal
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ones. However within this constellation there is a normatively
shaped set ‘of complementary expectations, not only that ego and
alter should communicate, but that they should react appropriately to
each other’s action’ (Parsons and Shils 1951: 106). A failure within
this social system through a violation of shared norms, relates to
Honneth’s concept of recognition, for ego: ‘violation of the norm
causes him to feel shame toward alter, guilt toward himself ’ (106).
This aspect is elaborated in greater detail in the later discussion
by Parsons and Shils on ‘Personality as a System of Action’. In
specific terms they address the concept of recognition as it impacts
on the individual ‘where the expectations of the actor concerning
himself do not correspond to the expectation others have formed
concerning him’(151). The personal categorization of the individual
as described here is closely related to Honneth’s concept of ‘social
disrespect’, but described in different linguistic terms as resulting
in: ‘ambivalences in the actor’s own categorization of himself ’ and
‘contradictory allocative standards and consequent instabilities of
behavior and internal conflict, as well as conflict between the actor
and the members of his collectivities’ (151).
Luhmann (1995) deals with the impression that ‘ego and alter,
on both sides, as fully concrete human beings’ is easily deducible
for the construction of double contingency, but which is ‘neither
entirely false nor entirely true’ (107).
He also rejects the notion that ‘double contingency’ can be seen
as a simple reciprocal process. He dismisses the analogy of the
mirror to make this point. He highlights the distorting potentials
because ‘a distorting mirror does not grasp the distortion of other
mirrors’ (107) and that a reciprocal orientation is essentially a
‘reduction of complexity’ (108). He also critiques ‘symbolic inter-
actionism’ pointing out that both ego and alter ‘experience double
contingency’ (108). He makes a very useful contribution to an un-
derstanding of double contingency, which also casts light on the
concept of triple contingency. He is closer perhaps to Strydom’s
theory than is Parsons’ formulation. Luhmann states that ‘the com-
plexity of such situations rules out the participants’ reciprocally fully
understanding each other, indeed, understanding every variant of
system performance that each individual contemplates’ (109).
He proposes a solution by way of introducing the idea of black
boxes. This is innovative and pushes the theory forward, but also
ironically exposes it to the limitations highlighted by Strydom.
While the black boxes liberate the notion of contingency from
the possibility of conceiving communication as sonar signaling,
where ego is the chief communicator, bouncing a signal off a
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contingent surface, but still largely responsible for interpretation, it
is still a somewhat closed system in Luhmann’s model. In the black
boxes ‘each determines its own behavior by complex self-referential
operations within its own boundaries’ (109). These black boxes
‘remain separate: they do not merge; they do not understand each
other any better than before’ (110).
Luhmann describes the communicative process whereby the two
parties (in double contingency) ‘observe as input and output in
the other as a system in an environment and learn self-referentially’
(110). What he means by ‘in an environment’, he does not elaborate.
It seems that he is just short of anticipating Strydom’s idea of the
public or the public sphere, but does not make that final step.
He immediately points out the contingent nature of social systems,
having ‘no basal certainty’ and ‘no prediction of behavior’, but
then inserts that they ‘are controlled only with reference to the
participants’ own behavior’ (110). This seems to suggest at one
level a realization of the existence of the public (environment),
but does not take on board its impact in the way anticipated by
triple contingency. When he again discusses environment, it seems
clearer that this could include the public: ‘experience related to
the environment, in addition to action, becomes relevant’ (113).
In discussion he raises the anticipation of the public (though not
explicitly stated) as an influential factor: ‘The social dimension of all
meaning concerns the entire world, the entire extensiveness of one’s
own experience, and the estimated experience of others, beginning
in the concrete here and now’ (113).
It seems that Luhmann, has already abandoned the double contin-
gency of Parsons, but has not quite embraced the triple contingency
of Strydom. Environment we can presume includes the public, but
his double contingency model, is still restricted to black boxes,
funneling communication, albeit absorbing environmental factors.
It does not allow for the interplay of the public in the dynamic form
suggested by Strydom.
EGO
Contingency
ALTER
Contingency
Environment
Communication
Environment
Environment Environment
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Some important points connecting ‘double contingency’ and Stry-
dom’s later development of ‘triple contingency’ are already present
in Parsons and Shils’s (1951) discussion on the ‘structure of the
interactive relationship’. They acknowledge that while ‘interaction
of ego and alter is the most elementary form of social system’,
they simultaneously recognize that features of this are present in
‘more complex form in all social systems’(105). The recognition
that contemporary societies ‘are increasingly assuming the form of
communication societies’ (Strydom 1999: 2) forces us to understand
the public in a new way. Strydom presents this new role of the pub-
lic as ‘triple contingency’, which supercedes the concept of ‘double
contingency’. This concept is especially important for the discussion
here as it links with Honneth’s concept of recognition, to give a
political impetus to a grounding of rights.
In order to fully understand the communicative context that gives
rise to recognition, dignity and respect we need to look at this in the
context of both double and triple contingency. As discussed above
this can be seen in terms of double contingency corresponding with
the process of recognition, which leads to individual rights and triple
contingency corresponding with recognition within the collectivity
leading to solidaristic rights. Social contract theories going back
to Hobbes, Locke or Rousseau and even citizenship theories going
right back to ancient Greece are contextualized within a collective
context. In other words being a citizen of Athens only had meaning
within a polis. This is still true today, even if an individual carries
with him or her a cache of rights outside their home political entity.
Rights are recognized not as an individualized contract, but on the
basis of a common contract within a collectivity, this applies both to
citizens within their home polity and individuals in foreign polities.
Legally while benefits and biases may apply, they ought formally to
be on the basis of common not particularistic principles, i.e. a person
may be prevented from taking up residence in a particular state,
not because the official did not like that person but because persons
in that particular category are so disbarred. In other words rights
are recognized and or denied on the basis of an individual being
recognized as a human being (regardless of their rights), which is
akin to a double contingency communicative process, but the rights
against which they are measured are collectively agreed ones which
have been subject to some degree of public discussion and agreement
(for instance a bill of rights, a constitution or a legal code), which
lies within the realm of triple contingency. Arbitrary denial of
recognition to an individual or individuals likewise falls within a
double contingency communicative space, while systematic denial
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of rights to collective categories (even if expressed to individuals in
an apparent individualized way) is within the communicative space
of triple contingency.
Rights can neither derive from a cosmological foundation as is
assumed for instance by natural law theories, which ultimately un-
derpin the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor can they de-
rive entirely through discursive processes as assumed by Habermas.
What Strydom (1999) presents to us, from a political perspective,
is a theory of action: ‘It is precisely in the principle of the public
or the “universality of non-expertise” as Fuller (1993: 285) calls it,
that the concept of triple contingency finds its starting point’ (21,
f/n 1). This action is about settling certain public issues: ‘The public
renders determinate, in quite unpredictable ways, what is at first
indeterminate in public communication’ (6).
In this theory the public plays a central role in making sense of
issues of contestation, and in bringing some degree of settlement
to the contestation, even if temporarily. So while the principles of
double contingency continue to play, a third view, that of the public
comes into play. It seems to me that the public makes sense of
the communication by both forcing the contesting parties to present
their case in a publicly sensible way and secondly the public interacts,
deflects and makes sense of the communication. As Strydom points
out in ‘unpredictable ways’, in that sense the public is not so much a
mirror reflecting light as a set of prisms refracting it. What emerges
is a ‘struggle for meaning’ forged in ‘a process of communication’
which involves not just the main participants but also ‘the observing
public’ (17).
Conclusion
In the twentieth century, especially after World War II, the ideas of
government that gestated in Europe were championed as the best
form of government. This was a society governed in the words of
Abraham Lincoln a century earlier as ‘government of the people, by
the people, for the people’ (Lincoln 1863), based on an independent
legal framework and built on both the premise of equality and a set
of rights to support that premise. Then, as now, it was not universally
accepted nor did it ever have anything like global application. This
was apparent even in the drafting (Third Committee stage) and
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 (Glendon 2001).
Contestation and contestability are the bedrocks of such a model
and if we tend towards an optimistic view they are the catalysts
to open up new frontiers in the recognition of humanity. Being
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faced with trenchant ideological challenges is not necessarily bad,
the alternatives show us the value of the freedoms we have, and
threats show us the fragility of what has been won and could be
lost.
We are in a time when the premises of a rights based democratic
way of life is challenged. The most outrageous challenge comes
from religious fundamentalists, who hold that the answers to all
human questions can be found in sacred texts. Islamic fundamen-
talists are not the sole source of this; Christian, Jewish and other
fundamentalists also question the secular way of life and the liberal
worldview. Neoconservatives and Neoliberals too question many of
the premises of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, national constitutions and bills of rights. Both sets of
arguments against human rights are strengthened by the weakness
of the case in favour of human rights as they still depend on ‘the
absolute and transcendent measurements of religion or the law of
nature [that] have lost their authority’ (Arendt 1973: 299). What I
have sought to do here is to present two pillars of a justification
process that I believe can begin to address the essential loss of
authority of the liberal justification of human rights. This is not
nearly the complete picture, it is merely a staging post. It starts from
Arendt’s essential question on what basis do humans have the right
to have rights. Human rights will never be safe until we answer that
with an irrefutable authority that relies neither on sacred script nor
natural law.
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MODELLING
‘TRIPLE CONTINGENCY’
Loet Leydesdorff
In Chapter 3 of Soziale Systeme, Luhmann(1984) discussed ‘double
contingency’ as central to the emergence of social systems. Borrow-
ing the concept from Parsons, he provides it with a completely new
solution. In my opinion, the simulations in terms of expectations
accord with this solution. Paul Hartzog sent me a short piece in
which he explains Luhmann’s solution in English (Hartzog 1997).
It made me aware that Luhmann moves fast in this chapter from
‘double contingency’ towards the emergence of social systems with-
out a specification of the mechanism. Luhmann warns against Von
Foerster’s too fast movement (f/n 12: 157). According to Luhmann,
the social system would ‘emerge’ from double contingency (in the
singular!).
In a previous communication (cf. Leydesdorff 2008), I speci-
fied the interaction mechanism between two anticipatory systems
contained in a double contingency as follows:
x(t) = a(1− x(t+ 1))(1− x(t+ 1))
The next state of the system is determined by the selective
operation of expectations upon each other in a dyadic interaction.
The simulations are robust and show that the system can move
erratically from the one side to the other side. If one wishes, one
can play with the parameters in the Microsoft Excel sheet and
follow the consequences at http://www.leydesdorff.net/temp/
doublcont.xls .
I guess that a double contingency can go on forever when no
third party comes into play. Piet Strydom(1999) used the term
‘triple contingency’ for explaining the emergence of a modern
communication society in the 16th and 17th century. The third
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party becomes abstracted as a public. In principle, one could model
a triple contingency analogously, using:
x(t) = a(1− x(t+ 1))(1− x(t+ 1)) (1− x(t+ 1))
This leads to a cubic equation of x(t + 1) as a function of x(t).
Cubic equations have analytical solutions (There is a freeware add-
in in Microsoft Excel for solving them). The solutions may imply
i =
√−1, and thus be in the complex domain.
For all values of the bifurcation parameter a the system is
highly unstable and quickly degenerates into a complex one. One
interpretation would be that triple interactions provide a short-term
window for organization (decision-making) to step into the system.
The relation between interaction and organization would then be
conditional for the emergence of the social system.
A formulation for organization could be:
x(t) = a(1− x(t))(1− x(t+ 1))(1− x(t+ 1))
x(t)
(1− x(t)) = a(1− x(t+ 1))(1− x(t+ 1))
By replacing x(t)(1−x(t)) with y, the solution is similar to the one for
double contingency, but mutatis mutandis:
x(t+ 1) = 1±
√
x(t)
a(1− x(t))
This formula is in the simulation as stable as double contingency
for values of a ≥ 8, but I don’t yet have an analytic solution for
this. For lower values of a, the system vanishes. Using an internal
degree of freedom, the system might be able to change its value of
a endogenously and thus alternate between double contingency and
its disappearance.
In summary, in the case of a triple contingency, the system
can show the behaviour of a window for organization to step in
by using three incursive terms (based on expectations), or bring a
double contingency to an end by bringing a historical contingency
(modelled as a recursive term) into play. Using the internal degree of
freedom for changing the value of a, the social system would also be
able to generate double contingencies (interactions) endogenously.
From entropy statistics, we know that a system with three
dynamics can generate a negative entropy in the mutual information
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among the three (sub)dynamics. (I use this as an indicator of self-
organization in other studies). However, there is still a missing link
between the above reasoning and the emergence of a social system
as a possibility because the complex system is not yet generated. I
suppose that I have to bring the social distribution into play and not
write x(t), but
∑
i xi(t).
This piece originated as a contribution to the online ‘Diskus-
sionsforum zur soziologischen Systemtheorie Niklas Luhmanns’ in
early April 2007. The title has been added here. The elaborated ver-
sion, ‘The Communication of Meaning in Anticipatory Systems: A
Simulation Study of the Dynamics of Intentionality in Social Interac-
tions’, Vice-Presidential Address at the 8th International Conference
of Computing Anticipatory Systems (CASYS07), Liège, Belgium, 6–
11 August 2007, to be published in the Proceedings of the American
Institute of Physics (2008), is available as a preprint version at
http://www.leydesdorff.net/casys07
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ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
IN LATIN AMERICA
José Maurício Domingues and Andrea
Coutinho Pontual
Introduction
Responsibility has become a major topic in world politics and
culture, with the environment featuring prominently in it. This is
true at the discursive level, and has also influenced social struggles,
institution building, and the making and implementation of policies.
Latin America has been part of this process for many years, although
the literature on the topic is fragmentary and lacks both good
empirical generalizations and conceptual discussions. Our aim here
is to contribute to overcome this limitation.
Firstly, we present our conceptual view of responsibility and the
public sphere. Secondly, we apply these conceptual constructs to an
understanding of the environmental question in Latin America. The
problems that beset the region regarding responsibility are discussed
in the last section.
Two conceptual questions: Responsibility and the Public Sphere
Responsibility
Responsibility has been a permanent topic in the social thought
of modernity. Its meaning has changed over time and has come
to the fore in the last decades. In liberal thought responsibility
was attached almost exclusively to the individual, who alone was
responsible for his actions and his destiny. The state should merely
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enforce the law, guarantee freedom and security, and maintain peace.
Eventually, much more than before, responsibility was transferred to
the state as part of its increasing role in the ordering of society and
social welfare. The first definition of responsibility belongs to the
first phase of modernity; the second, to its second, state-organized
phase. Since then responsibility has become a pervasive issue in
social discourse, but the modern view of the boundless domination
and exploitation of nature did not change in this period. Strydom
(1999, 2000) has spoken of three eras of discourse within modernity:
the rights discourse, the justice discourse and, finally, our present
one, that of the responsibility discourse. This is closely related to
the fact that we increasingly live in a ‘risk society’, due to the
increasingly pervasive unintended effects of the once supposedly
absolute mastery of nature (Beck 1986; Strydom 2002: 128–30).
This corresponds to and partially characterizes the third phase of
modernity, marked by extreme complexity, a pluralization of issues
and agents in the private and the public spheres (Domingues 2006).
In this context, ‘collective responsibility’ became an issue in
Jonas’ (1979) philosophy, in which nature appeared as threatened
by the Promethean drive of modernity. His work, however, did
not evince democratic leanings. Apel (1988) changed the approach
to the topic, introducing a radical democratic perspective vis-a-vis
responsibility, in which intermediate collectivities had a central role
to play. Environmental issues remained at the core of his reflection.
Nevertheless, he stressed the need for continuous economic growth,
rejecting any neo-Malthusian perspective.
The link between responsibility and risk was woven with the
appearance of the modern environmental discourse in the late
1960s and early 1970s. Henceforth environmental responsibility
spread its ideals to all sectors of society. This concept and the ideas
behind it have evolved over time; have been articulated in politics
and policies, in societal identities, professions and public spheres.
International discourse on the theme can illustrate this evolution.
The 1972 document Limits to Growth suggested a possible state
of global stability amid a ‘zero growth’ solution, an untenable
position, since it was considered to restrain the development of
Third World countries. A rift soon appeared between the North and
the South over the weight to be given to the environmental question.
This discussion took place in the context of state responsibility
for the protection of nature and natural resources. Third World
countries, especially from Latin America, were key players in a
change of perspective brought about by the World Environmental
Commission – the Brundtland Commission (1982–87). The notion
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of ‘sustainable development’ thus emerged, trying to balance both
sides of the equation, the environment and the economy. However,
much work was left to transform the concept into actions on the
ground. This was one of the main issues discussed during the 1992
United Nations Rio Conference (Earth Summit), which brought the
term ‘sustainable development’ into the mainstream and produced
the Agenda 21 policy document. Despite these efforts, the vagueness
of the concept of sustainability persisted, alongside its impact on
public debates and piecemeal institutionalization (Nobre et al. 2002;
MacDonald and Nielson 1997: 274–5). One may even argue that
the new centrality of the environmental discourse as a new modern
‘master frame’ and its institutionalization may have happened to
the relative detriment of the environmental movement and deeper
changes in the relation between nature and society (Eder 1996: Part
III).
The public sphere
Paramount in the discussion of the public sphere in the twenti-
eth century was Habermas’ (1962, 1981, 1992) sustained effort to
place it at the core of critical theory. He has always been adamant
on the definition of the public sphere as a place of rational argu-
ment and consensus-building. Conflict was at best a problem for
his framework, although he came to accept compromises as the
possible outcome of public debates. In contrast, Eder (1986) gave
pride of place to conflict and conflict resolution as producing new
‘collective learning processes’ in his explanation of the German Son-
dernweg and transition to modernity. In his analysis of the concept
of public sphere, though somewhat critical of Habermas’ normative
and contra-factual position, Eder (2005) does not stress his former
very productive point. Other authors have argued against several
features of Habermas’ theory: a more decentralized and pluralis-
tic view of the public sphere has derived from this (see Avritzer
and Costa 2005). Others have pointed to the emergence of institu-
tional settings for ‘reflexive’ public debate, conflict and consensus,
thematizing also environmental issues, following the crisis of neo-
corporatism in Europe. In this, however, the extent and nature of
the thematization of environmental issues is open to question (Eder
1996: Part III; Strydom 2002: especially 132–8).
We shall introduce some further elements in this discussion. To
define the public sphere we aim to go beyond an exclusive focus on
communication and the networks of collaboration that often, more
or less explicitly, are aired as characterizing it. Public spheres, we
would like to argue, are more complex than this. Thus, contrary to
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a perspective according to which money and power merely colonize
and destroy its foundations, the market – coordinated by voluntary
exchange – as well as hierarchies – based on command – are also
elements that constitute the public sphere, along with networks –
based on voluntary collaboration and projects. The introduction of
such notions, at an analytical level (see Domingues 2006: ch. 8),
lends a more sociological slant to its definition, helping us to escape
from an overly philosophical and idealized notion of the public
sphere.
In ‘real public spheres’, therefore, the market is present in the
making and the participation of business, the media and NGOs
(Non Government Organizations); hierarchies appear in the state,
NGOs, social movements and companies – as well as between
them, while networks predominate in the voluntary collaboration
of citizens and collectivities, often organizing social movements and
alternative media. Reflexivity is not inimical either to the market or
to hierarchies, although the prevalence of networks tends to be more
promising insofar as they allow for communicative interaction on an
enlarged basis of freedom. Conflicts usually initiate communicative
processes in the public sphere; sometimes consensus, sometimes
compromise, comes out of them (although at times issues simply
do not evolve). It is also possible that public debate even generates
more conflict. The political system (including the executive and the
legislative branches as well as political parties), the judiciary and
state bureaucracy must be taken into account so as to obtain a
complete picture of the public sphere. Indeed, the state often shapes
public spheres, which may be to some extent its own creation.
Finally, although true consensus may result from conflicts, and
in spite of the fact that axiological, normative and discursive di-
mensions are certainly crucial, power, differential resources and
irreducible interests must also be reckoned with. Conflicts usually
have winners and losers, majorities and minorities. Players are not
static and conflict is not necessarily a zero-sum game; but even so it
is likely that someone takes greater advantage (or loses less) in con-
crete outcomes. The realization of values may be one end to which
means are chosen, but the latter may become ends in themselves,
such as access to power positions.
Latin America and the environment
In Latin America the state was usually prominent in the initial
answers to the environmental debate. The unfolding of the issue
depended, however, on the variable mobilization of societal forces.
Against the backdrop of increasing awareness about global envi-
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ronmental problems and risks, the 1972 Stockholm UN Conference
strongly urged all states to create national legal frameworks and
pushed for governmental action related to environmental protec-
tion. Afterwards there was pressure to see such measures imple-
mented, some of which were even perceived as a threat to national
sovereignty (cf. the debate about the Amazon region, which the
Brazilian government answered with the creation of protective leg-
islation and responsible agencies). Since the 1980s endogenous
environmental social movements and an array of NGOs mush-
roomed in the region within the more general process of transition
from authoritarian regimes to democracy. Although environmental
issues have not achieved a paramount role in electoral debates, they
have been raised in the media and became of widespread social
concern, with varying degrees of importance, which states have to
some extent addressed so as to enhance their own legitimacy. The
specific features of Latin American environmentalism have led to its
conceptualization as a ‘socio-environmentalism’, meaning concern
with poverty and environmentally-sensitive development. As a result
of this two-pronged system of influences, institutional arrangements
rapidly advanced throughout the region: by the end of the 1980s
all countries had at least created environmental agencies, half a
dozen had elevated environmental policy to cabinet rank and even
more had a Ministry of Natural Resources. Sustainable development
eventually became a centre piece of environmental discourse (Leis
1991; Price 1994; Mumme and Korzetz 1997: especially 40–3, 51).
Viola (1997: 88-91) divided the region’s countries into four
groups:
1. Brazil, Mexico and Costa Rica, where environmentalism was
well established, counted on a network of activists, and inter-
national actors played an important role;
2. Venezuela, Chile and Uruguay, which were similar to the
former, but were not internationalized;
3. Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, where there
was virtually no concern with the environment;
4. Panama, Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Guyana, Surinam, Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador and Belize, with small groups of
militants and little impact on public opinion.
According to Mumme and Korzetz (1997), however, Ecuador
has had a long history of engagement with environmental
issues, with the opposition of indigenous groups to the ex-
ploitation of oil in the forests. In any case, much has changed
in the last ten years, especially in the Andean republics with the
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rise of powerful ‘indigenous movements’, and in Argentina.
Closely connected to such processes was the re-emergence, spread
and pluralization of the public sphere, wherein social movements,
NGOs and several media were able to thematize environmental
problems (Avritzer and Costa 2005). The rights discourse, in tan-
dem with the justice discourse and the responsibility discourse all
came to the forefront of political debate. Environmental concerns
were translated into constitutional regulations, legislation, and new
regulatory agencies; governmental intervention in social life and
environmental issues, as well as the activism of the judiciary, found
new sources of energy and legitimacy – as well as criticism. A new
generation of ‘diffuse’ rights, which included the environment was
thereby defined (cf. Bobbio 1969). Besides, at this moment in time
the traditional corporatist state-controlled regimes faced a deep cri-
sis, with varying results (more radical in Brazil and Argentina, less
disruptive in Mexico). In this context, in a much more complex
society, the bridges between state and society have had to be rebuilt
(Domingues 2005).
It was at this moment that NGOs became prominent world-
wide. Some of them have been capable of exerting leverage over
the policies of multilateral organizations, such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. On the other hand, some
‘southern’ NGOs have been financed by these multilateral institu-
tions, as well as by ‘northern’ NGOs. This implies at times agendas
with low internal public legitimacy for local NGOs, stalling the
development of endogenous priorities (Nelson 1997; Nielson and
Stern 1997; Vianna 2000). Especially problematic is the power held
by multilateral financial agencies and the conditions attached to
their loan schemes. Their ‘influence’ is exercised discretely, away
from the public eye. Paradoxically, sometimes they may contribute
to the creation of local public spheres, while they themselves are not
actually open to local and national agendas. A rather imbalanced
relation between Latin American national agents and international
agencies stems from this (Stallings 1992).
Environmental concerns have been played against the backdrop
of a view of natural resources as plentiful in most Latin American
countries. Large-scale construction of infrastructure and, when pos-
sible, industrialization, predatory use of natural resources and the
perspective of their inexhaustibility, have been traits of their models
of development. Acute pressure for development arises from the
problems of poverty endured by large sections of these populations
and skewed patterns of consumption due to an extremely unequal
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income distribution. More recently, a strong orientation to primary
exports and commodities above all else, within a neoliberal trade
regime, was resumed and has been at the forefront of economic
growth, putting further pressure on environmental resources and
producing damaging side-effects: urban degradation, increasing de-
forestation and soil erosion, the loss of biodiversity; at the formal
side, the low regulation of transgenic seeds and products, pressure
for changes in environmental laws towards laxity and weak enforce-
ment. Government commitment to growth within this reinforced
international division of labour has been strong, to the detriment of
environmental concerns, even when voiced by other state agencies
(Viola e Leis 1991; Castro Herrera 2003).
A tension exists within the state between its two roles of protect-
ing the environment and promoting development. Serious shortcom-
ings derive from this: legislation often remains a ‘dead letter’, with
environmental policy becoming merely symbolic. In other words,
the state faces demands from diverse sectors of society, deflects
pressures from reformists by passing legislation and creating insti-
tutions, but then frequently fails to enforce the law. The judiciary
plays an increasingly important role, but cannot appear as a thor-
ough solution. Of course, a further source of policy failure at the
implementation level is the limited capacity of the public sphere and
the agents that fight for environmental change to monitor and in-
fluence state policy in practice. This is another unfortunate example
of the Latin American tradition of placing more weight on formal
and legal aspects of institutions than on their actual functionings.
In so far as few resources are applied to enforcement little else
may be expected. The reduced capacity of the Latin American state
to intervene deeply in social life, and its limited ‘infrastructural’
power, takes its toll here as it does in other areas where it is badly
needed. As a result, informality spreads out and powerful state and
societal agents, usually capitalist firms, frequently manage to evade
the consequences of their actions (Mumme and Korzetz 1997: 51–2;
Laplante and Garbutt 1992; Mann 2005). This does not mean that
there have not been decisive advances in Latin America concerning
the protection of the environment and the spread of the concept of
responsibility. Indeed, they have happened. But the aforementioned
problems limit their impact.
What follows is a more specific treatment of these issues in
relation to Brazil, with Mexico and Venezuela complementing our
analysis.
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Brazil: environmental institutionalization, movements and the
public sphere
Brazil has been one of the countries in the region with a stronger
environmentalist movement, due to state commitment to the topic;
subsequently, it has also made considerable advances in terms of
legal and administrative provisions. The Special Secretary for the
Environment (SEMA) was created in 1973, just after the Stockholm
Conference. It was directly linked to the presidency of the repub-
lic, as a token instrument vis-a-vis the big development projects.
In 1981, still under the military, and within the ‘command and
control’ paradigm of environment management, the National En-
vironmental Law (LPNMA) was enacted. It created the National
Council for the Environment (CONAMA), which made provision
for the participation of civil society and subsequently became the
major national forum for consensus building on policy. State and
local bodies were also envisioned. The law instituted the main
instruments of public regulation: the environment license (which
included public consultation), ecological zoning, the mandatory
character of environmental studies and assessment reports, as well
as penalties for environmental damage. This was considered a very
innovative body of legislation at the time. In 1985 civil class action
also became law and, consequently, an important instrument for
societal agents’ intervention against environmental damage. After
the defeat of the military regime, in 1988, Brazil gained a new
Constitution permeated with environmental concerns. Article 225
of Chapter VI affirmed that a ‘healthy environment’ was a right
of every citizen and that the state was responsible for its preserva-
tion, and also its preservation for future generations. It revived the
former environmental legislation and created the Public Attorney
Office (Ministério Público), which cares for diffuse rights in this
as in other subjects. The Brazilian Institute for the Environment
and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) was created in 1989 as
the executive organ of the new Secretary of the Presidency of the
Republic for the Environment (SEMAN), changed into the Ministry
for the Environment (MMA) in 1992. In 1998 a new law dealing
with environmental crimes was introduced, it included regulating
administrative responsibility for the organizations and also making
their executives responsible by law for their decisions in relation to
the environment. Public hearings were made mandatory in relation
to the licencing of activities potentially harmful to the environment
on a significant scale, as defined by the CONAMA and the environ-
mental agencies of the state (see Brito and Câmara 1999; Acserald
2001; Little 2003; Santilli 2005).
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Connected to these institutional developments the 1980s wit-
nessed the rise of the ‘ecological’ movement, within a broadened
and freer public sphere. Originally a handful of groups denounced
environmental degradation, but the first half of the 1980s saw an
expansion and politicization of the movement in the context of the
democratic transition. According to Viola (1987, 1997), ‘Ecopoli-
tics’ was the next step, with militants joining political parties and
decisively impacting the constitutional process. His hypothesis is
that environmentalism was a leitmotif which disseminated across
different sectors of society, the state and the economy, through the
impact of the environmental movement (a strategy not followed
by those who created the Green Party, which might explain the
organization’s failure to become relevant).
Socio-environmentalism was an important aspect of the Brazil-
ian movement. After the 1992 Rio Conference – which boosted the
legitimacy of the movement and the role of NGOs – a convergence
between distinct sorts of agents came about towards a more sustain-
able environmental policy, especially around Agenda 21. Originally
important in the centre and the south of the country, and based
to a great extent on the middle classes, the movement spread in
the 1990s to the north, including rubber tapers and indigenous
communities, with strong international funding. Its impact on pub-
lic opinion, the media, other social movements, was deep. Urban
degradation, deforestation and biodiversity and the assassination
of environmentalists have been the main issues on the Brazilian
environmental agenda.
While environmental concerns became part of societal reflexivity
mediated in the public sphere, environmentalism penetrated the
state and many of its activists reached top positions in the political
decision-making agencies and bureaucracies. Whether the latter
speaks of its success or co-optation is open to question. Other former
activists became regular consultants to the state. On the other hand,
professionalization in NGOs (often exogenously funded) became
overwhelming. Overall, the environmental movement has had a
contradictory fortune. It has contributed to the impact of the issue
in public opinion, has occupied the commercial mass media, has
created a parallel media and its own fora of debate, as well as
originated strong NGOs, but the movement’s capacity for popular
mobilization and, to some extent, its influence in the larger public
sphere have declined since the 1990s (Neder 2002).
We must now ask how the public sphere has performed in
mediating, elaborating discourses, processing conflicts and achieving
consensus in Brazil. This must be analyzed at local and national
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levels.
Researchers who studied environmental issues in the public
sphere at the local level are not particularly optimistic. Alonso and
Costa (2003: 122–5; 2004) argue that, irrespective of advances,
those mechanisms are flawed in terms of efficacy and legitimacy,
generating conflict instead of consensus. In public hearings, discord
rather than agreement has in fact occurred, since divergences of
interest and value are strong. In addition, lack of adequate popu-
lar educational background to understand issues and participatory
mechanisms, plus a low level of public commitment, prevents people
from taking an active part in discussions that may directly interest
them. Fuks (1998) underscores similar problems: social awareness,
he says, decreases sharply in poorer areas and more especially
when the Public Attorney’s office plays a key role in these areas in
the defining and processing of conflicts related to the environment.
Fuks explores the importance of environmental discourse, where old
problems take on environmental components or become themselves
environmental as a means to grab attention and to be processed.
He contends that commercial media is one of the main vehicles for
public debate regarding areas of social conflict.
At national level, we find limits to collective environmental
responsibility too. As aforementioned, the CONAMA has lost much
of its power in recent years. Difficulties thus arise when private
interests face only locally-based environmental opposition, since
the fora for discussion are mainly for local issues rather than on
large-scale questions and there are actually no national public fora
for debates about strategic environmental-economic choices. Take
the case of the Amazon region and soy cultivation. Despite the
constitutional definition of the rain forest as a ‘national heritage’,
the annual rate of deforestation in the first few years of the century
has been over twenty thousand kilometres square, more than 80
per cent of which is in three states–Mato Grosso, Rondônia and
Pará (http://http://www.inpe.gov.br/). One of the causes of this
deforestation rate is the encroaching cultivation of soybeans at the
rainforest edge. It is also a case of development pressure with no
strategic planning, where private and collective interests may be
in conflict. The lack of enforcement of environmental legislation,
coupled with informality, often results in business interests easily
winning the environmental contest. The sustainable development
discourse is hence heavily underplayed and different government
ministries take conflicting stances on the environment (in the soya
case, the Agriculture Ministry being at odds with the Environment
Ministry) (Baker 2004). One could further argue that the forum for
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discussion of issues with national repercussions should be a duly
elected Congress, but environmental considerations carry very little
weight in the electoral process, there are few deputies elected under
the environmental banner and the Green party is weak. Congress
pays correspondingly little attention to environmental matters and
the public is left in the dark.
Overall environmental responsibility in Brazil seems to be con-
fined to certain sections of the state and society, while completely
lacking in others. It certainly does not amount to an all encompass-
ing collective process. Legal liability for environmental damage is a
fact but in practice many aspects of the law are considered merely
‘educational’. Reflexive institutions have been developed and their
participation in governance increased, but their range is limited.
Symbolic elements and informality appear as key concepts to under-
stand the workings of an apparently highly participatory process.
Conflicts, divergent interests on environmental issues and values,
are mishandled by the system or tackled in a rather partial man-
ner. Powerful interests and customary values, which heavily favour
economic development free from responsibility considerations, are
expected to largely predominate when decisions are taken, leaving
the process ever open to corruption. Furthermore, when decisions
contradict market forces and state hierarchies, very often they are
not enforced. A partial realignment of the Brazilian economy, into
the newer globalized scenario, and the pressure for a surplus in
trade account, has only made things worse. Changes in this pattern
seem to depend on a renewal of the environmental movement and
the growth of its influence within the broader public sphere.
Mexico: pre-emptive reform
Mexico has had environmental state agencies and legislation since
the 1970s. Similar to Brazil, its institutions in this field are as
a result of successive reforms which were to a great extent exoge-
nously driven, especially at the beginning, following the 1972 Stock-
holm Conference. Their emphasis was on demographic pressures
on specific ecosystems and industrial pollution causing atmospheric
contamination, mainly in Mexico City. In 1972 the Secretary for
Environmental Improvement was established and, six years later,
the Inter-secretarial Commission for Environmental Sanitation was
created. In 1982, the Federal Law for the Protection of the Envi-
ronment was promulgated. The Secretary for Urban Development
and Ecology (SEDUE) also came into being at this time. In 1984, a
national campaign was launched to increase public awareness and
stimulate the organization of, what was in fact, a state controlled
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environmental movement. In 1987 the de la Madrid government,
through the National Ecological Commission (CNE), proposed the
programme One Hundred Necessary Actions, envisaging the partici-
pation of other levels of government and society. During the Salinas
government many changes occurred regarding public policies for
the environment. The General Law on Ecological Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection was passed, which made the conceptual
advance of granting the environmental issue an encompassing status,
including socio-economic considerations. Under the aegis of SEDUE
(the Secretary for Social Development – SEDESOL since 1992), the
government’s national development plan included environmental
issues for the first time and created two subordinate agencies: the
National Ecological Institute (INE), to regulate environmental poli-
cies, and the Federal Attorney’s Office for Environmental Protection
(PROFEPA), to enforce the law. In 1994 reforms were consolidated
with the creation of the Secretary for Fisheries, the Environment and
Natural Resources (SEMARNAP, shortly afterwards SEMARNAT).
Sustainable development underpinned this institution-building pro-
cess, and over time air pollution has continued to dominate the pol-
icy priorities (Lezama 2006: 136–42; Mumme 1992). Since Mexico
joined the United States and Canada in free trade agreements, it has
been experimenting with voluntary mechanisms (that is, not based
on strict enforcement), starting with the National Programme for
Environmental Audit (PNAA) (Lezama 1999).
According to Mumme (1992), the de la Madrid campaign and
especially the Salinas (1988–1994) reforms (more formal than sub-
stantive), had mainly pre-emptive goals. They wished to gain legiti-
macy for a faltering authoritarian regime (albeit elected), which had
opted for neoliberal reform and political openness, without fully
considering the implications of their discourse. At the core of their
policies was the co-optation of the nascent environmental movement
and the neutralization of the potential impact of its discourse and
agenda, a recurrent tactic of the Mexican corporatist state regarding
social movements. As usual, groups that preferred a more grassroots
oriented approach and avoided being co-opted were excluded from
the government-convened fora and consultations. Mixed outcomes
resulted, however: while the Salinas government’s commitment to
environmental care remained essentially symbolic, his period in of-
fice helped place the issues the environmental movement wanted to
raise firmly in the public sphere. Faced with pressures for contin-
uing development, Mexican governments have turned a blind eye
especially to the harsh environmental impact of the expansion of
the ‘maquiladora’ industry on the border with the United States, a
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key aspect of the export led growth of the Mexican economy in
recent decades.1 Even in the case of air pollution, the government
has allegedly treated the problem in the capital less seriously than if
environmental responsibility had been properly taken into account.
The state has by and large managed to bypass conflicts and legit-
imize itself by paying lip service to environmental concerns with
this mainly symbolic use of legislation. But while the state shrugs its
responsibility, social movements have to some extent succeeded in
keeping the issues alive in the public sphere (Lezama 2000).
Venezuela: the public sphere and sustainable development
The Venezuelan case is particularly interesting to close our dis-
cussion. In 1976, with the introduction of the Organic Law on
the Environment (LOA) and the Ministry for the Environment
and Renewable Natural Resources, Venezuela had its first elements
of environmental legislation. In the 1999 Bolivarian Constitution
(which broke with the previous oligarchic republic) environmental
concerns stood out. Environmental movements were organized in
several distinct styles and networks were built to achieve a proper
level of coordination. Through the mass media they managed to
have a relevant impact on public opinion, especially at the symbolic
level. The sustainable development discourse was thus introduced
and the movement emerged as a relevant public actor (Pilar García
1992; García-Guadilla 2001). But relations with the state have not
been easy.
These uneasy relations are best exemplified by the problems en-
countered in the proposed construction of an electricity transmission
line, linking Venezuela and Brazil, through the Amazonian Great Sa-
vannah. On one side the government is promoting the project and
on the other the environmentalists and indigenous groups are op-
posing it. The Constitution, as well as agreements with UNESCO,
allow for studies about environmental impact, which are then de-
manded by some of the indigenous leaders, backed especially by
NGOs. These leaders were in place through some process of ‘direct
democracy’, while others were co-opted by the government, which
passed off talks with part of the indigenous leadership as being
enough to legitimize the construction of the transmission line. This
solution was plausible because, despite constitutional provisions,
there is no infra-constitutional legislation translating them into im-
perative state practices. A problematic situation arises from this: the
environmental movement emphasizes the ecological and participa-
tory dimensions of sustainable development, while the government
stresses economic growth; the government favours consultation,
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whereas movements demand a role in the decision-making process
(García-Guadilla 2001).
This example shows that the symbolic element of legislation is
once again played by the government, hierarchically, in order to
bypass social movements and their social networks. Beyond that,
a tension between the diverse elements of the term ‘sustainable
development’ comes to the fore, highlighting in concrete terms and
in the debate within the public sphere an almost useless and illusory
character. It starts as a consensual slogan, but ends up as a conflict-
ridden phrase. Responsibility is of course caught up in this division,
since it is not clear where it resides – with the state, with social
movements, or with a mix of both. Could a stronger public sphere
sort out such internal contradictions or is sustainable development
and related issues such as collective responsibility doomed when
push comes to shove in actual conflicts? Although this is indeed
quite possible, maybe the development of social movements in Latin
America will prove that such a hypothesis is premature and overly
pessimistic and they will carry collective responsibility onto a new
level of normative and empirical maturation.
Final Words
The net balance of our discussion points to the indubitable relevance
of the question of responsibility in Latin America in the present
stage of modernity. In this region, the same as worldwide, the
global environmental movement has had a powerful impact on
state institutions and policies, depending a lot, too, on endogenous
social mobilization. But in the countries where the issue has been
tackled in greater depth and for a longer period of time the variable
strength of the environmental movement and the somewhat limited
character of the public sphere, especially with respect to this issue,
have become manifest. There is, however, a real possibility, we
believe, for a distinct unfolding of the relation between society and
nature in Latin America. Although development is and cannot but
remain a paramount issue on the public agenda, concerns with the
degradation and overexploitation of nature are very pertinent and
widespread.
To sum up, a number of issues may be listed that characterize
the shortcomings of the practical workings of responsibility in Latin
America. Firstly, the strong symbolic character of legislation, as
stressed above – that is, strongly ‘symbolic’ precisely because it is
often confined to this dimension, without being actually enforced.
The fact that ‘collective’ responsibility has been trusted basically to
the state apparatus, highly hierarchical but with limited infrastruc-
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tural power, with several zones of informality (including corruption)
and traversed by conflicting values and priorities within its branches
is a second serious shortcoming. The net result of this is that lip
service is often paid to the most far-reaching problems and issues
even though their legitimacy is not in question and the potential for
more decisive and bolder measures exists.
Finally, we must focus on development. The discourse on sus-
tainability was in part a creation of Latin America, becoming a
centrepiece of public rhetoric and of the shift in the notion of
responsibility. Sustainable development consisted in an attempt to
find a way out of a polarization between the two terms comprised
in its own phrasing, but it is not clear how that difficult combi-
nation may find proper solutions without a deeper change in the
industrial and cultural framework. This stalemate is not exclusive to
Latin America. However, the placement of this region in the new
division of labour of present-day capitalism has pushed it to resume
its position as a producer and exporter of commodities, as well as
of low technology industrial products, reinforcing underdevelop-
ment. When we compare such economies to those of the central,
richer and more advanced countries, the equation becomes more
tense. In this scenario, capitalist companies easily disregard environ-
mental problems and legislation, being in principle legitimized by
their sheer contribution to economic growth. Nowhere in the world
have development and sustainability been adequately reconciled.
But poverty and inequality, dependency on natural resources and
the subordinate position of the region in global terms, compound
the Latin American conundrum and make it harder to find solutions.
Environmental issues in Latin America are part and parcel of
the pluralization of agents and questions being brought to public
debate in an increasingly complex society, in what we have called the
third phase of modernity. They compete for attention in the public
sphere with other, equally pressing and at times older issues, such
as inequality and poverty, as well as the widespread idea of socio-
environmentalism in the region. Whether they will attain greater
visibility hinges of course on the growth and independence of the
environmental movement and its capacity to move social agents
and build networks, in other words, to improve the capacity for
grassroots mobilization, persuasion and communication in a wider
public sphere, but also to monitor and foster policy implementation,
beyond reliance on the state to legislate and implement measures
in support of environmental care. The constraints to responsibility
ideas, as identified in this article, especially the largely symbolic
character of legislation, the pressure for development reinforced by
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trade liberalizations, its excessive dependency on the state and the
leading role of foreign NGOs in agenda setting, are likely to linger
on. But, even if the state has been central to the institutionalization
of the environmental discourse and simultaneous dampening of its
disruptive potential, conflicts have not been eliminated and remain
a potential source of further and deeper change.
Habermas (1992, especially ch. 8) has indeed made his concept
of the public sphere more complex. He introduced other elements
such as the ‘more or less discursive’ character of debates, the
notions of political ‘centre’ and societal ‘periphery’, ‘social power’,
‘civil society’, ‘influence’ as well as recognizing the usual presence
of the mass media and a specific political dimension, that is a
parliament within a constitution. But, while the latter is pervaded
by ‘instrumental’ action, it is seen as a place where the core of the
independent public sphere ‘resonates’. And what matters for that
core is, after all, its ‘communication structure’ and links with the
‘lifeworld’, defined mainly in normative terms.
NOTES
1. The term maquiladora describes favourable tax and regulation regimes for
corporations that import goods to Mexico for processing or assembly, which
are subsequently exported usually to the United States.
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNANCE IN IRELAND:
COMMUNICATION IN THE
‘SHADOW OF HIERARCHY’
Gerard Mullally
Introduction
Strydom identifies an interest in responsibility within the discipline
of sociology stretching back to writers like Durkheim, Weber, Par-
sons, Gehlen and Habermas, however, he takes as his starting point
the work of Karl-Otto Apel and Hans Jonas which is linked closely
to the development of ecological discourses at the end of the twenti-
eth century (1999: 65). Although the relationship between risk and
responsibility permeates much of his writings in the late 1990s the
theory of responsibility is given its first systematic outline in the
1999 article ‘The Challenge of Responsibility for Sociology’, then
set briefly against the background of sociological theories of dis-
course in Discourse and Knowledge (2000) and developed at more
length in Risk, Environment and Modernity (2002).
This chapter begins by (a) outlining Strydom’s development of
the idea of co-responsibility in relation to the concept of sustainable
development and examining the emergence of societal reflexivity
fostered through the contemporary discourse of risk. It then moves
on to (b) consider the emergence of co-governance as a steering
mechanism that has grown in importance in contemporary society
(Bang 2003). The specific focus is on the challenge of co-ordinating
societal responsibility for sustainable development in conditions of
complexity, uncertainty and growing ambivalence. It also considers
the argument that a normative programme such as ‘governance
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for sustainable development’ must take ‘reflexive’, ‘recursive’, and
‘discursive’ social processes seriously if we are to embed responsibil-
ity in appropriate institutional forms. We then move our attention
specifically to the Irish context (c) to examine related shifts in Irish
governance where there is increasing attention to the emergence of
a distinctive type of steering, and a debate as to whether it might be
labelled ‘post-corporatist’. This provides the basis for (d) examining
specific cases of public communication on sustainable development
ranging from the practices of social partnership, to the public com-
munication by business of their Corporate Social Responsibility,
to discursive struggles in the politics of waste management in Ire-
land. The focus of this examination is to determine whether we
might be witnessing a more reflexive approach to the governance of
sustainable development in an emergent social order.
Sustainability, Responsibility and Post-Corporatism
Sustainability or sustainable development, according to Strydom
(2002), is above all a cultural form: ‘consisting of words, con-
cepts, propositions, theories explanations, justifications meanings
and symbols, that provides legitimation to a range of distinct ac-
tors and agents to engage in certain kinds of actions and to create
certain kinds of institutions’ (128). While sustainability is a new
cultural form that has been developed from the ‘intellectual, the-
oretical empirical idea of a complex or a system to be preserved
intact, it is complemented by an emergent cultural form based on a
normative idea of moral obligation; that is responsibility or rather
co-responsibility’ (128). Co-responsibility stresses the dimension of
shared or common problems, but also retains a participatory role
for the individual in public communication and in the discursive
shaping and treatment of those problems (Strydom 1999: 68).
Responsibility as a cultural form ‘has become available due to the
efforts of a range of different actors or agents participating in the
risk discourse to ascribe responsibility or blame to each other in the
face of universal, global and irreversible risks’ (Strydom 2002: 130).
One way of institutionalizing responsibility is through the discur-
sive organization of co-responsibility within an appropriate social,
ethical and practical framework (134). As a result of sustainable
development discourse, contemporary debate has focused less on
proving the existence of environmental problems, and more on ‘the
nature of environmental responsibility, the predominant focus for
that responsibility and the best methods of undertaking it’ (Lightfoot
and Burchell 2005: 77–78). Responsible governance thus requires
‘interactive socio-political structures and processes stimulating com-
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munication between actors involved, and the creation of common
responsibilities next to individual and separated ones (Kooiman
cited in Crozier 2007: 4).
The challenge of steering sustainable development involves, for
Voßand Kemp (2005), a step away from the modern approach to
rationalist problem solving to embrace ‘reflexive problem-handling’
(7). This implies at least two distinct but interrelated understandings
of reflexivity: first and second-order reflexivity. First-order reflexiv-
ity relates to ‘the dealing of modernity with its own implications
and side effects, the mechanism by which societies grow in cycles
of producing problems and solutions to these problems which pro-
duce new problems’ (8). Reflexivity of this type is ‘reflex like’, it
captures ‘the unconscious or unintended consequences of industrial
modernization, or what Beck labels the ‘self-confrontation aspect
of reflexive modernization’ (Hendriks and Grin 2007: 335). Mead-
owcroft (2007a) argues that ‘the steady stream of societal problems
(pollution, environmental degradation, planning failures) associated
with “first-order reflexivity” can be understood as providing the
impetus for the emergence of the very idea of “sustainable develop-
ment”, for this concept denotes a kind of societal advance that will
not undermine the conditions for future progress’ (60).
Second-order reflexivity entails the application of modern rational
analysis not only to the problems that are self-induced ‘but also to its
very own working, conditions and effects’ (Voßand Kemp 2005: 8).
As such, it refers to the self-critical and self-conscious reflection on
processes of modernity. It evokes a sense of ‘agency, intention and
change’ where actors reflect not only on the self-induced problems
of modernity but also upon ‘the approaches, structures and systems
that reproduce them’ (Hendriks and Grin 2007: 335). Meadowcroft
(2007a) contends that a key element of ‘second order reflexivity’
was embedded in the concept of sustainable development from the
outset by not just recognizing environmental risk but also reflecting
on ‘what was really valued and then to intervene consciously to
adjust the emerging future’ (160).
In practice this can result in the creation of innovative institu-
tional procedures outside the state in a public (discursive) context
(Eder 1996: 204). These institutions are variously described as re-
flexive institutions, discursive institutions, ‘reflexive institutional
arrangements’ (Strydom 2002: 135–5), or more loosely ‘reflexive
arrangements’ (Hendriks and Grin 2007). In the case of reflexive
and discursive institutions we are talking about a shift from mod-
ern formal goal oriented institutions to more reflexive informal
ones, oriented towards ‘the appropriateness and reasonableness of
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action and the generation of an implicit understanding and agree-
ment of those involved’ (Strydom 2002: 134). Hajer contends that
despite operating within limits, reflexive institutional arrangements
are the most suitable to deliberate decision-making in the risk society
because they can accommodate ‘the increase in cognitive reflexiv-
ity, argumentation and negotiated social choice’ (cited in Strydom
2002: 135). Meanwhile, Hendriks and Grin (2007) are concerned
with how reflexive governance works in practice alongside a dy-
namic governance landscape since ‘steering for sustainability typi-
cally surfaces as moments of reflexivity among a sea of everyday
politics’ or as reflexive arrangements (334).
As they point out ‘sites of second order reflexivity are situated
and connected to existing spaces of political debate where first or-
der reflexivity unintentionally surfaces’ (338). In the first instance,
we are talking about creating institutions specifically with gover-
nance for sustainable development in mind, whereas in the second
instance we are talking about the challenge of sustainable devel-
opment for existing practices of governance. In either case, their
point of departure is that these developments are not only relevant
to environmental matters, but are symptoms of ongoing political
modernization in contemporary society (334).
Governing, Governance and Sustainable Development
Traditionally the concept of governance denoted the process of
governing, with the latter primarily associated with governmental
steering by regulation and sanctions (Lafferty 2004: 5). In structural
terms, this is referred to as ‘governance as hierarchy’ whereby
governance: ‘conducted in and through vertically integrated state
structures is an idealized model of democratic government and the
public bureaucracy. . . this was essentially governance by law; instead
of bridging the public private border, this type of governance strictly
upheld that distinction’ (Pierre and Peters 2000: 15).
A familiar structural form of contemporary governance is the idea
of governance as networks (19). Governance is a multi-stakeholder
process with actors drawn from the market, civil society and gov-
ernment, that: ‘broadens the capacities and responsibility for ac-
tion in society’ (Crozier 2007: 3). Governance is not completely
new in the sense that it describes historical patterns of corporatist
decision-making, as well as traditions of cooperation with volun-
tary associations and groups in civil society (Torfing 2006). Torfing
suggests that what is new, is that governments in many countries
increasingly perceive governance as ‘an effective and legitimate form
of governing society’ (113).
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Governance theory emphasizes ‘joint’ or co-governance by state
and non-state actors, and the self-governing capacities of society
(Evans et al. 2007: 13). The language of governance allows ‘practi-
tioners and theorists alike to unlearn embedded intellectual reflexes
and stimulates them to rethink governing, politics and administra-
tion against the background of changing societal processes’ (Hajer
and Wagenaar 2006: 6).
A theory of network governance identifies ‘a specific mech-
anism for the diffusion of ideas and principles; communication
through discursive interaction’ (Trenz and Eder 2004: 8). By mobi-
lizing discourses and counter-discourse to legitimate their positions
participants in communicative networks ‘bridge institutional and
non-institutional spaces of collective action situated at different
levels of governance’ (8). Governance networks tend to blur the
boundary between state and society and act as ‘a platform for re-
source exchange and risk sharing’ as responsible co-producers of
policy solutions (Torfing 2006: 115).
Bang (2003)offers a definition of ‘governance as networks of
political communication’ as:
expressing the reflexive self ordering of social relations
by individuals and groups, cooperating and exercising
their self rule in terms of their reciprocal interdepen-
dence, deliberation and sense of common destiny and
on the basis of continuing consultation, dialogue and
resource sharing. Governance implies a variety of recur-
sive practices oriented to both the creation of identity
and the enhancement of the governing faculties of in-
dividuals and groups to produce effective and relevant
outcomes through processes and projects in which they
are interacting (20 [my italics]).
Traditional hierarchical institutions of government don’t simply
fade away, neither do they ‘suddenly become bottom-up in nature,
nor are they disintegrating into centre-less systems governed from
below’ (Bang 2004: 159). On the contrary, ‘the survival and success
of systems today require the introduction and spread of new, more
communicative and cooperative modes of re-centring from above’
(159). In practice governance networks take different empirical
forms in different countries, at different levels of governance within
different policies areas (Torfing 2006).
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 194 –- #236 i
i
i
i
i
i
194 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
The Challenge of Sustainable Development for Governance:
Complexity, Uncertainty and Ambivalence
While it is useful and commonplace to begin with the well-worn
definition of sustainable development as ‘development that meets
the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs, it is often at the point
of implementation in everyday-life that the concept becomes most
problematic’. Sustainable development presupposes a transition ‘that
is on the one hand extremely value laden and purposeful, while
on the other being open, interactive and contextually adaptable’
(Lafferty 2004: 20).
Meadowcroft (2007b) points out that while sustainable develop-
ment is a complex and contested concept ‘it was essentially designed
as a normative reference point for environment and development
policy making’ (300). Lafferty (2004) suggests that, as a programme
for change, we are talking about the need for ‘effective political ini-
tiatives to ameliorate the negative impacts on life-support systems of
over-and-under development within an ethical context of global and
generational equity’ (17). Sustainable development as an implemen-
tation challenge amounts to ‘a decoupling of the “pressures” of ex-
isting economics and social “drivers” on natural life support systems’
(19–20). The integration of sectoral policy is a means to achieve
decoupling, but as Lafferty argues ‘the point is not to decouple and
leave uncoupled but to create a new environmental-economic-social
constellation’ (20). Therefore, in addition to issues of responsibility
and political coordination across domains ‘re-coupling presupposes
radical new images and understandings of sustainability in practice’
(20). While the goals and principles have been put forward by the
World Commission on Sustainable Development and the Agenda
21 process, ‘the functional building blocks are extremely complex,
unpredictable and the “decoupled” actors and their interests must
be reconstituted within different ecological and natural resource
settings’ (20).
Sustainable development problems often involve the complex
interaction between very different elements from the domains of
society, technology and nature (Voßet al. 2007: 197). The structur-
ing of these interactions is important because feed-back loops and
the emergent dynamics of systems can themselves make interven-
tions risky (197). In practice this means finding ‘manageable ways
of taking into account changing cognitive circumstances, chang-
ing empirical circumstances and persisting uncertainties’ (O’Toole
2004: 45). In this context, governance for sustainable development
must be able to accept that ‘the future is largely unknown and un-
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knowable, and recognize that our collective capacities to know what
is to come are limited’ (Meadowcroft 2007b: 302). Sustainability as
an orientation for development delivers ambiguous goals (Voßand
Kemp 2005: 15) and consequently steering will have to contend
with ambivalence and conflict (Voßet al. 2007: 194). A process that
entails no less than the structural transformation of whole sectors
of society means that the horizontal distribution of power along
different realms and functional sub-systems, and the vertical distri-
bution of power among different levels of government impact on
the ability to influence the shape of future development (198).
The Challenge of Governance for Sustainable Development
Governance for sustainable development is concerned not only with
the design and implementation of government policy, but also with
collective processes of monitoring, reflection, debate and decision
that establish the orientation for policy (Meadowcroft, Farrell and
Spangenberg 2005: 5). The specific model for sustainable develop-
ment considered here is the ‘Rio model of governance’ that emerged
from the Earth Summit in 1992 (Jänicke 2006: 1). Jänicke points
out that the ‘Rio model of governance’ is a knowledge-based model
of steering rather than one based on power and legal obligation,
essentially a voluntary process of policy innovation, lesson drawing
and policy diffusion (4). Yet, governments are still key actors in
these processes, and planning towards a sustainable society thus
takes place in the interaction between government and governance
(Evans et al. 2007). Capacities to influence societal change in the
direction of sustainable development are, however, distributed be-
tween different governance levels (e.g. nation states and the EU), as
well as between functional domains, such as production, consump-
tion and political regulation and between different actors within
these domains (Voßand Kemp 2005: 16). The capacity for action:
‘of governments, businesses or other societal actors, depends on
their ability to manage open informational loops, where power and
knowledge are generated’ (Crozier 2007: 13).
Reflexive Governance: The Challenge of Democratic Coupling in a
Complex World
In the contemporary world, solutions for many environmental prob-
lems cannot be found within the boundaries of the nation state,
‘forcing established institutions to take part in transnational net-
works of governance in which power is dispersed’, for example the
EU or the UN (Hajer and Versteeg 2005: 182). As governments go
increasingly transnational to make decisions in relation to issues like
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sustainable development, there is a sense that they move away from
the democratic traditions of national communities, as they go more
local to implement decisions in a democratically effective manner
they are judged on their capacity to deliver (Bang 2003). This has
placed the state in a state of constant ambiguity:
For how can it decide more globally and implement
more locally in and through a representative democracy
which is organised on a left-right access, derives its
legitimacy from the national political community and is
geared to protect and expand free access to the exercise
of influence on the input side of political processes (Bang
2003: 13).
The uncoupling of states from their national communities gives
rise to particular coordination problems and challenges because it
undermines democratic legitimacy and the effectiveness of decision-
making. Although the concept of sustainable development indicates
the kinds of issues that should be of concern, ‘its practical bearing
cannot be established independent of the concrete life circumstances
of a particular society and the needs, interests and values and aspi-
rations of its members’ (Meadowcroft 2007a: 161). It is therefore
a subject to democratic legitimation. At the same time, from a
functional perspective: ‘various social sectors, strata and organiza-
tions must be involved because the knowledge required to establish
pathways to sustainability is dispersed throughout society’ (161).
The problem of uncoupling gives rise to the challenge of the re-
coupling of various consequential collective actors in various config-
urations, at and between different social locations, e.g. the economy
and civil society, and at different levels of society. Negotiation in gov-
ernance networks that combines bargaining and consensus-seeking
deliberation gives rise ‘to a precarious framework of rule-governed
interaction that facilitates self-regulated policy making that always
takes place in the “shadow of hierarchy” and gives rise to a kind
of “bounded autonomy” ’ (Torfing 2006: 111). This can be more,
or less formal, and depending on the concrete empirical form may
result in an increasingly loose coupling of decision-making processes
and public debate (Eder 1996: 211–212). Nevertheless, coordina-
tion cannot rely on institutionalized hierarchies alone, but must take
place in networks linked together ‘in processes of interactive strat-
egy development’ (Voßand Kemp, 2005: 17). This is the creation
of reflexive governance modes: geared towards continuous learning
in the course of modulating ongoing developments, rather than
towards complete knowledge and maximization of control’ (9).
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Thus, reflexive governance is about ‘the organization of recur-
sive feedback relations between distributed steering activities’ (6).
Practical examples include constructive technology assessment, de-
liberative policy making, social appraisal of technology and Local
Agenda 21 (Hendriks and Grin 2007: 335). There is a strong resem-
blance between the notion of reflexive governance (Voßand Kemp
2005) and the idea of governance as networks of political communi-
cation (Bang 2003). What both require is a stronger appreciation of
the socio-political contexts in which these types of governance are
embedded and the struggles involved in reconfiguring institutional
arrangements (Hendriks and Grin, 2007: 337).
Recursive Governance: The Challenge of Knowledge, Trust and
Path Dependence
The growing complexity and intensified uncertainty of contempo-
rary society increases the demand for knowledge in decision-making.
In this context there is also a growing demand from society for the
inclusion of non-official and competing voices in decision-making
(Crozier 2007: 4). The consequence is a shift from the relatively
closed networks of experts and decision-makers to more open,
multi-lateral knowledge networks as inputs to policy making and
deliberation (4). In the older model, facts were assumed as self-
standing and definitive, in the new model truth claims can and are
being challenged and trust can become an issue (Crozier 2007: 11).
Politics and policy-making are not just about problem-solving, but
are also increasingly about the generation of trust (Hajer and Wage-
naar 2003: 17). The difficulty is that new political practices are not
created in a vacuum; they have to interface with existing practice if
they are to achieve some degree of efficacy, coherence and function-
ality. If distrust is already embedded in a context then the prospects
for effective institutional innovation are all the more precarious.
Existing institutional, cognitive, technical and economic patterns
may work as a selection environment for innovations and future
change (Voßand Kemp 2005). This means that ‘not only does history
matter in some undefined way, but that socio-ecological transfor-
mation is path dependent, i.e. future developments are influenced,
enabled and constrained by structures that have grown out of spe-
cific historical developments’ (Voßand Kemp 2005: 13–14). The
way in which the past shapes the present and thus ‘the deliberate
process of [path] creation may be constrained such that existing
institutional arrangements are reproduced in a new context’ along
with their limitations and weaknesses (Skelcher, Navdeep and Smith
2005: 576). Pre-existing institutional orders are fundamentally im-
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portant to the creation of paths towards sustainable development.
Pre-existing procedures, processes and institutional arrangements
are, however, also knowledge technologies that are susceptible to
recursive action (Crozier 2007: 2). In other words, institutions can-
not simply be self-referential, they must also be able to generate
sufficient knowledge and power through learning, if they are sur-
vive in complex and ever more contingent circumstances (12). The
process of recursion may push these forms to their absolute limit
or indeed transform them into something entirely different (Crozier
2007). One of the consequences that can be involved in this type of
recursion is the generation of new starting conditions. The fluidity
of the social context, not only poses management problems, but also
offers new strategic opportunities to manage given that the context
is altered by the effect of action (Crozier 2007: 6).
Discursive Modernity: the Challenge of Co-ordinating Distributed
Capacities
The public discourse of sustainable development has resulted in a
shift away from the formal rationality of the previous ‘command
and control’ governance, in relation to environmental regulation,
to embrace softer ‘steering-mechanisms’ like voluntary agreements
between industry and government (Flynn 2007), and the mobiliza-
tion of civil society for sustainable development (Lafferty 2004).
This does not imply the abandonment of regulatory power, indeed
it remains central to policy-making (Jänicke 2006: 6), but it is now
one among a mix of policy instruments and steering mechanisms
employed in governing sustainable development (Lafferty 2004;
Voßet al. 2007).
The shift from ‘formal’ rationality to ‘procedural’ rationality can
be seen in the emergence of different modes of coordinating inter-
ests. Historically, we have the consensual model of accommodating
corporatist interests and the adversarial model based on public en-
quiry. A third possibility is ‘a new type of interconnection between
civil society (represented by protest actors), the economy (repre-
sented by industrial actors, including trade unions) and the political
system (represented by modern state agents) (Eder 1996: 209–212).
This model proposes that corporatist forms of steering give way
to new post-corporatist forms that engage the types of actors men-
tioned above. Reflexive institutions are the characteristic forms of a
post-corporatist order, however, ‘their structure and processes are
still to be understood and explained’ (209–212). Post-corporatism is
a much looser structure than previous forms of co-ordination, it is
an institutional order penetrated by communication rather than be-
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ing connected purely through formally organized relations (Strydom
2002: 135).
The coordination of reflexive institutions in a post-corporatist
order could be termed reflexive governance (Voßand Kemp 2005;
Voßet al. 2007). However, as we step from the normative to the
empirical there are at least three clear limitations to the conceptu-
alization of reflexive governance as it stands (Hendriks and Grin
2007). Firstly, it downplays or ignores the diverse and dynamic
political landscape in which reflexive arrangements find themselves
(336). Secondly, the assumptions of reflexive governance in relation
to the way contemporary policy making works are questionable,
because it underestimates the ambiguity over the role of the state
in contemporary politics and the ambivalence of non-state actors
to state initiated projects. Thirdly, civil society is simply instru-
mentalized, since actors are called upon to cooperate in reflexive
governance and assist by reforming practices and structures (Hen-
driks and Grin 2007 336–7).
If we are to take socio-political contexts into account, we must
situate reflexive institutions in a broader democratic system (Hen-
driks and Grin 2007: 337). This comprises multiple interconnected
and overlapping spheres of public discourse, or discursive spheres
consisting of formal, informal and mixed modes of deliberation
(Hendriks 2006). Formal modes include scientific inquiry, arbitra-
tion or consensus; informal modes promote an exchange of ideas
or arguments; mixed modes are exemplified by discursive designs
like citizens juries and provide a context for diverse actors to come
together and cross-fertilize macro and micro public conversations
(Hendriks 2006: 501–503). The notion of ‘integrated deliberation’
as a system of overlapping discursive spheres that takes account
of all of these modes of deliberation is a theoretical interpretation
rather than a description of what in practice is a highly unstructured
dynamic process (Hendriks and Grin 2007: 338). Nevertheless, it
is consistent with Strydom’s argument that discursive modernity
might be an appropriate portrayal of the contemporary world since,
‘both risk and responsibility have roots in reality that emerge from
inter-subjective processes of attribution and require critical inter-
subjective testing’ (2002: 147).
Irish Governance as a Post-Corporatist Order?
The Irish social partnership model has provided the framework for
formal relations between the government, business and civil society
at both national and local levels (Daly 2007). This represents a grow-
ing shift from governance as hierarchy to new more flexible forms of
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governance in Ireland (Adshead 2003: 126). It has been suggested,
that the Irish model of social partnership differs from its European
counterparts because it conjoins negotiation, problem-solving, and
consensus seeking governance in deliberative democratic forms and
has also been labelled post-corporatist (O’Donnell and O’Reardon
2000). Roche and Cradden (2003), who are perhaps the most dis-
missive of the concept, give a useful shorthand summary of the main
features of the Irish case for post- corporatism. The first relates to
the deliberative and problem solving qualities that exist alongside
the more traditional bargaining function of Irish social partnership.
The second feature is that the range of interests now implicated
in Irish social partnership goes beyond those ‘arising from the
functional interdependence between labour and capital’ (Roche and
Cradden 2003: 86). The third feature of the Irish experience is the
emergence of new relationships between government policy-making
institutions and interests, at various levels from national to local
(86).
The characterization of Irish social partnership as post-corporatist
has spawned studies investigating the emergence of a post-corporatist
order. Although there is a clear affinity to Eder’s sociological char-
acterization, none of the Irish studies, predominantly drawn from
Irish political science, have crossed the divide. These studies cover
fields as diverse as social partnership arrangements (Adshead 2006),
anti-poverty strategy (Adshead and McInerney 2006), local govern-
ment (Larkin 2004), and local development (Teague 2006). While
there is ample evidence of the development and spread of a ‘co-
ordination reflex’ in Irish governance in reaction to various public
policy problems (O’Mahony 2007), the question is whether taken
together they might signify the emergence of reflexive governance
in Ireland? Hitherto the opinion from Irish studies ranges from
outright rejection (Roche and Cradden, 2003), or rejection in dis-
crete policy fields (Teague 2007), to a cautious acknowledgement
that post-corporatism might better describe the Irish situation than
available notions of corporatism, neo-corporatism and competitive
corporatism (Adshead 2006: 337).
Meanwhile, cognate studies in social science focusing on the
evolution of deliberative democratic forms in environmental politics
have begun to emerge (Murray 2006; Scott, Russell and Redmond
2007). These studies do not explicitly connect with the debate
on ‘post-corporatism’ in either its political science, or sociological
manifestations but are occupying common ground. Meanwhile,
deliberative practices are spreading to domains as diverse as land-
use planning; economic strategy development; Local Agenda 21
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work; community development; urban and rural development; and
environmental management processes like Integrated Coastal Zone
Management in Ireland (Scott, Russell and Redmond 2007: 167).
By linking Irish academic debates in different disciplines on these
emergent social practices with the broader literature explored here,
we might be able to gain a vantage point on the potential for
reflexive sustainable development in Ireland.
Situating Civil Society
Civil society is ‘the realm of organized social life that is open, vol-
untary, self-generating, at least partially self supporting and bound
by a legal order or set of rules’ (O’Flynn 2006: 144). Public spheres
are the more politicized arenas in civil society often located clos-
est to the state, i.e. interest groups, social movement networks as
well as everyday citizens who engage with the state when they can
(Hendriks 2006: 489). Non-institutional forms of civil society in-
clude direct action, social dialogue and analysis through alternative
social and political forums and campaigning and advocacy (Daly
2007: 10).
In Ireland, the voluntary and community organizations are the
‘core’ of civil society, where the voluntary sector is largely identified
either with charity or service provision, and the community sec-
tor is more concerned with politicization, advocacy and innovation
with a particular focus on policy (Somers and Bradford 2006: 70).
The community and voluntary sector have become increasingly in-
tertwined with the state at various levels to the extent that ‘any
boundary between the “state” and “civil society” has become highly
porous, sometimes ambiguous, and in some circumstances, some-
what meaningless’ (Somers and Bradford 2006: 80). This has led to
a kind of ambivalence within civil society regarding participation
in social partnership (Meade 2005). In her view, the community
and voluntary sector have been afforded token recognition but
it is a presence without influence, participation without power
(2005: 351). There is growing concern, at least in the literature
characterizing the experience of civil society in social partnership,
about the extent to which ‘the capacity of voluntary and community
organizations for self-organization, independent action and dissent
outside of the social partnership framework and other partnership
arrangements has been compromised’ (Daly 2007: 10).
Locating Environmentalism in Irish Civil Society
One might expect that environmental NGOs (Non Government
Organizations) would have a particularly important role to play
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in any system of governance for sustainable development. Irish
environmentalism has recently been identified among the weakest
sub-sectors in Irish civil society (Mullally and Motherway, 2009).
Environmentalist organizations are notably absent from existing
social partnership arrangements like the National Economic and
Social Council and the National Economic and Social Forum (Gara-
van 2007). While environmental organizations do participate in the
National Sustainable Development Partnership, they are not in a po-
sition to negotiate with other social forces in society that they might
regard as responsible for environmental problems (see below). This
political marginalization reflects a structural weakness since environ-
mentalism lacks a coherent national level of co-ordination (Flynn
2007). As a result of the informal character of much environmental
activism in Ireland, the main concern is to create new opportunities
for public awareness by offering a distinctive viewpoint for public
engagement and dialogue rather than trying to ‘represent existing
opinion among specific sections of the public’ (Tovey 2007: 190).
Therefore, ‘national-level environmental organisations must be seen
as vehicles for activism within the formal public sphere and thereby
bearers of an instrumental purpose rather than a representative
function’ (Garavan 2007: 850). Organized environmentalism ex-
hibits high levels of distrust towards the state because of negative
experiences of interaction (Tovey 2007: 185).
The forms of Irish environmental organization are, however,
also tactical since ‘there is a continual evolution in forms of activism
in response to new knowledge, new opportunities, and new shifts
in the configuration of political power’ (Garavan 2007: 846–847).
Flynn argues that the predilection among Irish environmentalists for
engaging in risk discourse, i.e. being advocates against environmental
threat, predisposes them to a type of reactive activism and creates
an unsympathetic resonance structure for their position in Irish
society (2007: 179). He reasons that rather than engaging reactively
in tactics related to specific issues, environmental organizations
should reorient themselves strategically to become advocates for
sustainable development. This assumes that a context conducive for
such advocacy exists, when the reality based on his analysis is that
hitherto the structural opportunities for participation have been
largely reactive. What then is the situation with regard to evolving
or emergent possibilities of reflexive governance for sustainable
development?
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Communicative Interfaces
Flynn (2007) has recently offered a critique of, and reform agenda
for, the institutional basis of environmental and sustainable develop-
ment policy in Ireland. My purpose here is to provide some empirical
reference points to ground our understanding of the emergent pos-
sibilities and limitations of reflexive governance in an integrated
system of deliberation. Therefore, by exploring some recent exam-
ples of communicative interfaces between different collective actors
(the state, civil society and business) we can begin to consider the
utility of the post-corporatist thesis. The question is where to begin?
Meadowcroft (2007) suggests that national processes and stra-
tegies for sustainable development could be regarded as instances
of reflexive governance. Sustainable development processes ‘with
their institutionalized cycles of goal definition/ policy designation/
implementation/ review and revision can provide an interactive
mechanism for publicly taking stock and orienting efforts for so-
cial transformation’ (2007a: 161). As well as providing for inputs
from advisory bodies, strategies for sustainable development ‘can
also create mechanisms for integrating stakeholders and citizens
into a structured review of social practices related to sustainable
development’ (161).
Sustainable Development: A Strategy for Ireland was published in
1997. The primary focus was on the integration of the environment
into various policy sectors (agriculture, forestry, marine resources,
energy, transport, tourism and trade). An interim review of the strat-
egy formed the basis of the government’s submission to the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. The review outlined
the uses of a more varied mix of policy instruments than had hith-
erto been the case, detailing a range of voluntary and participative
instruments alongside instruments to improve existing regulatory
measures. Comhar: the National Sustainable Development Partner-
ship was established ‘to advance the national agenda for sustainable
development, to evaluate progress in this regard, to assist in devis-
ing suitable mechanisms and advising on their implementation, and
contribute to the formation of a national consensus in these regards’
(Comhar terms of reference: http://www.comhar-ndsp.ie//). Al-
though a specific adaptation of the Irish model of social partnership,
Flynn contends that it remains a marginal entity in the overall sys-
tem, albeit one that makes ‘a laudable contribution’ (2007: 178).
Nevertheless, partnership remains central to the official discourse on
sustainable development (DOELG 2002: 105). With this in mind,
the focus now turns to three different instances of communication at
the interface with civil society: (1) local social partnership; (2) cor-
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porate social responsibility reporting; and (3) public discourse and
mixed modes of deliberation in the politics of waste management.
Local Social Partnership: Input, Influence and Distributed Capacity
The introduction of City and County Development Boards (CDBs)
in 2000 represents an attempt to build consensual problem-solving
institutions with strategic intentions at the local level of governance
in Ireland. CDBs are networking and strategic planning organi-
zations charged with a responsibility of formulating and keeping
under review a long-term strategy for local development, but have
no executive authority (Acheson and Williamson 2007: 32). The
CDBs and their strategies are of particular interest because: they
are localizations of the Irish model of social partnership, and the
strategies are explicitly considered as vehicles for promoting local
sustainable development (Mullally and Motherway, 2009).
CDBs, were consciously designed to be deliberative and partic-
ipative (Larkin 2004). Their legitimacy derives primarily from the
presence of elected representatives from city or county councils on
their boards (Acheson and Williamson 2007: 39). Local economic
development and public service delivery agencies have a much more
extensive role on these bodies than the social partners (39). More-
over, only two of the 24 places on the CDBs are allocated to the
community and voluntary sector, which is contingent on the sector
being organized in a Community Forum (39). Community Forums
are city or countywide structures created with national level fund-
ing ‘to facilitate participation, feedback and accountability among
community and voluntary organizations’ (Adshead and McInerney
2006: 14). The community and voluntary sector have limited bar-
gaining power in the CDBs because there is no programme money
to disperse (Acheson and Williamson 2007: 40). Participants have
identified the development of trust, often associated with the idea
of social capital, as a positive effect of engagement with the CDB
process (Mullally and Motherway, 2009).
The strategies emerged from structured consultation processes.
They encompass: agreed vision, goals, objectives and actions; and,
have built in mechanisms for monitoring, review and revision. An
analysis of all 34 City and County Development Strategies shows
that only one did not mention sustainable development, while
41 per cent identified sustainable development as a principle of
the strategy and 21 per cent specifically mention the National
Sustainable Development Strategy (Murphy and Weyman 2005: 6).
Meanwhile 79 per cent of the strategies specifically mention Local
Agenda 21 (LA21) with 62 per cent having specific LA21 initiatives.
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Following the interim review of the strategies in 2005–6, some CDBs
strategies are moving to integrate LA21 initiatives more centrally,
whereas others where LA21 had previously been prominent have
abandoned the concept entirely.
There are a number of limitations to the CDBs and their stra-
tegies. There is a sense within the community and voluntary sector
that there is little resonance or awareness of the role, purpose
and activity of the CDBs amongst the wider community (Acheson
and Williamson 2007: 35). There is also a gap between ‘participa-
tion opportunities and participation outcomes’ that replicates the
experience in other policy fields (Adshead and McInerney 2007).
While they represent an innovative form of public participation
their effectiveness in relation to sustainable development is ques-
tionable. Arguably, CDBs are more about fostering social capital
than sustainable development, less about integration than institu-
tional accommodation at a remove from real influence (Mullally
and Motherway, 2009). The ability to turn social capital into ac-
tion for sustainable development (agency) denotes ‘the capacity of
persons to transform existing states of affairs, the capacity to plan
and initiate action, and the ability to respond to events outside of
one’s immediate sphere of influence to produce a desired effect’
(Newman and Dale 2007: 81–82). The ‘hierarchy of governance
participants’ in CDBs suggests that inadequate attention has been
paid to power relations (Adshead and McInerney 2006: 24). Factor-
ing in the weak state of vertical in Irish multi-level governance, the
disjuncture between input, influence and implementation becomes
clear. Nevertheless, these types of institutions might reasonably be
considered as building ‘communicative bridges between the state
and civil society’ (Khan cited in Ó Brion 2006:169).
CSR: Business, the Ambiguous State and Civil Society
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) refers to the recognition by
business and industry of their role in sustainable development in
terms of the voluntary and self-regulatory practices they adopt.
(Mullally and Mullally 2006: 9). CSR, on a normative level, is
about fulfilling societal responsibilities; on a pragmatic level it is
the ability to respond to societal demands to pursue corporate
objectives; and at a practical level, it is a reporting instrument
for communicating information on the non-financial aspects of
company activity (O’Dwyer 2003: 525). CSR in Europe tends to
include stakeholders from the state, economy and civil society in a
neo-corporatist approach to steering practice (Van Tudler and Van
der Zwart 2006: 226). Despite the centrality of social partnership
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in public policy and sustainable development, it has not shaped
the evolution of corporate social reporting. Nevertheless, review
and evaluation processes can create inputs into public discourse
and contribute to societal reflexivity: in effect ‘deliberation without
participation’ (Lehtonen 2006).
CSR reporting is not mandatory in Ireland, it is conducted with
reference to international initiatives, programmes and standards,
and therefore the role of the state in the process is ambiguous. The
status of reporting is therefore questionable and could be regarded
not just as self-organizing, but also as self-referential communi-
cation or public relations. On the other hand, the process and
practice could potentially be considered reflexive and discursive: it
encourages businesses to reflect on their performance in relation to
sustainable development; to build in mechanisms for continual im-
provement in relation to their responsibility; and, to communicate
this information. Thus, it creates the conditions for deliberation,
but it does not involve the direct participation of civil society. CSR
reporting is therefore significant because of the performative action
undertaken within recursive processes of reflection, communication
and readjustment of practices on a cyclical (annual) basis, rather than
as a measure of the actual performance in relation to sustainable
development.
From a civil society perspective, CSR gives rise to concern in
relation to its capacity to deliver on sustainable development objec-
tives because it can be used ‘to distract from more transformative
approaches and diffuse regulatory innovation’ (Bendell and Kerins
2005: 16). There is a strong preference for mandatory rather than
voluntary reporting among the Irish NGOs sector but this is un-
likely to impact the CSR regime for the reasons outlined above
(O’Dwyer 2004: 19–20). A possible source of societal demand for
CSR is from consumers. A survey published in 2003 showed that 60
per cent of Irish adults believe that industry and commerce do not
pay enough attention to their social responsibilities (BITC 2003).
The Irish regime is still an emergent phenomenon with low levels
of reporting and a few forerunners taking the lead. Nevertheless,
it is becoming increasingly sophisticated, tending towards commu-
nication rather than mere public relations. A limiting factor is the
presence of a strong coalition of actors ensuring that it remains
a voluntary process and weak to non-existing societal demand for
mandatory reporting (Mullally and Mullally 2006).
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The Politics of Waste Management: Collective Action,
Ambivalence and Antagonism
Waste management politics in Ireland, in contrast to the pivotal
role accorded to civil society and partnership in national discourse
on governance for sustainable development, arguably marginalizes
civil society and constructs the local scale simply as a site of im-
plementation (Davies 2007: 69). If the previous examples exemplify
processes building communicative bridges, then waste management
politics represent a communicative abyss! At a national level, at-
tempts to overhaul the waste management system can be traced
back to the Waste Management Act (1996) and the Waste Manage-
ment Regulations (1997) a central feature of which was to move
towards the implementation of the EU waste hierarchy (Boyle 2002).
The government decided ‘to scale the problem of waste management
at the regional level’ (Boyle 2002: 183). The inclusion of incinera-
tion as part of these plans was the catalyst for the mobilization of
anti-incineration campaigns.
Boyle (2002) analyzing the discursive structure of the contro-
versy identified three main points of contention: the spatial location
of waste management infrastructure; the toxicity of waste; and,
the issue of waste as a public good. The first conflict concerns
the discourse of responsibility and where it should reside. On one
side, anti-incineration campaigners focused on alternatives to in-
cineration in the waste hierarchy as a way of taking responsibility,
simultaneously resisting the NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) label
(Davies 2006: 714). Their opponents alleged that opposing inciner-
ation was a dilution of civic responsibility (Boyle 2002: 186–187).
The second conflict centred on the discourse of risk. Proponents of
incineration placed faith in technological progress based on technical
assessments of risk, whereas anti-incineration campaigners focused
on the uncertainty in relation to the long-term effects of the tech-
nology: a position openly embedded in a lack of trust in regulatory
authorities, scientific experts and industry (Davies 2006: 714–5).
The third conflict centred on the discourse of waste as a public
good. The contention that disproportionate responsibility was being
placed on local communities for the management of waste faced the
argument that waste was the collective responsibility of society, but
the solution was the commoditization of waste in emerging markets
(Boyle 2002). In any event, responsibility for local decision-making
on waste management was removed from the local democratic arena
through the Waste Management (Amendment) Act 2001.
Not only was the local democratic process short-circuited in this
instance, the context for proactive public participation as well as
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 208 –- #250 i
i
i
i
i
i
208 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
local representative democracy was fundamentally altered creating
an inhospitable context for reflexive governance. This has been
illustrated by the experience of constituting a citizens jury on the
issue of incineration in Dublin (Murray 2006). In theory a citizens
jury represents a mixed mode of deliberation where citizens, experts
and decision-makers engage in a structured exchange of views on an
issue and arrive at a rational outcome. In this case, the lack of insti-
tutional decision-making capacity between participants meant that
not only did the deliberation fail to gain legitimacy in the commu-
nity because the point of decision-making remained insulated from
their influence, but it was regarded by participants and the observing
public as a public relations exercise (Murray 2006: 449). Deliber-
ation should complement, not replace representative democracy –
the removal of decision-making powers from elected representatives
through the amendment of the Waste Management Act meant that
any subsequent arrangement would not only struggle for legitimacy,
it would be the source of ambivalence towards decision-makers and
of antagonism in civil society (464).
Conclusion
Strydom’s sociological theory of responsibility and the attendant
prospect of reflexive institutions in a post-corporatist social order
provide an orientation to the possibility of reflexive (and hope-
fully better) governance for sustainable development in a discursive
modernity. The investigation of a specific socio-political context sug-
gests that the horizon that this opens up remains unattainable in the
content of residual practice, where a predilection to governance by
reflex thwarts its more enlightened cousin. My purpose is not to be
churlish – progress has been made in the Irish context. The model
of integrated deliberation, a theoretical rather than an empirical
standard, recognizes but doesn’t reify or fetishize distributed capac-
ities and power imbalances. Nevertheless, the decisions we make
now, constrain the possibility of organizing effective and legitimate
responses to the challenge of sustainable development in the future.
My intention has not been to cast a ‘pox on your hierarchal house’,
government remains the critical node in governance for sustainable
development. Rather, it is to illuminate the disjuncture in ‘joined-
up’ governance and beg the question: where do we go from here?
Thanks Piet!
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THE CALLING
OF A NEW CRITICAL THEORY:
SELF-DEVELOPMENT,
INCLUSION OF THE OTHER
AND PLANETARY REALIZATIONS
Ananta Kumar Giri
The social process of the discursive construction of
reality is a transformative cognitive process. On the
one hand, it draws on existing knowledge and cognitive
structures and, on the other, it generates new knowledge
and new cognitive structures and brings about their
selective coordination (Piet Strydom Risk, Environment
and Society, 2002:150).
Introduction and Invitation:
Piet Strydom has made valuable contributions to continental tra-
ditions of critical-social theory. His concept of ‘triple contingency’
and his subsequent contributions on ‘triple contingency learning’,
resonance, socio-cognitive critique, and emergent frames of co-
responsibility are valuable contributions to critical theory. As a
heart-touching teacher and fellow seeker Strydom has inspired so
many of us around the world to explore new horizons of learning.
What is touching is the way Strydom combines critical engagement
with a deep passion for an emergent normativity, one which in-
vites us to transform our sociological analytics to a new normative
height and depth. In outlining the contours of a new socio-cognitive
critique Strydom (2002) pleads for a non-judgemental critical en-
gagement:
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Far from judging and condemning the ideology of a
particular actor or agent it is a matter of closely studying
a variety of related cognitive processes and structures.
Included are the frames and normative codes of all
participants, despite their conflicting interpretations of
it (156).
Strydom (2000) urges us to understand the limits of rights and jus-
tice frames of modernity and open ourselves to the emergent frames
of co-responsibility. More recently Strydom (2006) tells us how
‘different configurations of public spheres allow distinct learning
processes’ and invites us to accept the challenge of triple contin-
gency learning: ‘Triple contingency learning represents the collective
learning mechanism which brings us closest to the communicative
self-constitution and self-organization of society. It harbors the “cos-
mopolitan” promise of a transformative moment in which a “creative
combination of different forces” occurs’ (9).
Continuing this inspiring spirit of a deeper normative critique
and transformation, Strydom urges us to go beyond the contest of
faculties, especially arts and sciences, and nurture a different rela-
tionship with science, scholarship and time. For Strydom, ‘Science
is a much slower field than politics, not to mention economics’
(2004b: 8). When science is ‘being steadily accelerated and stresses
up well beyond its own time culture’ social scientists have to con-
tribute to the epochal need of ‘the unhastening or deceleration of
science’ (8).
In reflecting upon the issue of a contest of faculties between the
arts and the sciences, Strydom invites us to a new ‘chrono-politics.’
But invites further consideration from us in that the proposed new
‘chrono-politics’ has to be a part of multi-dimensional strivings
for cultivating a new relationship with time, a time and space of
mutual nurturance and generosity. Cultivating a new relationship
with time calls for appropriate self-cultivation and spaces of value
formation. This is not only a political process but also a spiritual
process. Similarly, the emergent frames of responsibility are not
only socio-political but also spiritual and do not emerge only in
public spheres, even of Strydom’s reformulated concept of public
communication, but also involve practices of self-development and
transformation which are not reducible to the public. These are also
not solely epistemic processes; they involve ontological processes of
self-cultivation and self-transformation. Strydom’s inspiring critical
theory, like much of continental critical theory, is still primarily
epistemic and its brilliance can be now transformed into manifold
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creative pathways of an ontological epistemology of participation
going beyond the dualism of ontology and epistemology, I have
pursued this discussion elsewhere (Giri 2004a, 2007) and will
return to it later. Strydom’s deep engagement with environment
calls for a foundational border-crossing, for example transforming
anthropocentrism to a new political and spiritual struggle for the
dignity of life and ‘cross-species dignity’ (Giri 2006; Nussbaum
2006). Strydom’s plea is for a non-judgmental critical theory –
one which listens to all contending voices rather than quickly
identifying with an a priori ‘legitimationist’ perspective. This is the
critique Strydom (1999) applies to Habermas’ approach to public
sphere and can be illumined by a ‘multi-valued logic’ (Mohanty
2000). Strydom’s critical theory can realize many of its potentials
by building on and contributing to self-development, inclusion of
other and planetary realizations.
The Calling of a New Critical Theory: Learning With Piet Strydom
Strydom (2002) writes:
Since the late 1980s, finally, I have sought to extrapolate
and develop what I provisionally call the new cognitive
sociology from the cognitive turn in sociology and subse-
quent advances. Rather than concentrating on practices
as such, whether communication, discursive negotiation,
strategizing, competition, conflict or networking, none
of which is of course jettisoned, the focal concern here is
the variable structural models of practical action ( 149).
In developing a new critical theory at the heart of which lies what
he calls socio-cognitive critique, Strydom (2002) creatively builds
on both (what he calls) the new cognitive revolution and social
constructivism, and, at the same time imparting to this confluence his
own characteristic originality. For him the cognitive turn questions:
the function of norms in social action and interaction by
rejecting the traditional assumptions of norms as being
consistent and extending a determining influence. In-
stead, it emphasized the need to develop a sensitivity for
and an ability to identify the whole range of culturally
defined alternatives to practices and the construction and
organization of society. Casualties of the change were
such modernist notions as the unitary concept of moder-
nity, the linear concept of progress, the progressivist or
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developmental concept of evolution, the identification
of modernity and universalism and so forth (180).
Such questioning resonates with some of the most important themes
in contemporary critical theory such as contingency, disjunction
between facts and norms, the work of antinomies in self, culture
and society, and the critique of linearity (Giri 2007; Beteille 2000).
Strydom gives a cognitive thrust to social constructivism: ‘Construc-
tivism, in my view, is best seen from a cognitive theoretical point
of view that acknowledges both intersubjective understanding and
the objectivity of reality with which we maintain pragmatic rela-
tions’ (2002: 151). Thus with care, Strydom prepares the following
pathways of socio-cognitive critique:
1. It is based upon a ‘relational conception of the social world,
with the emphasis therefore being less on static substances and
entities’.
2. It is both a ‘critique of the status quo and a critique of
utopianism’.
3. ‘To fulfill the requirements of socio-cognitive critique, the
whole network of different cognitive processes and structures
is investigated.’ Socio-cognitive critique advances an ‘under-
standing of the critical task of sociology’ by ‘distinguishing
different types of cognitive structures or models’.
4. Socio-cognitive critique leads to the generation of explana-
tory models which in turn have ‘epistemic authority.’ ‘But
the sociologist has no exclusive possession of epistemic au-
thority. Observers and commentators as well as the observing,
evaluating and judging public to the very degree enjoy this
same privilege. In fact, often the epistemic authority of the
sociologist depends on such a third point of view’ (157).
Socio-cognitive critique is thus related to the work of ‘triple contin-
gency’ in self, culture and society, as well, this mode of critique is
itself a mode of triple contingency learning. As previously outlined,
triple contingency learning is a multilateral learning process in which
participating actors and institutions learn from and with each other
in a multigonal way embodying an emergent self-constitution and
self-organization of society. Socio-cognitive critique is thus a creative
process of self-creation in society (more on triple contingency later).
Further, socio-cognitive critique not only emerges out of vibrant
public communication but also makes sociology public:
The public role of sociology commences with the making
visible of the whole spectrum of different experiences,
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perceptions, frames and knowledges. This is achieved
by locating and heightening the tensions and relating
the intersecting lines of creativity and conflict to each
other. By adopting such a minimalist mediating role,
sociology’s aim is to break down the ethnocentricity of
perspectives and to contribute to the development of
reciprocal perspectives (158).
At the core of this new critical theory is Strydom’s (1999) for-
mulation of the concept of ‘triple contingency’. He presents it as
follows:
the concept of double contingency needs to make way
for a more adequate replacement – namely triple con-
tingency. In the first scenario, two social actors, commu-
nicatively acting subjects or black boxes, A and B, face
or encounter one another or enter into some relation
with each other as “I” and “Thou”. In the basic situa-
tion of triple contingency, by contrast, there is a third
perspective borne by C, who observes what A and B are
saying. By so doing C has a constitutive impact on the
social situation (8).
Though this third point of view at an earlier stage of Strydom’s
formulation ‘represents society’ (8), at a later stage it represents a
discursively engaged and learning public which is not just a repre-
sentation of society. Strydom also asks is ‘the third point of view:
within or beyond society?’ He tends to agree with Habermas that
the ‘third point of view represented by internal transcendence’ is
located within society. But what about those processes of critique,
creativity and transformation which cannot be fully captured within
the internal modes of definition and justification of society? Stry-
dom’s concept of triple contingency invites a transcendence in self,
culture and society, one which is not just ‘internal transcendence’
of the Habermasian kind but embodies border-crossing dialogue
and interpenetration between, within and beyond society, immanent
practice and varieties of transcendence.
Though Strydom (2001) builds upon Habermas he nonetheless
raises some significant questions about Habermasian critical theory.
For Strydom, Habermas does not really understand the distinction
between public sphere and public: ‘while writing eloquently about
double contingency as well as the public sphere, Habermas sur-
prisingly neglects to capture the role of public in communication
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societies in a comparably sharp manner’ (166). He holds that Haber-
mas gives priority to ‘the moral philosophical third point of view
to the exclusion of the third perspective of members of society or
citizenry’ (183). He applies a constructivist and cognitive approach
to triple contingency. He considers the Habermasian approach to
public sphere and triple contingency to be ‘legitimationist’ when
Habermas privileges social movements in the discursive construc-
tion of important concerns of society. For Strydom, we cannot
privilege only social movements: ‘other actors or agents who par-
ticipate in the process of social construction, such as industry, the
state, science, the legal profession and the media, should likewise
be regarded as vehicles of cognitive processes’ (150–151). Further-
more, for Strydom (1999), in Habermas, ‘the cognitive is narrowly
understood in terms of the individual mind rather than in terms of
the more sociologically relevant phenomenon of social knowledge
and cultural models’ (12).
Responsibility is an important aspect of the critical theory of
Strydom. Building upon Karl-Otto Apel, he presents responsibility
as co-responsibility which is in tune with his other related strivings
in critical theoretical engagement such as resonance and self-creating
public. Strydom (2000) challenges us to acknowledge the limits of
rights and justice frames of modernity and to transformationally sup-
plement these, not replace, with the emergent visions and practices
of responsibility. For him, the rights frame had emerged in the early
modern revolutions e.g., the Revolt of the Netherlands, the English
Revolution and the French Revolution. The justice frame had arisen
in the wake of the industrial revolution in ‘late eighteenth-century
England and continued unabated yet in a sublimated form until
the second half of the twentieth century, focused on the problem
complex of exploitation, pauperization and loss of identity’ (20).
These two discourses have inspired and influenced socio-political
movements in the modern world, including interventions on de-
velopment. Today their limitations are emerging in the challenges
posed by responsibility, for example in relation to the environmental
crisis and in the discourses around rights and justice. In Strydom’s
pregnant formulations, ‘The theory of justice is today making way
for another, still newer semantics in the form of the moral theory of
responsibility which is crystallizing around a number of intertwined
debates about the problem of risk’ (20).
Reflecting on contemporary conditions of risk, and his emergent
frame of responsibility, Strydom writes:
the competition and conflict point to a new evolution-
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ary departure. The production of risks as well as the
authoritarian paternalism by means of which they are
institutionally being dealt with have both been revealed
as being guided by structures that indeed originated
from evolutionary learning processes yet do not possess
the universal cognitive import we have assumed until re-
cently. Since these cognitive structures have contributed
to both the generation of environmental crisis and to its
poor management, they are in need of revision and fine-
tuning. The limits around science, technology, industry,
capitalism and state or, more generally, the experiment-
ing society must be redrawn in a more precise manner by
a new guiding and direction-giving structure developed
in practical discourse. Collective responsibility, or co-
responsibility, stands for this sort of cognitive structure
(Strydom 2002: 153).
Strydom (2006) states that risk communication is not simply about
‘problem-solving’ but is also about ‘creating and bringing a world
into being’ (4). Risk communication, in common with the broader
genre of public communication, involves ‘learning under contingent
conditions’ where ‘different configurations of public sphere allow
distinct learning processes’ (6). Resonance plays an important role
in such processes of communication and mutual learning.
Strydom (2004a) quite creatively presents six concentric circles
of resonance at work in contemporary communicative societies:
The smallest circle represents... the formal political or
decision-making institutions... The second circle cov-
ers... institutions such as statutory bodies, foundations,
universities, chambers and so forth which fulfill dele-
gated state functions or have been granted self-admini-
stration rights. They could likewise provide the nec-
essary basis for system or institutional resonance. The
third circle, representing civil society where it meets the
public sphere, embraces a diversity of radically different
social actors or agents, from active citizens, associa-
tions, organizations and social movements, on the one
hand, to business organizations and corporations, on
the other. Here business organizations and corporations
make available the resonance structure of system or
institutional resonance, while active citizens and the as-
sociations and organizations growing out of civil society
serve as the structural basis of Habermas’ civil society
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resonance and, directly corresponding to it, what Eder
conceives as ‘extra-constitutional resonance’. The fourth
concentric circle represents the lifeworld in which civil
society and, by extension, the public sphere are rooted.
The penultimate or fifth circle represents the cultural
foundations of the lifeworld, civil society and the public
sphere, and as such it provides the cultural resources –
i.e. cultural models, schemes, codes, or Gamson’s themes
and counter themes – upon which actors or agents draw
and which they activate in public communication. The
sixth and last concentric circle, however, brings to the
fore a resonance structure that is of still greater sig-
nificance, particularly in contemporary communication
society, yet is often forgotten, perhaps because it is the-
oretically not well understood. It represents the public
in the sense of the lay egalitarian public audience who
observes the actors, agents or players in the public arena,
evaluates and judges them, and thus takes a position on
the relevance and value of their respective contributions
to public communication (Strydom 2004a: 7–8).
New Critical Theory and the Calling of Transformations
In his representation of resonance, Strydom uses the notion of
‘concentric circles’. But these circles are not interpenetrative. Fur-
thermore, in these models of concentric circles, there is no circle of
self. Strydom is part of the European Enlightenment tradition which
provides an automatic privileging of the public to the exclusion of
engagement with self. Here what Ramshrov Roy writes about polis
and self is helpful, he suggests that public order is threatened by the
split between:
man’s concern for his own good and that of the good of
others. But can this threat to the public order be miti-
gated, if not completely eliminated, by the installation of
the Polis? For Aristotle, transcendence of self-interest is
consequent upon participation in public affairs [but] the
shortcomings associated with personal character cannot
be expected to be rectified by the public realm, if it lacks
necessary support from individuals reborn as citizens. To
be reborn as a person who, rising above his self-interest,
becomes attentive to and actively seeks to pursue collec-
tive good, is, then, to willingly accept a life dedicated to
the cultivation of dharma (Roy 1999: 5).
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But the notion of ‘concentric circles’ is indeed a transformative
one and it helps us understand the simultaneous logic of autonomy
and interpenetration. In fact the participants in public communica-
tion, including the conditions of triple contingency, are not isolated
agents, the reciprocal perspectives that Strydom aspires to are pos-
sible because of an ontology of autonomy and interpenetration that
characterizes the fields that Strydom talks about. Thus Strydom
needs to transform his concentric circles into interpenetrative ones.
The public resonance that Strydom wants to generate needs adequate
self-development such as the capacity to listen and self-transform.
Just ‘performative competence’ to argue, in the public sphere, is
not enough for resonance to realize its potential. Without the self-
development of participating agents such as the capacity to listen
and to overcome one’s egocentric, ethnocentric and anthropocentric
perspectives public resonance as multi-dimensional striving cannot
really realize itself.
This calls for a multi-dimensional perspective which is in tune
with Strydom’s aspiration to go beyond any a priori and one-di-
mensional privileging. If socio-cognitive critique has to be open to
all contending frames and models of discursive articulations and
social constructions, then it needs a multi-valued logic instead of the
binary logic of ‘either-or’ which dominates modernist epistemology.
Strydom’s critical engagement strives to go beyond a simple ‘either-
or’ logic, for example the state versus social movements, in the field
of risk communication, but this could be further strengthened by
accompanying foundational efforts in a multi-valued logic which
relates to all the participants and their truth claims as ‘partly true,
partly false, and partly undecidable’ (Mohanty 2000: 24).
Multi-valued logic is based upon non-violence in ontology and
intersubjective relations and non-injury in modes of thinking, es-
pecially epistemic engagement. Multi-valued logic helps us in over-
coming epistemic violence, the violence we inflict upon reality which
is ontologically multi-dimensional where different dimensions are
related to each other in a spirit of autonomy and interpenetration.
Multi-valued logic is itself a work of ontological epistemology of
participation where epistemic engagement with the partial nature of
our truth claims, including the attribution of falsity, is accompanied
by appropriate ontological preparation which facilitates such an
epistemic engagement and modes of reasoning.
Strydom’s critical theory, like much of continental critical theory
such as Habermas’, is primarily epistemic. Like Habermas, Strydom
is open to pragmatics but is silent about ontology. His focus on
learning, especially collective and cooperative learning under con-
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ditions of ‘triple contingency’, intimates that learning is mainly an
epistemic process, but doesn’t it also involve ontological processes
of self-development and self-transformation? In this context, what
Ankersmit (2002) writes deserves our careful attention:
Nevertheless, becoming acquainted with the possibility
of many such points of view will, add each time, a new,
though tiny stone to the mosaic of our personality. And
in the end this cannot fail to have its effect on the kind
of person that we are (235).
Like much of modernist continental critical theory Strydom’s crit-
ical theory is silent on ontology but it is helpful here to take note
of the transformations that both epistemology and ontology have
undergone in recent times. In the field of epistemology we see a
move towards ‘virtue epistemology’ and in the field of ontology
towards varieties such as ‘practical ontology’ and ‘ontology of self-
expansion’. These transformations have helped us to go beyond
the dualism between epistemology and ontology and work towards
varieties of border-crossing of an ontological epistemology of par-
ticipation. Strydom’s critical theory of socio-cognitive critique can
realize its many promising potentials as well as overcoming some
of its understandable limitations, by exploring the pathways of the
emergent ontological epistemology of participation.
Strydom’s socio-cognitive critique rightly pleads for inviting a
multi-dimensional perspective, but such a mode of engagement
calls for an appropriate ontology of reality. I suggest that this is
an ontology of multi-dimensionality which is then, the following
diagram of the development of social movements at the same time,
an ontology of autonomy and interpenetration. Here we can take
Strydom’s own example in the field of a resonant public. To the
six circles that Strydom presents, let us add the circle of self and
present these seven circles not only as concentric circles but also
as interpenetrative circles. The ontology of the public consists of,
at least to begin with, these seven domains of vision and practice
characterized by a multidimensional ontology of autonomy and
interpenetration.
To elaborate this multidimensional ontology of autonomy and
interpenetration, let us take the example of self. Self has, at least,
three dimensions in its multi-planar existence – the unconscious, the
role player/techno-practitioner, and the transcendentally real self.
But how do they relate to each other? Does one totally exhaust
the other or is one opposed to the other? The relationship between
these dimensions is one of autonomy and interpenetration, i.e. these
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dimensions of subject exist as concentric and interpenetrative circles
having simultaneously an autonomous and relational existence. For
example, whatever we do as role occupants and technopractitioners
is influenced by both the dimensions of the unconscious and the
trancendentally real self. Building on transformations in psychoanal-
ysis and spiritual traditions of the world, Chitta Ranjan Das argues
that the Unconscious itself is the repository of not only the libido or
the irrational but also the highest possible in self, world and cosmos.
But neither of these exist in a situation of either-or; they do not
embody a dualistic logic nor can one be unproblematically reduced
to or subsumed under the other (for more on this see Giri 2004,
2007).
Trascendentally real
self
 
Technopractioner
"homo sociologicus"
Unconscious
For Strydom (2002), ‘socio-cognitive critique’ provides ‘epistemic
authority’ which is not only the exclusive possession of the so-
ciologist, it also animates all discerning participants. But how do
we come to terms with the possible dangers of authoritarianism in
epistemic authority? Does not epistemic authority invite a critique
and transformation, parallel to the critique of authorities that we
face in movements of transformations? Should it not be accom-
panied by an integrally connected move of epistemic humility? In
i
i
“criticalturns” –- 2009/6/9 –- 18:28 –- page 224 –- #266 i
i
i
i
i
i
224 CRITICAL TURNS IN CRITICAL THEORY
the context of this discussion it is important to acknowledge the
critique of ethnographic authority by George Marcus and Michael
Fischer and religious authority by those concerned with secularism,
spiritual transformations and critical philosophers such as Derrida
and Bhaskar.
An important challenge here is the challenge of participation?
How can our mode of critical engagement be simultaneously critical
and participatory while avoiding the pitfalls of a spectatorial and
judgmental critique from above or afar? Commenting on Habermas’
legitimationist approach to the public sphere where he already
identifies with normative social movements, Strydom (1999) writes:
‘Constructivism, by its very nature, forbids the social scientist to
adopt an identificatory procedure’(14). But Strydom still leaves
untouched the challenge of participation. In order that critique
can be transformative it needs to be simultaneously critical and
participatory and here the pathway of an ontological epistemology
of participation can suggest a way out to us. I have argued that an
ontological epistemology of participation can help both observing
social scientists and participating activists overcome their initial
arrogance and closure, transform their self-identity and learn with
each other (Giri 2004b).
Strydom’s concept of triple contingency urges us to realize the
third point of view. But what is the ontology of the third so that it
again is not related to the first and the second in a dualistic way and
with an a priori judgment? Furthermore, if the third point represents
only the observing third actor C, who is observing A and B? Do not
A and B have the need to also cultivate an observant self in their
own selves? For the realization of triple contingency we thus need to
cultivate a third observing mode of being both within the first and
the second. In this context the question that Bourdieu (2003) asks
of participant observation is relevant: ‘How can one be both subject
and object, the one who acts and the one who, as it were, watching
himself acting?’ (282). Bourdieu himself does not address this issue
and he is primarily confined within ‘epistemic reflexivity’ without
an accompanying ontological nurturance. But to be able to act and
observe one’s own action requires cultivation of what is called sakhi
purusha (witnessing self) in Indian spiritual traditions and what
Adam Smith (1976) calls ‘impartial spectator’. Triple contingency
has thus to overcome the dualism of action/argumentation and
observation and cultivate a third point of view of critical observation
and sympathetic participation in discursively engaged/active self and
society. This also calls for the cultivation of a space of transcendence
in self and in society so that critical observation is an integral part
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of self and society and that it does not have to come only from the
external observing agents.
Strydom’s socio-cognitive critique builds upon potentials in con-
temporary cognitive social theory. But if cognition is not related
again in a spirit of autonomy and interpenetration to other domains
of life such as emotion it can be limiting. In this context some of the
problems of Habermasian critical theory, such as the valorization
of discursive intersubjectivity without the nurturance of emotional
intersubjectivity, persist in Strydom’s socio-cognitive critique. There
is possibly an evolutionary challenge for humanity to combine cog-
nition with emotion and generate knowledge which also flows from
the feelings of our heart. A new critical theory could help us in this
evolutionary journey in self and society.
Strydom’s socio-cognitive critique emerges from the backdrop of
what he calls the contemporary experimenting knowledge society.
He urges us to understand plural knowledges in our contempo-
rary societies: scientific knowledge, legal knowledge, social knowl-
edge, cultural knowledge and democratic common sense (Strydom
2004b: 6). But we do not find self-knowledge here. Critical theory
involves a critique of knowledge and of power. But this critique also
involves a foundational critique of knowledge itself, for example,
knowledge not only as emancipatory but knowledge as binding. We
do not find a foundational critique of knowledge in either Stry-
dom or Habermas (cf. Giri 2004c). Such a foundational critique of
knowledge is suggested in the following lines of Ishopanishada–one
of the foundational texts of spiritual universality coming from India:
Andham Tamah Prabishyanti Jo AVidyam Upasate, Tato Vuya Ibate
Tamah Jo Vidyaam Ratah. It means: those who worship ignorance
are steeped in darkness but those who are steeped in knowledge are
also steeped in darkness. Critical theory also involves a foundational
critique of self, for example, a critique and transformation of the
limitations of our own egocentricity born of our confinement within
one dimension of self only – be it role occupant, unconscious or
transcendental.
Strydom urges us to understand the significance of responsibility
for sociology. But he discusses responsibility primarily as a frame
in tune with his cognitive sociology. But how do we cultivate
responsibility as modes of being and becoming in self and in society?
Here again, is responsibility only a matter of frame or framing or
does it also involve appropriate self-preparation? Furthermore, what
is the link between suffering and responsibility? For the embodiment
of responsibility are we not invited to co-suffer with our fellow
beings as Levinas and Gandhi, in their different ways, have urged
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us to realize (Giri 2002; van Ufford and Giri 2003)? In Strydom’s
co-responsibility we are called upon to embody it also through co-
suffering and thus contribute to mutual transformation and world
transformation.
The Calling of a New Critical Theory: Self-Development, Inclusion
of the Other and Planetary Realizations
Critical theory is not only an epistemic engagement, it is simul-
taneously an ontological engagement; it is a dynamic work of an
ontological epistemology of participation. Self-development is a ne-
glected theme in critical theory as it is in the broader discourse
of social theory and human development. Building upon the work
of savants and inspiring seekers such as Strydom we can work to-
wards a new critical theory, which contributes to and builds upon
self-development, inclusion of the other and planetary realizations.
Self-development here refers to multi-dimensional self-develop/-
ment of both the critics and the actors. What is self? Does self refer
only to the egoistic dimension of the individual? Does it mean only
homo sociologicus, homo economicus, or the ‘technopractitioner’?
Faubion (1995) presents this model of the subject building upon the
works of Habermas and Bourdieu. Self is all of these, but is not ex-
hausted by these. It has a transcendental dimension, a dimension of
transcendental and transversal connectivity to the other, to society,
to nature, to the world and to the cosmos, what Roy Bhaskar (2002a)
calls ‘transcendentally really self ’. Self-development means develop-
ment of all these dimensions of self in a spirit of autonomy and
interpenetration and non-dual realizations. Self-development thus
includes processes of capacity building in various techno-practical
fields of life such as economy, polity, organization, state, civil society
and now in the field of interlinked globality and a cosmic human-
ity. Self-development involves the capacity for freedom as well as
responsibility. In the economic field, it means gaining economic
independence and market freedom. In the political field it involves
the development of the capacity for appreciation for as well as
realization of rights, justice and citizenship and the deepening and
broadening of these from their earlier state-centeredness to fulfill
the needs of a global humanity.
An important challenge here is to overcome the binding of the
concentration of power and to strive towards the realization of
what Dallmayr (2001), building on Heidegger, calls ‘power free
existence’. This also involves a critique of the logic of sovereignty at
the level of self and nation-state and striving towards the realization
of shared sovereignties (Giri 2007b). This aspect of self-development
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has a long lineage in the philosophical and spiritual traditions of
the West and the rest of the world. Examples include the Christian
concept of ‘kenosis’ or self-emptying (Vattimo 1999; Wilfred 2000),
the Confucian emphasis on self-cultivation (de Barry 1991) and
Foucault’s (1986) plea for developing self-restraint on the part of
the holders of power. What Toynbee (1956: 74) writes deserves our
careful attention:
In human life, Suffering is the antitheses of Power, and
it is also a more characteristic, and more fundamental
element in Life than Power is. Suffering is the essence
of Life, because it is the inevitable product of an un-
resolvable tension between a living creature’s essential
impulse to try to make itself into the center of the Uni-
verse and its essential dependence on the rest of creation
and on the Absolute Reality on which all creatures live
and move and have their being. On the other hand,
human power, in all its forms is limited and, in the last
resort, illusory. Therefore any attitude towards Life that
idolizes human power is bound to be a wrong attitude
towards Suffering and, in consequence, a wrong attitude
towards Life itself (Toynbee 1956: 74).
The project of self-development is linked with a project of inclusion
of the other which in Habermas’ recent formulations is not just
universalistic but also sensitive to difference, defending ‘a moral-
ity of equal respect and solidaristic responsibility for everybody’
(Habermas 1998: 5). But both the project of self-development and
inclusion of the other can be locked in a self-justificatory closure,
for example authenticity in the case of the former, and emanci-
pation in the case of the latter. For example, the movement of
self-study in India, Swadhyaya, can do a lot in terms of inclusion
of the other, especially those of low-caste (Giri 2007c). Similarly,
the project of inclusion of the other as articulated by Habermas
needs a lot more self-development in order that it can realize its
own aspiration of respecting the otherness of the other. A case in
point is Habermas’ approach to other religions. Habermas writes in
his Religion and Rationality: ‘We no longer confront other cultures
as alien since their structures still remind us of previous phases of
our own social development. What we do encounter as alien within
other cultures is the stubborn distinctiveness of their religious cores’
(Habermas 2002a: 156). When pressed to the limits, despite his post-
metaphysical thinking, Habermas acknowledges the significance of
the Judaeo-Christian tradition for the project of modernity but he
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seems not to offer the same acknowledgment of other traditions
such as Buddhism. Inclusion of the other is thus a multi-dimensional
process of dialogue and transformations involving dialogues across
cultures, religions and civilizations. It also involves initiatives and
struggles to build inclusive economies, polities, and communicating
publics from the local to the global. In his critical theory Strydom
is concerned about inclusion of the other and this concern can be
further realized by taking part in trans-civilizational dialogues and
related processes of transformations.
Today self-development and inclusion of the other must include
planetary realizations. Alberto Melucci writes in his The Playing
Self: Person and Meaning in the Planetary Society:
We live on a planet that has become a global society.
An ecology of economic, political, and technological
choices cannot operate independently of an ecology of
the everyday, of the words and gestures with which we
call into being or annihilate the inner planet. To pay
attention and respect to details; to be aware that we are
part of a whole and we need to connect the different
elements into this whole, to value the path and not only
the end (1996: 69; emphases added).
Planetary realizations are not unitary and simplistic processes: they
involve complexity, difference and uncertainty which demand from
‘individuals the capacity to change form (the literal meaning of
metamorphosis)’ (Melucci 1996: 2–3). Planetary realizations also
involve realization of the inner planet ‘consisting of the biological,
emotional and cognitive structures that underlies the experience and
relations of us all’ (56).
Strydom’s reflections on risk, environment and responsibility
can be looked at from this emergent calling of planetary realiza-
tions which involves transformation of anthropocentrism and post-
national transformations. Critical theory as planetary realizations
also involves trans-civilizational dialogues and planetary conversa-
tions about the foundational assumptions and themes of critical
theory such as justification, argumentation, human interest and
triple contingency learning.
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